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Executive summary
Broadly speaking, macroeconomic stabilization policy entails the design and implementa­
tion of fiscal an d /o r m onetary instrum ents in such a way as to ensure macroeconomic 
outcomes converge to their targeted levels within some reasonable time period. W hether 
this can be achieved depends on m any factors, including the structu re  of the economy, 
the nature of underlying disturbances, the set of objectives, the effectiveness in policy im­
plem entation and the appropriateness of the instrum ents. Keynes’ (1936) General Theory 
explained how fiscal and m onetary policy can be used to end depressions. Over time, many 
have viewed this as an argum ent for stabilization policy itself -  Keynesian economics. While 
the literature has largely focused on the closed economy setting, this thesis aim s to provide 
a deeper understanding of the role of m onetary policy as a stabilization tool in a small open 
economy.
This thesis includes four case studies. The first study looks at the im portance of time- 
inconsistent policy for New Zealand and how this notion has led to a num ber of interesting 
insights regarding the central bank’s behavior and institutional design. The resu lts indicate 
that the size of the stabilization bias is nearly twice as large for a small open economy 
(SOE) relative to that usually found for closed economies. The results also indicate th a t the 
size of the stabilization bias is increasing with the policymaker’s preference for stabilizing 
exchange ra te fluctuations.
The second case study tries to uncover the underlying macroeconomic stabilization ob­
jectives for Australia, C anada and New Zealand, and to see how this can be used to enhance 
the transparency and accountability in the im plementation of m onetary policy. The esti­
mated policy preference param eters suggest the three central banks are very sim ilar in their 
overall objective. None show a concern for stabilizing the real exchange rate and all three 
share a concern for minimizing the volatility in the change in the nominal interest rate.
The third case study examines the sources of business cycle fluctuations, in particular, 
the role of international shocks for Australia. In contrast to previous VAR studies, inter -
iv
national factors are found to contribute to over half of the ou tput forecast errors whereas 
dem and shocks have relatively m odest effects.
The fourth case study examines possible changes to the international transm ission 
m echanism  in the case of U.K over the period 1975 to 2005. In the period before 1990 
the response of the domestic economy resem bles a classic beggar-thy neighbor scenario, 
with increases in foreign money supply resulting in a fall in U.K. real activity. W hereas, for 
the period after 1990, the results suggest a foreign m onetary policy easing has substantially  
different effects on the U.K. In this later period, the response is positive bu t insignificant.
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1.1 R esearch q uestion
"1 \  ROADLY SPEAKING, m acroeconom ic stab ilization  policy en ta ils  the design and  im-
J _ß  p lem entation  of fiscal a n d /o r  m onetary  in s tru m e n ts  in  su ch  a w ay a s  to en su re
m acroeconom ic outcom es converge to th e ir targeted  levels w ith in  som e reasonab le  tim e 
period. W hether th is  can  be achieved depends on m any  factors, includ ing  the  s tru c tu re  
of the  economy, the n a tu re  of underly ing  d is tu rb an ces , the  se t of objectives, the effective­
n ess  of policy im plem entation  and  the ap p ro p ria ten ess  of the  in s tru m e n ts . Keynes’ (1936) 
General Theory explained how fiscal and  m onetary  policy can  be u sed  to end depressions. 
Over tim e, m any have viewed th is  a s  an  a rg u m en t for stab ilization  policy itself -  Keyne­
sian  econom ics. T his th es is  prim arily focuses on the  role and  u se s  of m onetary  policy a s  a  
stabilization  tool in a sm all open econom y (SOE).
The K eynesian’s view h a s  no t been  w ithou t sc ru tin y  in the  lite ra tu re . F riedm an (1962) 
in h is  book Capitalism  an d  Freedom  a rgued  th a t active countercyclical policy can n o t affect 
the average level of unem ploym ent and  ou tp u t. L ucas an d  S argen t (1979) w ent further, 
con tending  th a t it is no t only im possible to increase  the  average level of o u tp u t, it is also 
im possible to stabilize it. More recently, Lucas (1987, 2003) h a s  argued  th a t even if s ta b i­
lization policies are effective, they w ould yield negligible w elfare gains and  hence it should  
not be a  m acroeconom ic priority.
L ucas’s conclusion h a s  failed to influence the  practice. Policies focusing on o u tp u t and  
price stability  have long been  explicit o r im plicit objectives of m onetary  policy in m any 
industria lized  coun tries. Increasingly, the  app roach  is being adopted  by developing and
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emerging m arket economies.
At the end of the 1970’s, inflation had risen to very high levels across most industrial 
countries. In contrast, today most of these countries have inflation around or close to the 
2 percent level with relatively low volatility. A result m any would argue as being consistent 
with price stability. One concern might be that the low and stable levels of inflation may 
have been achieved at the expense of higher ou tput volatility, bu t this has not been the case. 
Since the mid-1980’s, the volatility of ou tput and inflation has declined substantially  across 
OECD countries, a phenom enon known as the “great m oderation”. In addition, the level and 
persistence of inflation has stayed around historical lows. Many studies have docum ented 
reduced-form evidence in support of this observation. For example Kim and Nelson (1999), 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), and Cogley and Sargent 
(2005) in the case of the U.S., Benati (2006) for the U.K, and Sum m ers (2005) for major 
industrialized countries. However, the issue related to the causes and consequences of 
these changes have been more controversial.
A large literature has examined changes to the m onetary transm ission m echanism  d u r­
ing the great moderation, and conclusions are mixed. Cogley and Sargent (2002), and 
Clarida et al. (2000) lend support towards the hypothesis th a t changes in the U.S. m acroe­
conomic dynamics were linked to changes in macroeconomic stabilization policies, “good 
policy”. On the other hand, Primiceri (2005), Sims and Zha (2006), and Gambetti et al. 
(2008) are more sym pathetic to the idea that it is the absence of adverse non-policy shocks 
th a t contributed to the great moderation “good luck”.
The curren t global financial crisis has ignited the great m oderation debate and the role of 
m onetary policy in stabilizing the business cycle. Arguably, the recent events point to more 
evidence in favor of the good luck hypothesis. Many may even argue th a t the unusually  
low world wide interest rates at the beginning of this decade may have contributed to the 
excessive credit expansion th a t proceeded the crisis. This is an interesting and im portant 
area of research that will no doubt dominate the macroeconomic research agenda for years 
to come. It is im portant to stress that this thesis primarily focuses on the role of monetary 
policy in stabilizing the business cycle, it does not try to address the relative im portance of 
good policy versus lower macroeconomic disturbances in explaining the great moderation.
While the literature has largely focused on the closed economy setting, this thesis pro­
vides a deeper understanding on the role of monetary policy as a stabilization tool for small 
open economies. International trade and financial m arket integration induce additional
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constrain ts for the SOE’s stabilization problem. First, the inter dependence with the rest of 
world can alter the fundam ental tradeoffs among the various objectives (or target variables). 
Second, there can be additional policy objectives beyond output and inflation stability, for 
example, exchange rate stability. Third, foreign disturbances may be completely outside 
the control of domestic stabilization policy instrum ents.
This thesis focuses on these very issues. C hapter (3) looks at the im portance of time- 
inconsistent policy for New Zealand and how this notion has led to a num ber of interesting 
insights regarding the central b an k ’s behavior and institutional design. C hapter (4) uncov­
ers the underlying macroeconomic stabilization objectives for three of the earliest inflation 
targeters: Australia, C anada and New Zealand. In particular, the role of exchange rate s ta ­
bilization in the policy m akers’ objective function. Chapter (5) examines the sources of Aus­
tralia’s business cycle fluctuations focusing on the role of international shocks. Chapter (6) 
investigates changes to the international transm ission m echanism  of foreign disturbances 
for the U.K from 1975 to 2005.
The empirical analysis presented in this thesis is primarily focused on four SOEs -  
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and U.K. Although, the methodologies developed here can 
be easily related or applied to other SOEs.
1.2  M ethods o f in v estig a tio n
The analysis contained in this thesis relies heavily on the use of s tructu ral and empirical 
macroeconomic models. Earlier policy oriented models developed in the 1960s, such as 
the MIT-Penn-SSRC model used by the Federal Reserve, were based on long-run tradeoffs 
between unemployment and inflation. It was not until the 1970s th a t the concept of acceler­
ationist Phillips curve was formally introduced, bu t expectational elements were still largely 
missing. The next generation of macro models incorporated the im portance of expectations 
in the determ ination of real activity and inflation (Bryant et al., 1993, provide an excellent 
overview of these earlier models). Since then, these models have become workhorse models 
for policy analysis in central banks and government institutions around the world.1
More recently, the focus has shifted towards building models with stronger micro­
foundations. This approach builds on two recent developments in the literatures, namely
'Examples are the QPM model at the Bank of Canada by Coletti et al. (1996), and the FPS model at the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) by Black et al. (1997a).
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real business cycle models and New Keynesian theory. These models emphasize the con­
cepts of optimizing representative agents and the role of nominal rigidities. They are often 
referred to as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Subsequently, a 
large literature has surfaced with the aim of bringing these models closer to the data (see 
Sm ets and Wouters, 2003; Ireland, 2004; Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez, 2005; Lubik and 
Schorfheide, 2007, for example).
This thesis m akes extensive use of new open economy models with a slight preference 
for sm aller and more tractable model structure. There are several advantages in adopting 
this approach. First, rich m icro-foundations embedded in DSGE models m ake the policy 
conclusions more robust to the Lucas Critique. Second, advances in econometric knowledge 
has allowed for a more efficient param eterization of the model with respect to the historical 
data. Third, it enhances the ability to perform various counter-factual analysis. Lastly, 
these models explicitly incorporate assum ptions about future expectations and how they 
are formed.
However, DSGE models are often described as too “rigid” when taken to the data. In 
addition to DSGE models, part of the analysis is based on more flexible econometric tech­
niques such as vector autoregression (VAR) and factor-augm ented VAR models to uncover 
the sources business cycle fluctuations and the international transm ission of shocks.
1.3  Sum m ary o f k ey  resu lts
C hapter (3) uses a fully specified DSGE model to explore the relationship between a central 
ban k ’s policy objectives and the size of the stabilization bias. The model is estim ated using 
data  from New Zealand. The resu lts indicate th a t the size of the stabilization bias is nearly 
twice as large for a small open economy (SOE) relative to that usually found for closed 
economies. The results also indicate th a t the size of the stabilization bias is increasing with 
the policymaker’s preference for stabilizing exchange rate fluctuations.
Chapter (4) estim ates the underlying structu ral macroeconomic stabilization objectives 
of three of the earliest explicit inflation targeters within the context of a SOE DSGE model. 
The central banks are assum ed to set policy optimally and the policy objectives are reverse 
engineered from observed time series data. Jo in t tests of the policy preference param eters 
suggest that central banks are very sim ilar in their overall objective. None of the central 
banks show a concern for stabilizing the real exchange rate. All three central banks share
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a concern for minimizing the volatility in the change in the nominal interest rate. It also 
shows that the resulting optimal policy rule responds to exchange rate movements, even in 
the case where the central banks do not explicitly care about exchange rate stabilization. 
This result is also corroborated by results from an alternative sim ple-rule characterization 
and estim ation of central bank  behavior. These last two findings point to the pitfalls of 
making inferences, from the level of ad-hoc simple rules, about w hat central banks may 
care about.
Chapter (5) examines the sources of A ustralia’s business cycle fluctuations. The cyclical 
component of GDP is extracted using the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition and a structu ral 
VAR model is identified using robust sign restrictions derived from a structu ra l small open 
economy model. In contrast to previous VAR studies, international factors are found to 
contribute to over half of the ou tpu t forecast errors w hereas dem and shocks have relatively 
modest effects.
Finally, chapter (6) extends the open economy FAVAR models with time-varying coeffi­
cients and stochastic volatility to examine possible changes to the transm ission of foreign 
money supply, dem and and supply shocks to the U.K. The proposed model captures the 
changing co-movements among the macroeconomic time series by allowing their depen­
dence on common factors to evolve over time. It also allows for stochastic volatility in the 
innovation process of the factors. The m ain resu lts are as follows: A foreign m onetary 
policy easing has substantially  different effects on the U.K. in the period after 1990. In 
particular, the response of the domestic economy in the period before 1990 resem bles a 
classic beggar-thy-neighbor scenario, with increases in foreign money supply resulting in 
a fall in U.K. real activity. In the later period, the response was positive bu t insignificant. 
O ur estim ates a ttribu te this to a fall in exchange rate pass-through to relative prices. A 
foreign aggregate dem and shock had a large positive im pact on U.K. GDP during the years 
1980-1990, bu t its impact in the more recent period has been substantially  smaller. For­
eign supply shocks were im portant for U.K. inflation during the 1970s and the persistence 
of the inflation response has also been smaller since the early 1980s.
1.4  T h esis structure
Each of the subsequent chapters in the thesis is self-contained and is organized as fol­
lows. Chapter (2) introduces the notion of stabilization policy, and d iscusses the recent
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developments in the area of open economy macroeconomic models and how these have 
been used in the policy process. It identifies rem aining issues in the curren t literature and 
discusses how this thesis contributes to the ongoing debate. Chapter (3) investigates the 
size of the stabilization bias using New Zealand as a case study to explain why m ost SOE’s 
choose to adopt inflation targeting. Chapter (4) estim ates the macroeconomic objectives, 
and their relative tradeoffs, for Australia, C anada and New Zealand. Chapter (5) examines 
the sources of business cycle fluctuations focusing on the role of international shocks for 
Australia. C hapter (6) uses an  open economy FAVAR model with time-varying coefficients 
and stochastic volatility to examine changes to the international transm ission mechanism  
of international shocks for the U.K. C hapter (7) concludes on the m ain findings and offers 




2 .1  Introduction
INCE THE early 1990’s, m any coun tries have adopted  inflation targeting  as the ir form al 
fram ew ork for m onetary  policy. The regim e is u sua lly  characterized  by: (1) an  explicit 
and  publicly announced  inflation target, e ither in te rm s of an  in terval or a point target: 
(2) a  high degree of tran sp aren cy  an d  accountability : and  (3) a  relatively high degree of 
operational independence.
These cen tral b an k s  form ulate policy in a forward looking m a n n e r an d  co n stru c t condi­
tional inflation forecasts a s  an  in term ed ia te  ta rget to guide policy se ttings. In the process, 
they rely heavily on large-scale m acroeconom ic m odels, for exam ple the  Q uarterly  Project 
Model (QPM) model a t the  B ank of C an ad a  by Coletti et al. (1996), th e  Forecast Projection 
System  (FPS) model a t the  Reserve B ank  of New Z ealand by B lack et al. (1997a), and  the 
B ank of England Q uarterly  Model (BEQM) a t th e  B ank of E ngland by H arrison  et al. (2005). 
On the o ther han d , s ta tis tica l m odels su ch  a s  vector au to reg ression  (VAR) m odels are  heav­
ily u sed  to help gauge th e  q uan tita tive  im pact of various s tru c tu ra l d is tu rb an ces  on the 
m acroeconom y.
This ch ap te r provides an  overview of recen t developm ents in the  a rea  of open econ­
omy m acroeconom ic m odels and  how these have been used  in the policy process. Section
(2.2) d iscu sses  the objectives of m acroeconom ic stab ilization  policy and  a  brief overview 
of the  cu rren t in stitu tiona l fram ew ork for a  few selected sm all open econom ies. Section
(2.3) reviews the  recent developm ents in s tru c tu ra l open econom y m odeling and  estim ation  
techn iques are  d iscussed  in section (2.4). Section (2.5) looks a t an  a lternative  approach  in 
u sing  VAR m odels. Section (2.6) concludes.
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2 .2  M acroeconom ic stab iliza tion  policy
Macroeconomic stabilization policy can be broadly summarized as methods to mitigate 
short-run business cycle fluctuations around some long-run growth path using different 
policy instruments. Two policy tools are often emphasized in the literature: fiscal policy -  
the way that governments choose aggregate expenditure and tax collection; and monetary 
policy -  the way central banks change the amount of money supply via the price of money 
-  interest rates. Both of these are very powerful tools at the disposal of policymakers. This 
thesis will primarily focus on the study of monetary policy for small open economies.
The motivation behind the need for stabilization policy is simple. A risk averse agent 
would prefer a deterministic consumption path relative to a risky one with the same mean. 
Therefore, appropriate stabilization policy set up to help smooth an agent’s consumption 
path can be viewed as welfare improving. To illustrate this, consider the following simple 
stylized example set out in Lucas’s 2003 AEA Presidential address. Assuming a single 
consumer is endowed with the following stochastic consumption stream:
Aeßte~?°2e 1 (2 . 1)
where // is the deterministic growth rate of consumption, and log(ct) is normally distributed 
with mean of 0 and variance a2. The mean consumption level at time t is, E(ct) = ct = Aeßt. 
The agent’s lifetime utility function of current and future consumption path is assumed to 
be:
c 1 - 7ct
7
(2.2)
where ß is the discount factor and 7 is the coefficient of risk aversion. One can measure the 
difference in lifetime utility for the risk averse agent between the stochastic consumption 
path of ct and the deterministic path ct such that:
(2.3)
where A represents the welfare gain from eliminating consumption risk. Taking logs, can­
celing and collecting terms gives:
(2.4)A = - 7a2 
2 '
This compensation parameter depends on the degree of risk aversion, 7 , and the amount of
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volatility th a t is present, a 2. One can think th a t a 2 com prises two parts: a “non-removable” 
component th a t is purely exogenous and a “removable” com ponent th a t depends on the 
structu re of the economy and its transm ission m echanism . Stabilization policy does not 
aim to eliminate all the volatility associated with consum ption. However, appropriate s tab i­
lization policy can alter the way shocks are transm itted through the economy to help reduce 
the volatility of consum ption. There are debates to exactly how m uch of the volatility can 
be attenuated. Lucas (1987, 2003) argues this may in fact be very small, yielding negligible 
improvements in welfare. However, Akerlof and Yellen (2004), and Barlevy (2005) provide 
alternative estim ates and evidence to suggest Lucas’s conclusion maybe misleading.
2 .2 .1  O bjectives o f m onetary policy
In the last two decades, m any central banks have begun concentrating on price stability 
and inflation control as their main policy objective. A num ber of central banks have for­
mally adopted inflation targeting as the framework for the operation and implementation of 
m onetary policy. Moreover, m any countries recognize the importance of tim e-inconsistent 
policy following the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983), 
and have subsequently  changed their institutional framework to reflect this. These changes 
em phasize the im portance of implementing m onetary policy in a credible, accountable and 
transparen t m anner.
2 .2 .1 .1  T im e-in co n sisten t p o licy
Considered as one of the key developments in macroeconomics (Chari and Kehoe, 2006), 
Lucas (1976) famously argued that preferences and technology are invariant to policy, b u t 
private agents’ behavior are not -  the Lucas critique. In m ost cases, agents’ current deci­
sions depend on their expectations of what future policies will be, and policy m akers m ust 
take those expectations into account when formulating curren t and future policy.
Consider the following simple example. At the beginning of the period, wage setters 
choose the nominal wage followed by the m onetary authority  choosing the rate of inflation. 
If inflation is higher than  what wage setters expected, the real wage will fall inducing firms 
to dem and more labour, and output is higher than  its natural rate. Once wages are set, 
there is a great deal of incentive for the m onetary authority  to choose a higher inflation rate 
and therefore higher output. W ithout commitment, the m onetary authority’s claim to keep
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inflation low is time inconsistent and not credible. Agents will take this into account when 
setting wages, the result will be higher inflation than  optimal and output rem aining at its 
natural level -  this is known as the discretionary inflation bias.
This insight has shifted m uch of the focus from the operational side of m onetary policy to 
the design of institutional frameworks aimed at mitigating the time inconsistency problem. 
Rogoff (1985) proposed delegating the role of setting inflation to an  independent authority 
to solve the inflation bias problem. Since then, the study of commitment and discretionary 
m onetary policy has been extended from the static framework to incorporate realistic per­
sistence in ou tpu t and inflation. This requires m onetary policy to be conducted in a forward 
looking m anner with substan tial effects on the equilibria. Svensson (1997) dem onstrates 
discretionary policy can lead to a stabilization bias m eaning th a t inflation volatility is too 
high, and output volatility is too low relative to the com m itm ent equilibrium .1 The size of 
the stabilization bias represents the degree of inefficiency in the economy due to imple­
menting m onetary policy in a time inconsistent m anner. C hapter (3) evaluates the size of 
the stabilization bias for New Zealand and illum inates on why m any SOEs choose to adopt 
inflation targeting.
2 .2 .1 .2  Inflation  targeting
Many countries have changed their institutional framework in apparen t recognition of the 
time inconsistency problem. Three im portant institutional changes are especially evident 
in practice. First, central banks have become substantially  more independent from political 
authorities in their decision m aking and their operation. Second, central banks have placed 
a lot more em phasis on price stability as their prim ary policy objective. Third, central banks 
have adopted a more transparen t strategy for com m unicating the context and rationale of 
policy choices to the public. For m any countries, these institutional changes are explicitly 
reflected in the legislative framework.
By 2002, 22 countries had formally adopted inflation targeting as their m onetary pol­
icy framework (Truman, 2003).2 These countries are all SOEs, ranging from developed 
economies to emerging m arket economies and the num bers are expected to grow over time.
'The stabilization bias differs from the inflation bias in the sense that it still occurs even when the monetary 
authority targets the natural level of output.
2Thc countries, listed by the date in which inflation targeting was adopted arc as follows (and in some cases 
readopted): 1989, New Zealand: 1990, Chile: 1991, Canada and Israel: 1992, the United Kingdom; 1993, Australia, 
Finland, and Sweden; 1995, Spain and Mexico; 1997, Czech Republic and Israel (again); 1998, Poland and Korea; 
1999, Brazil, Chile (again), and Colombia; 2000, Thailand and South Africa; 2001, Hungary, Iceland, and Norway; 
2002, Peru and the Philippines.
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They all openly pub lish  th e ir  inflation target and  m ost of them  have a g reat deal of op era­
tional independence from th e  governm ent. F u rtherm ore , m any cen tra l b a n k s  th a t have not 
form ally adopted  the fram ew ork, for exam ple the  US Federal Reserve, have been influenced 
by the app roach  one way or the  other.
The fram ew ork, referred to a s  constrained discretion  by B ernanke  (2003), tries to strike  
the  right ba lance  betw een s tric t policy ru les  and  p u re  policy d iscretion . U nder su ch  a 
fram ework, th e  cen tra l b a n k ’s prim ary  focus w ould be inflation. However, given inflation 
and  fu tu re  inflation expectations are u n d e r  control, policy m ak ers  can  still stabilize o u tp u t 
(and its o th er policy objectives) in the face of sh o rt-ru n  d is tu rb an ces . One m ay argue  th a t, 
it would be easier for the  cen tra l b an k  to m ain ta in  its  o ther policy objectives w hen  inflation 
expectations are  b e tte r anchored .
Figure (2.1) d isplays th e  inflation experience for four SOEs th a t  have adopted  inflation 
targeting: A ustralia , C anada , New Z ealand and  the  U.K.3 The four pane ls of Figure (2.1) 
show  the ra te  of inflation before and  after the  im plem entation  of inflation targeting  m arked  
by a vertical line. A cross th e  four coun tries, inflation fell su b stan tia lly  in all the  coun tries 
following the  adoption  of th e  inflation target. R esearchers con tinue  to debate  w hether th is  
decline w as solely due to the  change in policy. However, there  is c o n sen su s  th a t inflation 
targeting  played a  crucial role in the  decline.
In practice, inflation targeting  often involves se tting  b a n d s  of acceptab le  inflation ra te s  
and  also a list of o th er secondary  policy objectives. Athey et al. (2005) co n stru c t a  m odel 
w here the  m onetary  au th o rity  h a s  private inform ation ab o u t the  econom y an d  show  th a t 
optim al policy does allow for lim ited d iscretion  w ith in  a specific range of inflation ra tes. 
Athey et a l.’s analysis  does provide a theoretical ra tionale  for th e  inflation  targeting  b an d s  
seen in practice.
In the  case of New Z ealand, the first coun try  to adop t inflation targeting , the  policy 
objectives are  explicitly se t ou t in the Policy T arget A greem ent (PTA) betw een the B ank  and  
the  M inister of F inance w ith an  inflation b an d  cu rren tly  betw een 1-3%.
“In pursuing its price stability objective, the Bank shall implement monetary policy in a 
sustainable, consistent, and transparent manner and shall seek to avoid unnecessary in­
stability in output, interest rates and the exchange rate.”4
3A1 though the U.K. is the sixth largest economy in term s of total GDP, it is considered to be a sm all open 
economy here because economic developm ents in the U.K. have negligible im pacts on the world economy.
4 Extract from Section 4(b) of the PTA aggrem ent, 2008, available on the RBNZ website:
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/pta/.
11
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the U.K., the price stability objective is also made explicit in the m onetary policy 
framework.
"The first objective of the central bank is to safeguard the value of the currency in terms of 
what it will purchase at home and in terms of other currencies. In May 1997 the Government 
gave the Bank operational independence to set monetary policy by deciding the short-term 
level of interest rates to meet the Government's stated inflation target - currently 2%.”5
As part of the inflation target, the government also set a range for acceptable fluctuations 
in inflation. If inflation moves outside its target range, the Governor is required to write an 
open letter to report on the causes for this deviation, the corrective policy action the Bank 
plans to take, and the time period within which inflation is expected to re tu rn  to its target 
range.
In Canada, the main goal is also to keep inflation within a certain target range. In terest­
ingly, the Bank of Canada also express explicit preference for a symmetric target.
“The cornerstone of the Bank’s monetary policy framework is its inflation-control system, the 
goal of which is to keep inflation near 2 per cent -  the mid-point of a 1 to 3 per cent target 
range. The Bank is equally concerned with significant movements in the inflation rate, both 
above the 2 per cent mid-point and below it.”6
Similar target band is set in Australia while allowing for natu ral short-run  variation in 
inflation over the business cycle.
“In pursuing the goal of medium-term price stability, both the Reserve Bank and the Govern 
ment agree on the objective of keeping consumer price inflation between 2 and 3 per cent, 
on average, over the cycle. This formulation allows for the natural short-run variation in 
inflation over the cycle while preserving a clearly identifiable performance benchmark over 
time.”7
As argued by Svensson (1999), inflation targeting in practice is never “strict” inflation 
targeting bu t always “flexible” inflation targeting. That is, central banks do not only aim to 
stabilize inflation around the target, b u t also pu t some weight on stabilizing other m acroe­
conomic variables such as real ou tput and full employment. The price stability objective is
5Bank of England website:
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/corepurposes/monetary_stability.htm.
6Bank of Canada website:
http://www.bank-banque-Canada.ca/en/monetary/monetary.html.
7 Reserve Bank of Australia website:
http://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-4-06122007.html.
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usu a lly  explicitly specified and  revealed publicly, however, o ther m acroeconom ic stab iliza­
tion objectives and th e ir relative im portance are  never elucidated . C h ap te r (4) identifies 
the  m acroeconom ic objectives, and  th e ir relative tradeoffs, for th ree  of the  earliest explicit 
SOE inflation targeters: A ustralia , C anada  and  New Zealand. The re su lts  show  all th ree  
cen tra l b a n k s  sh a re  a  concern  for m inim izing the  volatility in the  change in the  nom inal 
in te re s t ra te . It also show s th a t the resu lting  optim al policy ru le  re sp o n d s to exchange rate  
m ovem ents, even in the case w here the  cen tra l b a n k s  do not explicitly care  ab o u t exchange 
ra te  stabilization .
2 .2 .2  Optimal m onetary policy
The s tu d y  of d iscretion  v e rsu s  com m itm ent in m onetary  policy h a s  helped prom ote the 
u se  of policy ru les to m inim ize the tim e inconsistency  problem . H enderson  and  McKibbin 
(1993), an d  Taylor (1993) proposed a  sim ple m onetary  reaction  function  th a t  responds to 
ch an g es in the price level, o u tp u t a n d /o r  incom e.8 T hese sim ple reaction  functions had  
been  docum ented  to provide an  excellent fit to ac tu a l policy behavior, see C larida et al. 
(1998, 2000), and  Taylor (1999) for the  case of the  U.S., P lan tier and  Scrim geour (2002) 
for th e  case  of New Zealand, de B rouw er and  G ilbert (2005) for A ustralia , and  R am ayandi 
(2007) for five ASEAN coun tries. U sing a m edium  scale estim ated  DSGE m odel, Adolfson 
et al. (2008) concludes p a s t policy of the  R iksbank  tend  to be b e tte r explained by sim ple 
ru les  ra th e r  th an  optim al policy u n d e r com m itm ent.
More recently, the  lite ra tu re  h as  devoted m ore a tten tio n  to the  s tu d y  of optim al policy 
ru les  ra th e r  th an  sim ple policy reaction  functions. A n u m b er of im p o rtan t im plications 
em erge from the work of C larida et al. (1999) for a  closed econom y. F irst, optim al policy 
em beds inflation targeting  in a sense  th a t calls for g radual a d ju s tm en t to th e  optim al in ­
flation ra te . Second, th e  nom inal in te rest ra te  should  a d ju s t m ore th a n  one-for-one w ith 
expected inflation. Third, m onetary  policy can  com pletely offset dem and  sh ocks b u t supply  
side sh o ck s create a sh o rt-ru n  tradeoff betw een inflation and  o u tp u t variability. Finally, the 
optim al policy depends critically on the degree of p ersistence  in bo th  inflation and  o u tpu t.
C larida et al. (2001) ex tends the d iscussion  to a SOE fram ework. In terestingly , the SOE 
m odel (under certa in  assum ptions) can  be reduced  down to a tw o-equation  rep resen ta tion  
(New K eynesian Phillips Curve and  IS-type dem and equation) sim ilar to the  closed econom y
se tu p . In su ch  a case, th e  policy problem  for th e  SOE is isom orphic to the  policy problem
8These simple reaction functions are often referred to in the  literature as Taylor-type reaction functions.
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for the closed economy in Clarida et al.’s model. Hence, all the qualitative results from the 
closed economy carries over to the SOE’s case. However, the degree of openness does affect 
the param eters of the model suggesting a quantitative difference.
In the open economy, a rise in domestic real interest rate induces an  appreciation of the 
term s of trade th a t lowers domestic dem and via the expenditure switching effect. Chapter 
(6) investigates this transm ission channel for the U.K and found significant changes to the 
international transm ission of foreign m onetary policy shocks. A higher degree of openness 
helps strengthen the effect of interest rate changes on domestic output. Under certain 
param eter restrictions, Gali and Monacelli (2005) show th a t domestic inflation targeting is 
superior to both CPI targeting and an exchange rate peg. The intuition is th a t the excess 
sm oothness in the nominal exchange rate implied by both CPI targeting and the exchange 
rate peg, combined with the assum ed inertia in nominal prices, prevents relative prices 
from adjusting sufficiently quickly in response to changes in relative productivity. This 
causes a significant deviation from the first best allocation.
Moving away from Clarida et al., and Gali and Monacelli’s restrictive setup, Monacelli 
(2005) introduced deviations from the law of one price for import prices, by allowing for 
incomplete exchange rate pass-through. This bears im portant implications for the design 
of the optimal m onetary policy. First, incomplete pass-through alters the canonical form 
of the two-equation NK model, and the isomorphic feature between the closed and open 
economy model is lost. Second, the analysis of m onetary policy for an  open economy is 
fundam entally different from th a t of a closed economy. Allowing for deviations from the 
law of one price generates an  additional endogenous short-run  tradeoff between stabilizing 
inflation and the ou tput gap. Third, optimal commitment policy entails a sm oother law of 
one price gap, hence less volatile exchange rate fluctuations relative to the discretionary 
outcome. However, the simple Gali and Monacelli and Monacelli (2005) framework does not 
allow for imported interm ediate goods as in McCallum and Nelson (1999) which might be 
im portant for SOEs. Chapter (3) provides further discussions on the effects of incomplete 
pass-through and its implications for the size of the stabilization bias.
2 .2 .3  B usiness cycle  flu ctu ation s
Stabilization policies are often aimed at mitigating short-run cyclical (or business cycle) 
fluctuations from some long-run trend. However, determ ining which part of output varia-
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tions can be attributed to the cycle and which part to the trend, is not an easy task. Canova 
(1998) provides an excellent review of the various detrending/filtering methods along with 
discussions on their advantages and disadvantages. The problem comes down to trying to 
identify two separate components simultaneously, the trend and the cycle, from a single 
observed time-series. The alternative detrending methods differ with respect to their iden­
tifying assumptions. One common feature, at least with statistical filters, is that the filters 
remove certain frequencies of the underlying data while amplifying the power of others. 
The result is smoother cyclical fluctuations that look more like “business cycles”. However, 
high frequency fluctuations induced by frequent economic shocks may also be of economic 
interest from a stabilization policy point of view.
Economists have developed a number of procedures to overcome the weakness of sta­
tistical filters. This often involves applying detrending techniques based on some economic 
model. First is the common component approach. King et al. (1991) propose a model where 
the long-run properties of the endogenous variables, such as consumption, real output and 
investment etc, are driven by a common trend, i.e.: a non-stationary technology shock. 
More recently, Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) propose a two-country model where output in 
both countries are driven by a common non-stationary technology shock.
The easiest way to calculate such a decomposition is to estimate a vector error correc­
tion model (VECM) and use the cointegrating vector’s residuals as the cyclical component. 
The Beveridge Nelson decomposition essentially does the same thing by assuming a non- 
stationary shock that drives the trend of output. Another approach is to calculate the cycli­
cal component using the Kalman Filter by assuming some simple structure of the underly­
ing economy. For example, consider that output yt is made up of a trend, rt = 7  + rt_i + 77*, 
and a cyclical component, ct . Assuming the underlying economy is described by a simple 
purely backward looking Phillips Curve such that inflation is nt = + ßct + t t , where
7/e and ct are i.i.d noise terms and cov(r)t ,(.t) = 0. One can estimate the parameters q, ß, 
av and at given observations for yt and nt , and use the Kalman filter to back out ct as the 
cyclical component. The resultant cyclical component will be consistent with some notion 
of “non-inflationary output gap” measure. The main drawback of using these methods is 
that the estimates of the trend and cycle differ under different economic specifications.
Figure (2.2) plots the cyclical component of GDP data for Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand and the U.K. using four different statistical filers: the HP filter with A = 1600, the 
fourth order difference (annual percentage change), a linear filter and a quadratic trend.
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As emphasized earlier, depending on the filtering method, the resu ltan t cyclical behavior 
can be quite different. Furtherm ore, the second m om ent of the cycles varies greatly across 
these detrending methods.
This thesis acknowledges the difficulties and the non-uniqueness problem with extract­
ing the “trend” and “cycle” from a single time-series. Alternative detrending m ethods can 
potentially provide a different window through which economists examine the data. It is an 
ongoing debate as to which one of these windows is the correct one, or more interesting one 
to look through. Throughout this thesis, where appropriate, the discussion of the results 
will include some sensitivity analysis with respect to the different detrending methods.
2 .3  New open  econ om y m acroecon om ics
Many inflation targeting economies are small open economies with alm ost free capital mo­
bility, where shocks originating from the rest of the world are im portant, and the exchange 
rate plays a prom inent role for macroeconomic stabilization policy aimed at mitigating b u si­
ness cycle fluctuations. The literature on new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) rep­
resent attem pts to formalize the analysis of exchange rate determ ination and international 
interdependence in the context of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models.
In contrast to the M undell-Fleming-Dornbusch type models, NOEM offers a more rig­
orous treatm ent of the underlying m icrofoundations for welfare analysis and policy dis­
cussion. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), to be discussed later in more detail, is commonly 
recognized as the contribution that launched this new wave of research. However, several 
previous studies in this area are also worth mentioning. Svensson and van Wijnbergen 
(1989) present a stochastic, two country, sticky price model with m icrofoundations em bed­
ded in an intertem poral optimizing setting. McKibbin and Sachs (1989) develop a similar 
m ulti-country model that incorporates richer dynam ics to address several im portant policy 
questions such as the effects of alternative exchange rate arrangem ents, different m one­
tary policy rules, and international transm ission of shocks focusing on inter-country de­
pendence.9 Models with rigorous m icrofoundations can also be found in previous studies, 
notably Stockm an (1980), Lucas (1982), Backus et al. (1992, 1994), among others. Lane 
(2001) and Sarno (2001) provide a more in depth discussion of this literature.
9A sum m ary of the resu lts  and policy d iscussions are collected in McKibbin and Sachs (1991).
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2 .3 .1  The R edux m odel
The baseline Redux model proposed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) is a two country, Dy­
namic General Equilibrium (DGE) model that allows for nominal price rigidities, im perfect 
competition, and a representative agent th a t produces and consum es. Each agent pro­
duces a single differentiated good. All agents have identical preferences, characterized by 
an intertem poral utility function th a t depends positively on consum ption and real money 
balances b u t negatively on work effort; effort is positively related to output. There are two 
im pedim ents to international trade: the law of one price (LOP) holds across individual goods 
and purchasing power parity (PPP) holds for a basket of goods across the two countries. As 
a result, LOP and PPP imply a constan t real exchange rate (RER) and any tem porary varia­
tions in the RER are expected to revert back to its long-run level.
Assum ing perfect capital m arkets and only one internationally traded risk-less asset, 
agents maximize lifetime utility subject to their budget constrain ts (identical for dom estic 
and foreign agents). Utility maximization gives three fundam ental first order conditions 
(FOCs). The first is the standard  intertem poral Euler equation, which relates the marginal 
utility of consum ption to the real in terest rate. The second condition is the money m arket 
equilibrium  condition th a t equates the marginal rate of substitu tion between consum ption 
and real money balances, to the opportunity cost of holding money (the nom inal in terest 
rate).10 The third condition requires th a t the marginal utility from producing an  extra un it 
of ou tpu t (the real wage) is equal to the marginal disutility of effort, the classic labor-leisure 
tradeoff equation.
The s tru c tu re  of the price setting m echanism  is relatively simple in the baseline Redux 
model. Firm s sim ultaneously set prices one period in advance. As a result of th is fairly 
arbitrary assum ption, all adjustm ents are completed after one period. With sticky prices, 
m onetary policy can have real effects in the short-run. A domestic m onetary expansion 
will lower the nom inal interest rate and the exchange rate depreciates via the uncovered 
in terest parity (UIP) condition. Domestic goods become relatively cheaper com pared with 
foreign goods, generating a tem porary increase in dem and for domestically produced goods 
and hence higher ou tpu t - this is the expenditure switching effect. On the production side, 
monopolistic producers will set prices above the marginal cost and it is profitable to m eet 
the unexpected dem and at the prevailing price level given the fixed wage cost.
10The representative agent directly benefits from holding money in the utility function but loses the interest rate 
on the riskless bond as well as the opportunity to eliminate the cost of inflation.
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The literature has largely focused on the two country version of the model, which al­
lows for explicit analysis of international interdependence and endogenous determ ination 
of in terest rates and asset prices. However, this comes a t a considerable cost in term s of 
model complexity that may not be of great im portance in analyzing SOEs. Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995) also presented a simple example of a SOE model where ou tput is separated 
into tradable and nontradable goods. Both of these enter into the consum er’s sub-utility 
function via log separable preferences. In this simple model, monopolistic competition only 
exists in the nontradable goods sector, whereas the tradable goods sector is characterized 
by a single homogenous product that sells for the sam e price in the perfectly competitive 
world m arket.1 1 Unlike the two country Redux model, the discount rate is tied down by the 
level of world interest rate (exogenous to the SOE) implying a flat optimal consum ption path 
for tradable goods. In th is case, exchange rate overshooting may occur. Since m onetary 
shocks do not produce a curren t account imbalance, money is neutral in the long run and 
the nominal exchange rate changes are proportionate to the change in the money stock. 
If the elasticity of money dem and is less than  1, the nominal exchange rate overshoots its 
long-run level following relative money supply shocks.
Lane (1997) applies this SOE model to examine discretionary m onetary policy and the 
im pact of openness (proxied by the relative size of the tradable sector) on the equilibrium 
inflation rate. A more open economy with a larger tradable sector gains less from “s u r ­
prise inflation” because the ou tput gain from the m onetary expansion is only limited to the 
nontrabable sector where nominal rigidities exist. However, the SOE-Redux model used in 
Lane’s (1997) analysis does not account for imperfect exchange rate pass-through from 
nom inal rigidities. Chapter (3) extends Lane’s analysis to an empirical DSGE model with 
nominal rigidities in both domestically produced and imported goods. The case study tries 
to further understand the natu re of the policy tradeoffs, and the size of the stabilization 
bias for a SOE relative to its closed economy counterpart.
2 .3 .2  Workhorse New K eynesian open econ om y m odel
Subsequent work on NOEM has modified or extended many of the assum ptions and fea­
tu res of the baseline Redux model largely motivated by the need to m atch the historical 
data. This subsection reviews some of the key contributions of this growing literature.
1 'The domestic price of tradable goods is equal to the exogenous world price multiplied by the nominal exchange
rate.
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2 .3 .2 .1  N om inal r ig id ities
The baseline Redux model assum es prices are sticky for only one period. There has been a 
growing em phasis on both nominal price and wage rigidities. Hau (2000) considers the case 
where prices are flexible bu t nominal wages are predeterm ined. Each household supplies 
a differentiated labor input and monopolistic firms set prices as a constant m arkup over 
the wage. As a result, optimal prices will inherit the stickiness from predeterm ined wages 
and rem ain fixed in the short-run. Labour m arket rigidities produce the sam e international 
transm ission effects as price rigidity in the baseline Redux model.
Many NOEM models have introduced the staggered price assum ption first suggested by 
Calvo (1983) to capture the smooth, ra ther than  discrete, aggregate price level adjustm ents. 
Calvo price setting assum es in any period t, only a fraction of the firms are able to reset 
their prices optimally, while others keep their prices fixed. The opportunity to adjust prices 
arrives stochastically for each firm is independently across the firms and time. As a re ­
sult, the aggregate price level is a smooth variable and changes only gradually over time. 
Kollman (1997) uses a model with sticky prices and wages to explore the behavior of the 
exchange rates and prices in response to m onetary policy shocks. The results suggest that 
Calvo-type nominal rigidities are better in m atching the high serial correlation of nominal 
and real exchange rates, and the gradual adjustm ent of the price level. However, it does 
less well in m atching the cross correlations of ou tput with other macroeconomic variables. 
Andersen (1998) points out that staggered wages can generate more persistence than  stag­
gered prices.
While staggered prices and wages can generate smooth and gradual adjustm ents of the 
price level, they fail to account for the smooth and persistent behavior of inflation. To cap­
ture this, the standard  Calvo mechanism  is modified to allow for non-optimizing firms to 
index their prices with some reference to past inflation rates, see Woodford (2003), Smets 
and Wouters (2003), and Christiano et al. (2005). In addition to the popular Calvo-type stag­
gered prices, Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2007), Ball et al. (2005) and Arslan (2008) hypothesize 
th a t the observed inflation inertia comes from sticky information ra ther than  sticky prices. 
Nevertheless, both sticky prices and sticky information generate sim ilar functional form for 
the inflation process. This is often referred to as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), 
which represents a crucial building block in m odern macroeconomic models.
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2 .3 .2 .2  Im perfect exchange rate pass-through
The discussion in the previous subsection largely focused on the role of nominal rigidities 
in dom estic product and factor m arkets. The overall price level in an open economy also 
includes imported goods. In m ost industrialized countries, imported goods make up a 
significant proportion of the consum er’s consum ption basket, see the import-to-GDP ratio 
for selected countries in Table (2.1). Jap a n  has the sm allest import-to-GDP ratio of 11% 
followed by the US with 17%, while Luxembourg’s ratio is over 150%. Most of the inflation 
targeting countries have an  import-to-GDP ratio between 30-50%.
For an  open economy, it is useful to distinguish the difference in the source of nomi­
nal rigidities between domestically produced and imported goods. For example, Monacelli 
(2005) allows for monopolistic competition in the importing sector. While competition in the 
world m arket may bring import prices close to the marginal cost a t the “dock”, bu t monop­
olistic im porters can set final prices away from the world price to generate a wedge across 
countries. Rigidities in the importing sector gives rise to incomplete exchange rate pass­
through which has im portant implications for the central bank’s stabilization problem.
2 .4  Towards new  open  econ om y m acroecon om etrics
Empirical studies in the area of open economy analysis have largely focused on trying to 
distinguish between various competing assum ptions, either via calibration or direct econo­
m etric investigation (or a combination of the two). More recently, the focus has shifted 
slightly towards building models with a better empirical fit to complement existing tools for 
policy evaluation and forecasting analysis. This section provides an overview of this rich 
literature focusing on the estim ation and evaluation of DSGE models.
2 .4 .1  Param eter calibration and estim ation
Earlier open economy analysis follows the RBC literature quite closely in parameterizing 
the model. This usually involves first specifying a collection of empirical regularities (“styl­
ized facts”) th a t the model is designed to account for. A set of s tructu ral param eters is 
choosen to m atch a subset of these stylized facts, then conditional on the model’s param ­
eterization, verify whether the model can replicate other empirical regularities in the data. 
One such  criterion is to m atch the unconditional m om ents generated by the model to the
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uncond itional m om ents observed in the  d a ta  a s  in C hari et al. (2002) for an  open econom y 
model.
A lthough useful in gain ing em pirical insigh ts, th is  app roach  does no t provide an  overall 
evaluation  of model fit and  it is difficult to form ally a s se ss  its  s ta tis tica l validity. More 
recently, m ethods have been  developed to confront th e  m odel directly w ith the data . This 
thesis  focuses on two p o pu lar estim ation  p rocedures: m axim um  likelihood estim ation  and 
B ayesian estim ation .
The m axim um  likelihood estim ation  (MLE) ap p ro ach  utilizes all the  inform ation available 
from the  d a ta  and  inference on the m odel’s p a ram ete rs  can  be directly  ob tained  from the 
likelihood function. Exam ples in u sing  MLE for e s tim ating  DSGE m odels include Ireland 
(1997, 2004), Schorfheide (2000), F ü h re r  (2000) an d  C hristiano  et al. (2005). U nfortu­
nately, num erica l m axim ization  of th e  likelihood is often very difficult in  prac tice  due to 
the identification problem s in h eren t in  DSGE m odels and  non linearity  in p aram eters . For 
exam ple, two s tru c tu ra l p a ram ete rs  th a t en te r the  m odel only proportionally  will no t be 
recoverable, and  the  likelihood function  will be “flat” in som e d im ensions of the  param eter 
space. To cope w ith th e  problem , re sea rch ers  often fix a su b se t of the  p a ram ete rs  and  
try  to estim ate  the  rest. C anova an d  Sala  (2006) provide a m ore detail d iscussion  of the 
identification issu e  in DSGE m odels.
The u se  of B ayesian m ethods h a s  becom e very p o p u la r following the  w ork of Sm ets and  
W outers (2003), R abanal an d  R ubio-Ram irez (2005), an d  Lubik an d  Schorfheide (2005, 
2007). A review of the  lite ra tu re  can  be found in An an d  Schorfheide (2007). The idea 
behind  B ayesian analysis  is to com bine the  inform ation con ta ined  in the d a ta  (likelihood 
function) w ith prior inform ation  (prior d istribu tion) in th e  estim ation  of the  param eters . 
Inference is based  on the  posterior d is trib u tio n  of the  m odel (the likelihood w eighted by the 
prior d istribu tion) and  various s ta tis tic s  of in te rest, su ch  a s  IRFs, can  be sim ula ted  from 
the  posterior d ra w s .12 A nother often cited advan tage  of u sin g  B ayesian  m ethods is th a t the 
posterior d is trib u tio n  provides a probabilistic  rep resen ta tio n  of the pa ram ete r and  model 
space. On th e  p ractical front, adding  p rio rs in troduce  “c u rv a tu re ” into the  objective function 
m aking m axim ization of the  posterior m u ch  easier th a n  the  likelihood function  alone. Case 
s tu d ies  p resen ted  in C h ap te rs  (3) an d  (4) m ake extensive u se  of th is  estim ation  m ethod.
However, B ayesian  m ethods also suffer from several d raw backs. F irst, a tightly  specified
l2Usually no closed form is available for calculating the posterior distribution, instead, it is simulated using the 
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
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prior can  in fact p roduce a well behaved posterior d istrib u tio n , even if the  likelihood func­
tion h as  little inform ation, giving the econom etrician  th e  illusion th a t h e /s h e  have collected 
useful evidence, i.e. a very sm all s ta n d a rd  erro r for th e  estim ated  coefficient. Second, em ­
ploying prior d is tribu tions th a t do no t tru ly  reflect th e  existing location uncerta in ty , m ay 
hide identification problem s. Third, it is often difficult to ob tain  good inform ation  to build  
the  priors on, choosing them  arb itrarily  defeats the p u rp o se  of u sin g  any  prior a t all.
2 .4 .2  Model com parison and evaluation
The u ltim ate  goal of w orking w ith DSGE m odels is to provide reliable q uan tita tive  answ ers 
to su b stan tiv e  econom ic policy questions. In add ition  to the  ability to correctly  estim ate  the 
underly ing s tru c tu ra l pa ram ete rs  (model estim ation), a n o th e r challenging ta sk  is the  ability 
to d istingu ish  com peting theories and  m odel a ssu m p tio n s  to a s se ss  the fit of the  underly ing  
m odel (model evaluation).
The first approach  is to a sse ss  th e  abso lu te  m odel fit based  on the  predictive density  
of the  m odel - the  classical approach . If the d a ta  lies in th e  ta ils  of the  m odel’s predictive 
d istribu tion , th is  serves as evidence ag a in st th e  c u rre n t model relative to o th e r a lternatives. 
O ther diagnostic  s ta tis tic s  su ch  a s  th e  m odel’s uncond itional m om ents, au to  and  cross 
co rrelations are  also useful. Lees e t al. (2007) u se  th is  stra tegy  to a sse ss  the  em pirical fit 
of an  estim ated  DSGE-VAR model.
The second app roach  is based  on the  posterio r odds (the ra tio  of the  m arginal d a ta  
densities m ultiplied by the prior odds) of various com peting m odels. R esearchers can  place 
prior probabilities on com peting m odels, and  a sse ss  a lternative  specifications u sin g  the  
posterior odds. The m arginal d a ta  density  can  be approx im ated  using  Geweke’s (1999) 
modified harm on ic  m ean  estim ator. C h ap te r (4) m ak es u se  of th is  app roach  to a sse ss  
w hether exchange ra te  m ovem ent en te rs  the  cen tra l b a n k ’s objective function.
2 .5  S ta tistica l VAR m odels
Two d istin c t ap p ro ach es to m acroeconom ic an a lysis  em erged d u rin g  the early 1980s and  
co n tin u es to drive the lite ra tu re  today. One app roach  follows th e  work of Kydland and  
P rescott (1982) in using  DSGE m odels w hich were d iscu ssed  in section  (2.4) . The a lte rn a ­
tive follows the  work of S im s (1980) in characteriz ing  the co-m ovem ents in key aggregate 
variab les u sin g  VAR m odels. Both of these  ap p ro ach es have th e ir  d is tinc t s tren g th s  and
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weaknesses. DSGE models for instance, are constructed based on firmly grounded micro- 
founded economic theory. These models generally draw a tight link between the structural 
parameters and the time-series behavior of aggregate macroeconomic variables. However, 
DSGE models are often described as too “rigid” when taken to the data. VAR models, on 
the other hand, tend to be more flexible and can be easily estimated to help address a 
wide range of policy questions. Examples of VAR studies include Cushman and Zha (1997), 
Monticelli and Tristani (1999), Dungey and Pagan (2000), Buckle et al. (2002), Faust and 
Rogers (2003), and Farrant and Peersman (2006).
2 .5 .1  Iden tification  problem s
The flexibility of VAR models also poses important drawbacks. VAR specifications often 
require little, if any, reference to detailed economic theory. As a consequence, results are 
often hard to interpret and difficult to relate back to the underlying economic question. 
Many studies have tried drawing closer links with economic theory to identify the shocks 
of economic interest. However, this remains a controversial topic, where different iden­
tifying assumptions can lead to quite different conclusions. Several recent papers in the 
international transmission literature have proposed alternative identification structures in­
cluding, amongst others, the recursive schemes in Grilli and Roubini (1995), Eichenbaum 
and Evans (1995), and Faust and Rogers (2003), the non-recursive schemes in Cushman 
and Zha (1997), Dungey and Pagan (2000), Kim and Roubini (2000), and Kim (2001).
To see where the problem lies, consider the following general VAR(p) model with n vari­
ables Yt:
BYt = A{L)Yt. 1 + et (2.5)
where: A(L) = A\L + ■ ■ ■ + APLP is an pth order matrix polynomial: B is an (n x n) matrix 
of coefficients that reflect the contemporaneous relationships among Yt \ and et is a set of 
(nx 1) normally distributed structural disturbances with mean zero; and variance covariance 
matrix E, E,j  = 0 Vz ^ j.  The structural representation in Equation (2.5) has the following 
reduced form:
Yt = U{L)Yt-!+et (2.6)
where 1I(L) = B~l A(L) and et is a set of (n x 1) normally distributed reduced-form errors 
with mean zero and variance covariance matrix V, ^ 0 Vz, j. The identification procedure
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involves mapping the statistical relationships sum m arised by the reduced form errors et 
back into economic relationships described by et . Let P = B~ x. The reduced form errors are 
related to the structural d isturbances in the following m anner:
et =  Pet and V = E{ete't ) = HH'  (2.7)
for some matrix H such th a t HH'  = PEP1. An identification problem arises if there are 
not enough restrictions to uniquely pin down H from the matrix V.13 However, there are an 
infinite num ber of ways in which this orthogonality condition can be achieved. Let H be 
an orthogonal decomposition of V = II II ' . The multiplicity arises from the fact th a t for any 
orthonorm al m atrix Q (where QQ’ =  /), such th a t V = HQQ'H'  = HH' is also an admissible 
decomposition of V.
One example is the Choleski factor of V, where II =  chol(V) and the set of economic d is­
turbances is et — HeL. Another example of such orthogonal representation is the eigenvalue- 
eigenvector decomposition of V = PAP' =  HH',  where T is a m atrix of eigenvectors and A 
is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. In which case, H = PA1/2, need not be a lower trian ­
gular matrix. This decomposition does not have any economic content, b u t nevertheless, 
produces a set of uncorrelated shocks et = Het , w ithout imposing zero-type restrictions. It 
is obvious th a t different decompositions will produce a different set of structu ra l d is tu r­
bances, and hence a different vector moving average (VMA) represen ta tion .14
Another approach is to impose the DSGE restrictions directly on the VAR’s IRFs, Chapter 
(5) investigates the validity of this proposal using the sign restriction method. Some earlier 
studies have attem pted this, though using a slightly different approach. McKibbin et al. 
(1998) use the McKibbin-Sachs Global (MSG2) model to restrict the long run  behavior of 
a VAR while the short run  features are left unconstrained. Peersm an and S traub (2004) 
use a calibrated RBC model to derive sign restrictions to help identify technology shocks. 
Dungey and Fry (2009) uses similar methodology to identify both m onetary and fiscal policy 
shocks. In term s of methodological contribution. Chapter (5) tries to identify a full set of 
domestic and international shocks, and dem onstrates how to impose the SOE assum ption 
using the sign restriction identification scheme. The resu lts show th a t international factors 
contribute over half of the ou tput forecast errors w hereas dem and shocks have relatively 
modest effects.
13There are n 2 unknow ns elem ents in II with only n(n + l) /2  unique elem ents in V.
14Typical sum m ary sta tistics from VAR stud ies are usually  functions of the underlying VMA representation.
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2.5.2 Large information set
Most of the contributions discussed above were based on VAR models with only a few se­
lected variables. Arguably, central banks across the world monitor (and possibly respond 
to) a far wider information set than typically assum ed in these sm all-scale VARs. To over­
come this, Boivin and Giannoni (2008), and Mumtaz and Surico (2009) extend the Factor- 
Augmented VAR (FAVAR) model proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005) to the open economy 
setting. The FAVAR model helps address the limited information problem, in particular, 
M umtaz and Surico (2009) found many of the open economy anomalies disappear when a 
large panel of data  is used. However, a common assum ption is th a t both the stochastic 
driving process’s volatility and the nature of co-movement among the variables does not 
change over tim e.15
Many studies have docum ented significant declines in the ou tput and inflation volatility 
since the m id-1980’s, a phenom enon known as the “great m oderation”. In addition, the 
level and persistence of inflation has stayed around historical lows. Therefore, it is u n sa tis ­
factory to simply assum e the size and the transm ission mechanism  of international shocks 
has not changed over th is period. Chapter (6) extends the open economy FAVAR models 
with time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility to examine possible changes to the 
international transm ission m echanism.
2 .6  C onclusion
This C hapter provides an overview of the motivations and objectives behind macroeconomic 
stabilization policies, focusing on the role of monetary policy. The theoretical literature has 
advanced quickly in the last 10 years to provide a class of open economy models. At the 
sam e time, the empirical literature has also kept pace with the theoretical developments to 
provide a set of tools for estim ating and comparing various quantitative models. Although 
challenges rem ain, these developments have provided researchers and policymakers with 
an  useful set of tools to tackle im portant policy questions. This thesis utilizes these tools to 
address the stabilization problem related to small open economies.
15Boivin and  G iannoni (2008) estim ates the model over two sub-periods by introducing a dum m y variable.
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Table 2.1: Export and import ratio for OECD countries in 2005
COUNTRY Imports to GDP ratio COUNTRY Imports to GDP ratio
Australia 0.30 Korea 0.45
Austria 0.52 Luxembourg 1.51
Belgium 0.86 Mexico 0.37
Canada 0.41 Netherlands 0.71
Czech Republic 0.88 New Zealand 0.43
Denmark 0.48 Norway 0.32
Finland 0.38 Poland 0.37
France 0.30 Portugal 0.42
Germany 0.38 Slovak Republic 0.94
Greece 0.27 Spain 0.37
Hungary 0.92 Sweden 0.41
Iceland 0.48 Switzerland 0.43
Ireland 0.82 Turkey 0.39
Italy 0.26 United Kingdom 0.34
Ja p an 0.11 United S tates 0.17
Figure 2.1: Annual change in inflation for inflation targeting (IT) countries
U.K. Canada
IT period ->





IT period -> IT period
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Figure 2.2: B u sin ess  cycle u sin g  various filtering m ethods
U.K. Canada
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Chapter 3
S tabilization  bias fo r  a small 
open  ec o n o m y : T he  ca se  o f  New  
Zealand
Abstract*
Using a a fully specified DSGE model, this paper explores the relationship be­
tween a central bank’s policy objectives and the stabilization bias. The model 
is estim ated using data  from New Zealand. Results indicate th a t the size of the 
stabilization bias is nearly twice as large for a small open economy (SOE) relative 
to th a t usually found for closed economies. The results also indicate that the 
size of the stabilization bias is increasing with the policymaker’s preference for 
stabilizing exchange rate fluctuations.
3.1  In troduction
T  \  OMER 1993 highlighted an im portant empirical regularity th a t the average rate of in- 
JL v>»flation is a decreasing function of trade openness. Römer a ttribu tes this to the higher 
cost of discretionary m onetary policy in a more open economy. Since then, the study of 
commitment and discretionary m onetary policy has moved beyond the static framework to 
incorporate realistic persistence in output, inflation and other nom inal rigidities. This p a ­
per investigates the possible links between policy objectives and the size of the stabilization 
bias for a small open economy (SOE).
This is potentially interesting for several reasons. The analysis uses an estim ated dy­
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to provide a realistic estim ate of the
*An earlier version of Chapter (3) was previously published as “Gains From Commitment Policy For A Small 
Open Economy: The Case Of New Zealand", CAMA Working Paper 2006-25.
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size of the  stabilization  b ias for an  ac tu a l econom y. The evidence can  be used  a s  a possible 
explanation  for the m otivation beh ind  why m any  SO Es have chosen  to adopt inflation t a r ­
geting .1 Insigh ts from the analysis  are  also linked to th e  influential work by Röm er (1993) 
and  it ex tends the  d iscussion  to a fully dynam ic optim izing fram ework.
While the lite ra tu re  h a s  largely focused on the  case of a  closed econom y, the  s tab iliza­
tion problem  faced by a SOE cen tra l b a n k  differs in two im po rtan t d im ensions. F irst, in 
addition  to dom estic supply  an d  dem and  shocks, the  SOE is also sub jec t to various foreign 
d is tu rb an ces. Second, the  exchange ra te  im plies an  additional tran sm issio n  channe l for 
m onetary  policy a s  well as  an  ind irect channe l for the  tran sm issio n  of foreign shocks to the 
dom estic economy.
C larida et al. (2001) u se  a sim ple canonical New K eynesian m odel to show  th a t the SO E’s 
optim al m onetary  policy design problem  is isom orphic to th a t of a  closed economy. T h a t is, 
the  n a tu re  of the underly ing o u tp u t and  inflation tradeoff rem ains the  sam e. More recently, 
Monacelli (2005) po in ts ou t th a t th is  is no longer tru e  once incom plete p ass-th ro u g h  in 
im port prices is incorporated  into th e  model. Allowing for incom plete p ass-th ro u g h  b ea rs  
im portan t im plications for th e  design of the  optim al m onetary  policy. D eviations from the 
law of one price (or p u rch asin g  pow er parity) g enera tes an  additional endogenous short- 
ru n  tradeoff betw een stabilizing inflation and  th e  o u tp u t gap. In an  a ttem p t to fu rth e r 
u n d e rs tan d  the n a tu re  of th is  policy tradeoff, two key q u estions a re  s tud ied  in th is paper: 
the  em pirical im portance of th e  size of the  stabilization  b ias for a SOE; and  the  relationsh ip  
betw een the stabilization  b ias  and  policy objectives of th e  cen tra l bank .
A n um ber of em pirical s tu d ie s  have exam ined the  size of the  stab ilization  b ias a s  a  proxy 
for the costs of d iscretionary  policy relative to the  com m itm ent case  (pre-com m itm ent).2 
D ennis (2004b) m easu res  the  im provem ent from pre-com m itm ent u sing  C larida et a l.’s 
(1999) closed econom y m odel to be betw een 0% to 11%; E h rm an n  and  S m ets (2003) u se  a 
New Keynesian m odel ca lib rated  to th e  E uro  a rea  an d  m easu re  the  gains from com m itm ent 
to be betw een 17% and  31%. Using the  injlation equivalent m easu re , D ennis and  S ö d er­
ström  (2006) consider four m odels estim ated  u sin g  US d a ta  and  find the size of the b ias 
ranges from 0 .05  to 3 .6  percen tage po in t of inflation. D ennis and  S öderström  also s tre s s  
the  size of the stabilization  b ias  depends critically on the  m odel as  well a s  the underly ing
'Since the 1990's many SOEs have adopted an institutional framework that emphasizes inflation targeting. No 
country that has adopted it has abandoned it (Truman, 2003), and the numbers are expected to grow.
2The terms “stabilization bias" and “gains from pre-commitment", measured as the difference in the loss func­
tion between commitment and discretion equilibrium, are used inter-changeably.
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param eters describing the economy. Lees (2007) estim ates the size of the stabilization bias 
for New Zealand to be around 1 percentage point.
Open economy empirical findings so far, such as Lees (2007), are based on models that 
lack rich microfoundations. These features are now crucial building blocks in modern 
workhorse macroeconomic models for policy analysis. This paper presents a fully specified 
DSGE model estim ated using New Zealand data as the vehicle for discussion. As a point of 
departure, the paper also provides an empirical distribution for the size of the stabilization 
bias as opposed to ju s t a point estimate.
New Zealand was the first country to explicitly adopt an inflation targeting framework 
under the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Act in 1989 with the aim of bringing infla­
tion down to a specific target range. The establishm ent of the Act generated a great deal of 
in terest among both policy m akers and researchers in the early 1990s. In addition to the 
inflation target, the Policy Target Agreement (PTA) was updated in 1999 to reflect the desire 
to minimize unnecessary variations in the exchange rate as well as variations in output 
and interest ra tes.3 This legislative framework closely resembles the literature on modeling 
the behavior of a central bank using a loss function. While the quantitative results drawn 
here are specific to the case of New Zealand, insights and the policy discussions are also 
applicable to other SOEs.
Two interesting results emerge from the analysis. First, the estim ated size of the s ta ­
bilization bias for a SOE is found to be nearly twice as large relative to th a t usually found 
in the closed economy counterpart. As the economy becomes more open, the cost of dis­
cretionary policy relative to commitment equilibrium is higher. Second, the size of the 
stabilization bias increases with the policymaker’s preference for stabilizing exchange rate 
fluctuations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section (3.2) outlines the small open economy model. 
Section (3.3) discusses the estim ation methodology and describes the data. Section (3.4) 
p resen ts the param eter estim ation results. Section (3.5) estim ates the size of the stabiliza­
tion bias together with some policy discussions. Finally, Section (3.6) contains concluding 
rem arks.
3See section 4(c) of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand PTA, 1999.
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3 .2  A sm all open  econ om y m odel
This section describes the key structural equations implied by the model proposed by Gali 
and Monacelli (2005) and Monacelli (2005). The model’s dynamics are enriched by allowing 
for external habit formation and indexation of prices, as in Smets and Wouters (2003), and 
Christiano et al. (2005).
3 .2 .1  H ouseholds
The economy is inhabited by a representative household who seeks to maximize:
E o Y lßt{U {C t ) -V ( N t)} (3.1)
„»-je
where ß is the rate of time preference, o is the inverse elasticity of intertem poral su b stitu ­
tion, and is the inverse elasticity of labour supply. Nt denotes hours of labour, and hCt-\  
represents habit formation for the optimizing household, for h e [0, 1]. Ct is a composite 
consum ption index of foreign [CF t) and domestically (CH,t) produced goods defined as:
Ct = ( l - a ) i c ^  + a i c ^ (3.2}
where a e [0, 1] is the import ratio m easuring the degree of openness, and ?/ > 0 is the 
elasticity of substitu tion between home and foreign goods. The household’s maximization 
problem is completed given the following budget constrain t a t time t:
fJ o {Ph,t(i)Ch,t(i) + PF,t(i)CF,t(i)}di + Et{Q/.,*+iDt+i} < Et + IVtNt (3.3)
for t =  1,2,. ..,oo, where and ) denote the prices of domestic and foreign good
i e [0, 1] respectively, Qt,t+i is the stochastic discount rate on nominal payoffs, Dt is the 
nominal payoff on a portfolio held at t -  1 and Wt is the nominal wage.4
Solving the household’s optimization problem yields the following set of first order con­
ditions (FOCs):
W t
(Ct -  h C t - x ) - * = N? (3.4)
r t
4The consum ption basket is aggregated over all i goods, i G [0, 1].
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ßBtE, Pt (  Ct+\ -  hCt 1 (3.5)
Pt+i \C t — hCt -1
w here Rt = \ / E tQt,t+\ is th e  g ross nom inal re tu rn  on a risk less one-period bond m atu ring
1
in l + 1 an d  Pt =  [^ (1 -  1 " is the  C onsum er Price Index (CPI). The in tra ­
tem poral optim ality  condition  (3.4) s ta te s  th a t the  m arg inal u tility  of consum ption  is equal 
to the  m arg inal value of lab o u r a t any  one po in t of time; (3.5) gives the E u ler equation  for 
in te r tem poral co n sum ption .
H ouseho lds in th e  foreign econom y are  assu m ed  to face exactly the sam e optim ization 
problem  w ith identical p references. The only difference being th a t  the  influence from the 
o th e r econom y is negligible.O ne can  arrive a t a  sim ilar se t of optim ality  conditions describ ­
ing the  dynam ic b eh av io u r of key v ariab les in th e  foreign econom y. Foreign sec to r variables 
a re  deno ted  by  *.
3 .2 .2  Inflation , th e  real exchange rate and term s of trade
T h ro u g h o u t th is  paper, th e  a ssu m p tio n  of the law of one price (LOP) holds for the export 
sector, b u t incom plete p a ss - th ro u g h  for im port prices is allowed. The m otivation behind 
th is  a ssu m p tio n  is th a t th e  sm all open econom y is a  price tak e r w ith little bargain ing  power 
in the in te rn a tio n a l m ark e ts . For its export bundle , prices are  determ ined  exogenously in 
the  re st of th e  world. On th e  im port side, com petition in the  world m ark e t b rings im port 
p rices close to the  m arg inal cost a t the  w holesale level, b u t rigidities arising  from inefficient 
d is trib u tio n  netw orks an d  m onopolistic  re ta ilers  allows dom estic retail im port prices to 
deviate from  th e  world price. B u rste in  et al. (2003) provide a sim ilar a rgum en t, w hich is 
su p p o rted  u s in g  U nited S ta te s  (US) data .
The terms of trade (TOT) a re  defined a s  St =  (or in logs st =  PF,t -  PH,t)-5 Log- 
linearizing th e  CPI fo rm ula  a ro u n d  th e  steady  s ta te  and  tak in g  the first difference yields 
th e  following iden tity  link ing  CPI-inflation, dom estic inflation (ttha) and  the  change in the 
TOT:
Ast =  7Tp,t -  * H ,t  (3.6)
The change in  th e  TOT is p roportiona l to the  difference betw een im port and  dom estic infla­
tion. In add ition , £, is th e  nom inal exchange ra te  (expressed in te rm s of foreign currency
5The terms of trade is thus the price of foreign goods per unit of home good. An increase in st is equivalent to 
an increase in competitiveness for the domestic economy because foreign prices increase and/or home prices fall.
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per unit of domestic currency).6 Similarly, the real exchange rate and the law of one price 
(LOP) gap are defined as Q = and 'Iq = £ ^   ^ respectively. If the LOP holds, i.e. if 
ty, = 1, then the import price index PFt is the foreign price index divided by £t, or PFt =
The LOP gap is a wedge or inverse mark-up between the world price of world goods and the 
domestic price of these imported world goods. Substituting the definition of the CPI, st and 
1>t = In('Pt) into qt = ln(Ct) gives:
Qt =  et + pt -  Pt 
= ~i>t -  (1 -  a)st
(3.7)
=>^t = ~[Qt +  (1 -  a ) s t]
Consequently, the LOP gap is inversely proportionate to the real exchange rate and the 
degree of international competitiveness for the domestic economy.
Under the assumption of complete international financial markets and perfect capital 
mobility, the expected nominal return from risk-free bonds, in domestic currency terms, 
must be the same as the expected domestic-currency return from foreign bonds, that is 
E t Q u + 1 = Et{Q t,t+ \%t i ). Using this relationship, the intertemporal optimality conditions 
can be equated for the domestic and foreign households’ optimization problem. Assuming 
the same habit formation parameter across the two countries gives a similar international 
risk sharing condition as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) under external habit formation:
Ct -  hCt_! = d (c; -  h C ^ ^ Q "  (3.8)
where d is a constant depending on initial asset positions. Log-linearizing equation (3.8) 
around the steady state gives:
ct -  hct-i = (yt -  % *_!)---------:qt
G
(3.9)
Under the small open economy assumption, trade with the domestic economy is assumed 
to have a negligible impact on the foreign economy such that c*t = y,*. The assumption 
of complete international financial markets and perfect capital mobility leads to a simple 
relationship linking the domestic economy with world output and the real exchange rate. 
Furthermore, these assumptions help recover another important relationship, the uncov-
6An increase in £/ means an appreciation of the domestic currency.
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ered interest parity  (UIP) condition:
£ r } ) = °  ,3101
Log linearizing a ro u n d  the perfect foresight steady  s ta te  yields the  fam iliar UIP condition 
for the real exchange ra te :7
Et Qt,t + 1 Rt -  R*t
EtAqt+i = -  {{rt -  EtTrt+i) -  (rt* -  Etn*+1)} (3.11)
th a t is, the  expected change in q, depends on the  c u rre n t real in te re s t ra te  differentials.
3.2.3 Firms
3 .2 .3 .1  P roduction  tech n o logy
There is a  co n tinuum  of identical m onopolistically-com petitive firm s; the j th firm p roduces 
a differentiated good, Yj,  u sing  a linear p roduction  function:
Yt (j) =  At Nt (j) (3.12)
w here a t = lo g / \ t follows a n  AR(1) p rocess, a t =  paa t- i  + i d e s c r i b i n g  th e  firm -specific 
productivity index. Aggregate o u tp u t can  be w ritten  as
Yt LYt( j ) ^ d j (3.13)
w here e > 1 is th e  elasticity  of su b s titu tio n  am ong varieties. Given each  firm h a s  the  
sam e technology, the  real to tal cost of p roduction  is TCt (j) = Hence, the  real
m arginal cost, M C t{j) = 4p,‘n i , will be com m on across all dom estic firm s. S u b stitu tin g  
the in tertem poral E u ler equation  (3.4) and  the p roduction  function  (3.12) into the m arginal 
cost equation , after log-linearizing we obtain:
mct =  ---- - ( ct -  hct- 1 ) +  <pVt +  <*st -  (1 + <p)at (3.14)1 -  h
T hus, m arginal cost is an  increasing  function  of dom estic o u tp u t and  st , an d  is inversely 
related to the level of lab o u r productivity.
7The risk premium is assumed to be constant in the steady state.
34
CHAPTER 3. STABILIZATION BIAS FOR A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
3 .2 .3 .2  Price se tt in g  behaviour and in co m p lete  pass-through
D om estic  firm s
In the dom estic economy, m onopolistic firm s are  a ssu m ed  to se t prices in  a Calvo-staggered 
fashion. In any  period t, only 1 -  Oh , w here 0H € [0.1], fraction of firm s are able to rese t 
the ir prices optim ally, while the  o ther fraction 9h canno t. Instead , the  la tte r are  assu m ed  
to ad ju s t th e ir prices, P / ( j ), by indexing it to la s t period’s inflation a s  follows:
Ph,,U) = " (3 . 15)
w here 6h £ [0, 1] is the degree of price indexation  to the  previous period’s inflation ra te .8 
C onsider only the  sym m etric equilibrium  case  since all dom estic firm s face the  sam e pricing 
problem , th a t is P//,t(j) =  P//,t(/c), Vj,/c. Let Pn,t denote  the price level th a t  an  optim izing 
firm se ts  each  period. The evolution of the  aggregate hom e goods price index is defined as:




W hen se tting  the new price, in period t, an  optim izing firm will seek to m axim ize the  
cu rren t value of its  dividend s tream  sub jec t to the  sequence  of dem and  co n stra in ts  su ch  
that:
max y " ( 0 H)k Et l Qt,t+kYt+k(j)




~  PH't+kMCt+k (3.17)
sub jec t to Yt+k(j) <
P//,t(j) /  P H , t + k - l \ 8 "  
P H , t .+ k  V P tf.t-1 )
[Cn,t+k  +  C*H t+ k )
w here M Ct+k is the real m arg inal cost faced by each firm and  the effective s tochastic  d is ­
coun t ra te  is now 0kHEtQt,t+k to take into acco u n t firm s have a 9h probability  of not being 
able to rese t p rices each period. The corresponding  first o rder condition  can  be w ritten  as:
^ ^ 0 kHEt < Qt,t+kYt+k
k= U  l
Ptf,t
( PH,t+k-l\ S" 
V  PH,t- 1 J
PH t+kM Ct+k 0 (3.18)
w here is th e  real m arg inal cost if prices w ere fully flexible. Log linearizing equation
8C h ristian o  e t at. (2005) a s su m e  <5# =  1, here  it  is left u n re s tr ic te d  to d e te rm in e  th e  degree of b ack w ard  
look ingness in  th e  Ph illips C urves.
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(3.18) yields the following New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC).9
™H,t
1
1 + ß S H ( ß E tFH,t+\ +  ÖHTTH,t- 1 +  A  Hmct j^
(3.19)
where Ah  — The Calvo pricing struc tu re  yields a familiar NKPC, where do­
mestic inflation has a forward looking and backward-looking component depending on the 
degree of price indexation. On the other hand, the elasticity of domestic inflation with re ­
spect to changes in the marginal cost depends on the frequency of price adjustm ents, the 
sticky price param eter d H .
Im port reta il firm s
For the import retailing sector, it is assum ed the LOP holds a t the wholesale level. However, 
inefficiency in distribution channels together with monopolistic retailers keep domestic im ­
port prices over and above the marginal cost (the world price). As a result, the LOP fails to 
hold a t the retail level for domestic consum ers. Following a sim ilar Calvo-pricing argum ent 
as before, an  import retailer will try and maximize the following objective function subject 





Q t , t + k P  F , t + k { j ) Pp,tU)
PF,t  +  k - \  
PF,t — 1
<5 F jy+fc(j)l 1 
^ t,k  J (3.20)
subject to C F , t + k ( j )  <
> F ,.P ) (  P F , t + k - l \ 6"
P F , t+ k {  P F , t- 1 J
CF,t+k
where P*+ k  is the world competitive price in foreign currency, Op  e [0, 1] is the fraction of 
im porter retailers that cannot re-optimize their prices every period, S p  e [0, 1] is the degree 
of price indexation in the import retailing sector and both Oh  and 6 h  are allowed to differ 
from its domestic counterpart. Recall the LOP f y t. =  t t he corresponding first order 
condition can be written as:
' ^ O f P i. j Q t , t + k ^ F , t + k
k=0 v
f  P F , t + k - 1
V  PF,t-
ÖF
j PF,t+k^t+k 0 (3.21)
In setting the new price for imports, domestic retailers are concerned with the future path 
of import inflation as well as the LOP gap, 'Iq. Essentially, 'Iq is the margin over and above 
the wholesale import price. A non-zero LOP gap represents a wedge between the w o r l d  and 
domestic import prices. This provides a m echanism  for incomplete import pass-through
9 Details are shown in Appendix (3 .A. 1) .
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in the  sh o rt-ru n , im plying changes in world im port prices have a  g radual effect on th e  
dom estic  econom y. Similarly, the im port price inflation dynam ic can  be show n to follow th e  
following NKPC:
7TF’t = i _[_ (yßEfKFj.+1 + <W,t-i +  (3.22)
w here Ap = Log-linearizing the definition of CPI and  tak ing  the first difference
yields the  following rela tionsh ip  for overall inflation:
7T( =  (1 — a)nn  +  ottf (3.23)
T aking the  definition for overall inflation (3.23) together w ith equations (3.19) and  (3.22) 
com pletes the  specification of inflation dynam ics for th e  SOE.
3 .2 .4  E quilibrium
3 .2 .4 .1  A ggregate dem and and output
G oods m ark e t clearing in the  dom estic econom y requ ires th a t dom estic o u tp u t is equal 
to th e  su m  of dom estic consum ption  and  foreign consum ption  of hom e produced  goods 
(exports):
Vt — C H , t  +  C*H,t (3.24)
The optim al dem and  functions for Cn,t and C*H t a re  given by:
Ch,, =  (1 -  a )  ( ? j £ \  and (3.25)
and  tak in g  the  log of the two dem and functions and  u sin g  th e  definitions of the log of TOT 
(,st ) an d  th e  log of the LOP gap (-0t) gives:
C H , t  =  (1 -  ot)[cnist + c t ] (3.26)
c H,t = a[rj(st + ipt) + c*t ] (3.27)
From  eq ua tion  (3.26), an  increase  in st (equivalent to an  increase  in dom estic com petitive­
n ess  in th e  world m arket) will see dom estic agen ts su b s titu te  ou t of foreign-produced goods 
in to  hom e-produced  goods for a  given level of consum ption . The m agn itude  of su b stitu tio n
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will depend  on ?/, the  elasticity  of su b s titu tio n  betw een foreign an d  dom estic goods; and  the 
degree of openness, a. Similarly, from equation  (3.27) an  increase  in st will see foreigners 
su b s titu te  ou t of foreign goods and  consum e m ore hom e goods for a  given level of income.
S u b stitu tin g  equa tions (3.26) and  (3.27) into (3.24) yields the goods m ark e t clearing 
condition  for th e  SOE as:
Vt =  (1 -  ot)ct +  o/c*t + (2 -  a)(rrjst +  arjfa (3.28)
Notice th a t w hen  o = 0, the  closed econom y case, it gives yt = ct .
3 .2 .5  The m onetary policy  reaction  fu nction
In o rd er to e stim ate  the deep s tru c tu ra l param eters , th e  behavior of the dom estic m onetary  
a u th o rity  is specified to com plete the  sm all open econom y model. The aim  of th e  m onetary  
au th o rity  is to stabilize bo th  o u tp u t and  inflation accord ing  to a  sim ple Taylor type ru le 
su ch  tha t:
rt = Prrt- \  +  (1 -  pr)[fa^t +  0 2 ( 3 . 2 9 )
w here pT is the  degree of in te re s t ra te  sm oothing, fa  an d  fa  are  the relative w eights on 
inflation  and  o u tp u t growth respectively. The app roach  here  follows O rphan ides (2003) in 
includ ing  o u tp u t grow th ra th e r  th a n  th e  trad itional o u tp u t gap m easu re  in th e  Taylor rule 
to provide a h istorical view on the  cen tra l b a n k ’s behavior over the  sam pling  period.
3 .2 .6  The linearized  m odel
T his subsec tio n  sum m arizes the com plete log-linearized model. Log-linearizing the in ­
tertem poral E u le r equation  (3.5) gives the  following dynam ic equation  relating  p as t, cu rren t 
an d  fu tu re  co nsum ption  w ith the real in te rest rate:
ct -  hc t-i =  Et (ct+1 -  hct) -  ------ (rt -  Et-nt+\) (3.30)a
U sing the m odel’s definition for th e  te rm s of trade , the te rm s of trade  grow th can  be 
rew ritten  as:
ASt = HF,t. -  7TH,t +  V? (3.31)
w here v} re p re se n ts  the  m easu rem en t erro r from the  m odel’s  definition. The assu m p tio n  of
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perfect capital mobility and complete international markets gives the usual UIP condition 
(3.11) plus a risk premium term [v() as:
AE,qt+i = -{(r , -  Eti\t+1 ) -  (rt* -  E,tt*+1)} + u ‘ (3.32)
In addition to the UIP condition, domestic consumption is tied with foreign consumption 
through the international risk sharing condition in equation (3.9) as:
ct -  hct-i = y*t -  hy*_x
1 -  h
---------- Qta (3.33)
The dynamic behavior of domestic inflation can be summarized using a Phillips curve 
under the assumption of monopolistic producers together with the Calvo pricing mechanism  
as:
71H.t  =  i + \ f H ( ^ E t TTH , t + i  +  ^ h 77//.t—i +  Awmctj +  V *H (3.34)
where mct = -y^(ct -h ct - i )  + ipyt + otSt-(l + ip)at is the log of the marginal cost, and v*H is the 
measurement error of the domestic inflation Phillips curve. The assumption of monopolistic 
importers gives a similar Phillips curve describing the behavior of import inflation:
77F,t = Y T W ^ ß E t l t F 't + 1  ^ F^7lF,t_1 v t F (3.35)
where t/’t = - [qt  + (1 -  a)st} is the log of LOP gap that gives rise to imperfect exchange rate 
pass-through, and v*F is the measurement error of the import inflation Phillips curve. From 
the definition of the CPI, overall inflation can be written as:
7Tt = (1 -  o)7rH,t + otnF,t (3.36)
The goods market clearing condition requires that domestic output is equal to the sum 
of domestic consumption plus exports gives:
yt = (2 -  a)ayst + (1 -  a)ct + m]xpt + oty*t (3.37)
The behavior of the central bank is described using a Taylor type reaction function:
rt = p, r t - 1 + (1 -  P r ) ( 0 i 7 T t + (t>2 Ayt) -f vTt (3.38)
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w here is the  m easu rem en t error to the  policy m ak er’s reaction  function. To com plete the 
linearized model, th ree exogenous AR(1) driving p ro cesses  are  included for at , pt* and  r* -  7rt* 
w ith AR(1) coefficients pa, pr  and  pr . respectively.
3 .3  Em pirical analysis
T his section  ou tlines the procedure u sed  to ob tain  th e  posterio r d istribu tion  of the  s tru c ­
tu ra l p a ram ete rs  underly ing the  m odel described  in section  (3.2).
3 .3 .1  The Bayesian approach
Fernandez-V illaverde and  R ubio-Ram irez (2004) show ed the  B ayesian estim ato r is co n sis­
te n t in large sam ples su ch  th a t the posterior d is trib u tio n  of the  p a ram ete rs  collapses to its 
p seu d o tru e  values. The use  of prior, p (0), allows re sea rch ers  to include inform ation ab o u t 
the  possible va lues of p a ram ete rs  th a t  a re  considered  to be ou tside  the  form al m odeling 
fram ework. Adding lnp(0) sm oothes the  often uneven  su rface  of the  log likelihood function 
m aking estim ation  algorithm s m uch  easier. However, a tightly specified prior can  give the  
illusion th a t the  econom etrician  h a s  collected usefu l evidence, i.e.: a relatively sm all s ta n ­
dard  error for the estim ated  coefficient.10 T his p ap er tak es  an  agnostic  app roach  w here the 
prior specifications are  relatively diffuse.
In the B ayesian  context, all inference ab o u t th e  p a ram ete r © is con tained  in the posterior 
d istribu tion . The posterior density  of th e  m odel p a ram ete r 0 can  be w ritten  as:
p(&\y t ) L(Yr |0)p(0) 
f  L ( Y T \Q)p(Q)dQ
(3.39)
w here p(0) is the  prior density  and  L (y r |0 ) is the  likelihood conditional on the  observed 
d a ta  Y t . The likelihood function  can  be com puted  via the s ta te -sp ace  rep resen ta tio n  of 
the model together w ith the  m easu rem en t equation  linking the  observed d a ta  to the s ta te  
vector. The so lu tion  of the  linearized econom ic model described in section (3.2.6) h a s  the 
following s ta te -sp ace  rep resen ta tion :
X t + 1  — T i X t  +  r 2 ?/.’t + i
H — A X t + p.t
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w here X t is the  s ta te  vector, Yt is th e  vector observed variab les, et is th e  vector of s ta te  
innovations, pt is the m easu rem en t error, 1A and  P2 are  th e  so lu tion  m atrices of the rational 
expec ta tions model, and  A is the m atrix  defining th e  re la tionsh ip  betw een the  s ta te  vector 
an d  the  observed variables. A ssum ing th e  s ta te  innovations and  m easu rem en t erro rs are 
norm ally  d is tribu ted  w ith m ean  zero and  variance-covariance m atrices E and  T respectively, 
th e  likelihood function of the  model is given by:
lnL(YT|r lTr 2,A;E,T)
T N
In 2n — 2 ln I + (3.42)
w here 0  = { r , ,P 2,A ,- .T } , =  A 'S ^ A  +  T and  + r 2EI^. Given
som e initial s ta te  value, So ~  A(S0,E 0), the likelihood function  (3.42) can  be evaluated  
u sin g  th e  K alm an filter algorithm  described in  A nderson  et al. (1996). Recognizing th a t 
f  L(Y r \6)p(9)dd is a  co n stan t, it is only necessary  to be able to evaluate  the  posterior 
density  up  to a  proportionate  c o n stan t u sing  th e  following relationsh ip :
p (0 |Y T) oc L(YT|0 )p (0 ) (3.43)
The posterio r density  sum m arizes the  inform ation con ta ined  in the  likelihood function 
w eighted by the  prior density  p(0). The prior can  be u sed  to b ea r inform ation not con ­
ta ined  in the  sam ple, Y r . The random  walk M etropolis-H astings algorithm  described in An 
an d  Schorfheide (2007) is used  to sim u la te  the M arkov C hain  M onte Carlo (MCMC) draw s 
to c o n s tru c t the posterior d istribu tion  of the m odel’s param eters .
3 .3 .2  D ata and priors
New Z ealand  d a ta  from 1990Q1 to 2006Q 4 is u sed  to estim ate  th e  model. Q uarterly  o b se r­
v a tions on log of dom estic o u tp u t (pt), in te rest ra te s  (r,), overall in f la tio n ^ ) , im port inflation 
(7TF,t)> log of real exchange ra te  (gd, the  log of te rm s of trad e  (st), log of foreign o u tp u t (p,*), 
an d  foreign real in te rest ra te  (rf* = r t* -  nf) are tak en  from  S ta tis tic s  New Z ealand and  the 
RBNZ d a tab ase . All variab les are re-scaled  to have a m ean  of zero and  could be in terpreted  
a s  an  approx im ate percentage deviation from th e  m e a n .11 See A ppendix (3.A.2) for a  m ore 
detailed  descrip tion  of the  d a ta  transfo rm ations.
The choice of priors for the  estim ation  are  guided by several considera tions. At the  basic
11 Apart from the interest rate and inflation data which are already in percentage terms.
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level, the priors reflect the modeler’s beliefs and confidence about the likely location of the 
s tructu ra l param eters. Information on the structu ral characteristics of the New Zealand 
economy, such as the degree of openness, being a commodity producer and its institutional 
settings, were all taken into account. In the case of New Zealand, micro-level studies 
are relatively scarce. Priors from similar studies using New Zealand data, for example 
Ju stin ian o  and Preston (2004), and Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) , were also considered. 
Finally, the choice of prior distributions reflects restrictions on the param eters such as 
non-negativity or interval restrictions. Beta distributions were chosen for param eters that 
are constrained on the unit-interval. Gamma and norm al distributions were selected for 
param eters in $R+, while the inverse gamma distribution was used for the variance of the 
shocks.
The priors on the model’s param eters are assum ed to be independent of each other, 
which allows for easier construction of the joint prior density used in the MCMC algorithm. 
Furtherm ore, the param eter space is truncated to avoid indeterm inacy or non-uniqueness 
in the model’s solution.12 The marginal prior d istributions for the model’s param eters are 
sum m arized in Table (3.1).
3 .3 .3  E stim ation  and convergence d iagn ostics
Given the data and prior specifications in section (3.3.2), two parallel 2 million draws of 
the Markov chain were generated.13 The Markov chains are generated conditional on the 
degree of openness (a) and the time preference (/3) param eters, which are fixed a t 0.3 and 
0.99 respectively, a = 0.3 coincides with the proportion of imported goods in the CPI basket 
over the sample period and ß  = 0.99 corresponds with an  annual risk free rate of 4 percent.
Various convergence diagnostic statistics were computed after an initial 75% burn -in  pe­
riod. The aim is to assess whether the sequence of Markov chain draws has converged to the 
target distribution to ensure the reliability of the estim ates generated from the Metropolis 
Hastings algorithm. The first column of Table (3.2) shows the m ean of the posterior d is­
tribution. The NSE refers to the Numeric S tandard  Error as an approximation to the true 
posterior s tandard  error and the p-value is the test between the m eans generated from the 
two independent chains as in Geweke (1999). For each of the param eter estim ates, there 
is no indication the two m eans generated from the two chains are significantly different
12This only accounts for a very small proportion of the draws, around 0.2%.
13Each chain  is generated a t different starting  values. It takes approxim ately 25 CPU h ours to generate each 
independent chain  using the APAC linux cluster machine.
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from each  other. The seventh  colum n show s th e  un ivaria te  “sh rin k  factor” using  the ratio  
of betw een  an d  w ith in  variances a s  in B rooks an d  G elm an (1998). A sh rin k  factor close to 
1 is evidence for convergence to a  sta tio n ary  d is tribu tion . All MCMC diagnostic te s ts  su g ­
gest th a t  th e  M arkov ch a in s  have converged to the  s ta tio n ary  d istribu tion  after 2 million 
ite ra tio n s . 14
3 .4  P osterior param eter e s tim a tes
B ased on th e  two in dependen t M arkov C hains, the  posterio r m ean  and  the  95 percen t 
p robab ility  in tervals  a re  com puted  for each  of the  pa ram ete rs , w ith re su lts  reported  in 
T able (3.2). The p rio r an d  estim ated  posterio r m arg inal d ensities are  plotted in Figure (3.1). 
The p lo ts ind ica te  th e re  is a  su b s ta n tia l a m o u n t of in form ation contained  in the d a ta  to 
help  u p d a te  th e  p rio r beliefs on the  m odel’s pa ram ete rs . The posterior m arginal densities 
a re  no ticeab ly  m ore concen tra ted  relative to th e  prior densities.
The re su lts  ind ica te  there  is a  relatively high degree of h ab it persistence, w ith h = 0.94, 
com pared  to o th e r s tu d ie s  for the  U.S. and  the  E uro  area , eg: S m ets and  W outers (2003) and  
Lubik an d  S chorfheide (2005).15 The high degree of h ab it form ation lim its the elasticity  of 
co n su m p tio n  w ith resp ec t to real in te rest ra te  changes, while the  im pact from consum ption  
on dom estic  in fla tion  is m uch  stronger. The inverse elasticity  of in tertem poral substitu tio n , 
cr, is e s tim a ted  to be 1.20. The estim ate  is very close to the  prior value of 1 and  sim ilar 
to th e  re su lts  o b ta ined  by Ju s tin ia n o  and  P reston  (2004). The elasticity  of su b stitu tio n  
betw een hom e a n d  foreign goods, r], is a ro u n d  1.02. The u n ita ry  elasticity  is in line w ith the 
p rio r th a t  New Z ealand  is a  sm all open com m odity-producer an d  its consum ption  b ask e t 
relies heavily on foreign produced  goods. The estim ated  inverse elasticity  of su b stitu tio n  
for labor, 99 =  0.62, tu rn s  ou t to be less th a n  1. T his m ean s a  1 p ercen t increase  in the real 
wage will re su lt in m ore th a n  a 1 p ercen t increase  in the  labor supply .
On th e  p ro d u c tio n  side, the  probability  of no t chang ing  prices in a given q u a rte r is 
es tim a ted  to be a ro u n d  93 percen t for dom estic firm s and  lower for im port re ta ilers a t 77 
percen t. The estim ated  Calvo coefficients im ply the  average d u ra tio n  of price con trac ts  is 
a ro u n d  twelve q u a r te rs  for dom estic firm s and  four q u a rte rs  for im port re ta ilers (degree of
14The nu m b er of iterations required to guaran tee  convergence is m uch larger th an  those often reported in the 
literature.
15A11 the resu lts  reported here are based on the m ean of the posterior distribution.
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incom plete p a ss -th ro u g h ).16 The degree of hom e price s tick in ess  is m uch  g rea te r th a n  those  
reported  for th e  E uro  a rea  and  the U.S., w hereas, the  degree of im port price s tick iness is 
inline w ith previous em pirical es tim ates. On th e  o ther h an d , th e  degree of price indexation  
is e stim ated  to be 0 .58 for dom estic firm s and  0 .46  for im port re ta ilers. Together, the 
Phillips C urves estim ates  imply there  is a  g rea te r am o u n t of s tick in ess  in the  price se tting  
behavior of dom estic firm s relative to im port re ta ile rs  w here they  face stronger com petition. 
T his in  tu rn  im plies g rea te r pers is ten ce  in the  dynam ics of dom estic inflation relative to 
im port inflation.
The sim ple reaction  function  used  in the  model provides a fairly good descrip tion  of 
m oneta ry  policy over the  s tab le  inflation period in New Z ealand. The posterior m edian  for 
the degree of in te re s t ra te  sm ooth ing  is estim ated  to be 0 .78  w ith 1.25 and  0 .50  being the 
w eight on inflation  and  o u tp u t respectively. The re su lts  ob ta ined  here  are  consis ten t w ith 
em pirical estim a tes  of Taylor ru le  coefficients in P lan tier and  Scrim geour (2002).
The la s t co lum n (flat prior) of Table (3.2) rep o rts  the  m ean  of the  M arkov C hain  draw s 
w ith a non-inform ative prior. The m ean  of th e  p a ram ete rs  does no t change significantly 
com pared  to th e  m odel estim ated  w ith inform ative p rio rs .17 However, there  are  a  few ex­
ceptions, the  m ean  of the non-inform ative estim ate  falls o u tside  the  inform ative estim a te ’s 
95 pe rcen t probability  interval. The elastic  of su b s titu tio n  betw een hom e and  foreign goods 
(//) is slightly  lower a t 0.81 com pared to 1.02. T his suggests  New Z ealand ’s sm all open econ­
omy ch a rac te ris tic  is m ore p ronounced  w ith lim ited su b stitu tab ility  betw een its p roduction  
and  co n su m p tio n  b ask e t of goods. The inverse elasticity  of lab o u r supp ly  (</>) also tu rn s  ou t 
to be sm alle r com pared  w ith the  inform ative estim ate , suggesting  an  even m ore elastic  labor 
supply . The s tick in ess  p a ram e te r for im port p rices [Op] is estim ated  to be slightly larger a t 
0 .83. However, the  conclusion  th a t dom estic prices a re  observed to be m uch  m ore sticky 
still holds. Finally, the response  of the  in te re s t ra te  to o u tp u t (02) in th e  reaction  function  
is slightly  lower, though  th is  coefficient will n o t significantly affect th e  optim al policy s im ­
ula tion  re su lts  p resen ted  here. Overall, the  B ayesian estim ato r seem s ro b u st to the prior 
specification.
16Duration = . Vi •
17Thc flat prior estimates are still subject to the same interval constraints.
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3.5 S tab iliza tion  bias for a sm all open  econ om y
t  is well recognized th a t  com m itm ent policy will p roduce  a un iversally  superio r inflation 
ju tcom e com pared  w ith the  d iscretionary  equilib rium  due  to th e  tim e-inconsistency  prob- 
em advocated by Kydland and  P resco tt (1977), B arro and  G ordon (1983), and  Svensson 
1997). The an a lysis  here  tries to quantify  the  size of th e  stab ilization  b ias for a  SOE us- 
ng the  m odel described  in section (3.2) and  p a ram ete rs  e stim ated  in section  (3.4) for New 
Zealand.
For a  very sm all c la ss  of m odels, a  closed form rep resen ta tio n  of the  m odel’s theoretically  
consisten t social w elfare function can  be derived from tak ing  th e  second order approx im a­
tion of th e  rep resen ta tiv e  h ouseho ld ’s d iscoun ted  life-time utility, see Erceg et al. (2000) and  
Woodford (2002) for exam ple. However, th is  app ro ach  is only feasible for a  sm all su b se t of 
models or as a  special case  by restric ting  th e  m odel’s p a ra m e te rs .18 As an  alternative, it is 
com m only accepted  in the  lite ra tu re  and  am ong policy m ak ers  th a t  m onetary  policy should  
be aim ed a t s tab iliz ing  inflation an d  som e m easu re  of real activity. In the case of New 
Zealand, the  policy objectives are explicitly se t ou t in th e  Policy T arget A greem ent (PTA) 
between the B ank  an d  th e  M inister of F inance.
“In pursuing its price stability objective, the Bank shall implement monetary pol­
icy in a sustainable, consistent, and transparent manner and shall seek to avoid 
unnecessary instability in output, interest rates and the exchange rate.” 19
Here, the  social objective function  is set u p  to be co n sis ten t w ith the  PTA agreem ent, one 
that penalizes sq u a red  deviations in inflation from target, sq u ared  deviation in o u tp u t from 
potential, sq u ared  deviation  in the exchange ra te  and  an  in te re s t ra te  sm ooth ing  term . The 
in terest ra te  sm oo th ing  te rm  e n su re s  policy changes in resp o n se  to sh ocks occur in sm all 
steps. S ack  and  W ieland (2000) a rg u es th a t including th e  in te re s t ra te  sm ooth ing  te rm  m ay 
in fact be optim al even though  the  cen tral b a n k ’s m ain  objective is to replicate the second 
best outcom e d u e  to d a ta  and  pa ram ete r u ncerta in ty . Following th e  lite ra tu re , the  social 
objective function  is approx im ated  using  th e  following linear q u ad ra tic  loss function:
OC
L ( t , oo) =  E t  [*■l t + j  + x !Jt+j +  W t + j  +  u A r t + j \  (3 -4 4 )
j =o
18Gali and  Monacelli (2005) derived the social welfare function using  the second order approxim ation of the 
household’s utility by se tting  a  =  rj =  =  1.
19E xtract from Section 4(c) of the  PTA aggrem ent, 1999, available on the RBNZ website:
h t t p : //www. r b n z . g o v t . n z /m o n p o l /p ta / .
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where 7rajt is annualized inflation, yt is output, qt is the real exchange rate and Art is the 
change in the nominal interest rate; and A, <; and v are the weights relative to inflation. All 
variables are written as deviations from its steady state.
Under optimal commitment policy, the central bank  optimizes once a t t =  Ü by m ini­
mizing the loss function given in equation (3.44) subject to the dynamic constrain ts of the 
economy, and perm anently commits to the optimal plan. In th is case, the dynamic equilib­
ria of the economy will be augm ented to reflect the com m itm ent m ade earlier by the central 
bank .20 Optimal discretionary policy is one where the central bank  optimizes equation 
(3.44) on a period by period basis. The problem occurs once private agents form expecta­
tions about the future. There is then no incentive for the central bank  to follow through with 
earlier policy announcem ents -  the classic tim e-inconsistency problem. The dynamic be­
havior of the economy under discretion constitu tes a Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in which 
policymakers optimizing today are the Stackelberg leaders, and private agents and future 
policymakers are Stackelberg followers. The algorithm s described in Dennis (2007) are 
used to solve the com mitment and discretionary dynamic equilibria and the value of the 
loss function is calculated for each case.
To define a common metric for the size of the stabilization bias, Dennis and Söderström  
(2006) use the perm anent deviation of inflation from target th a t is equivalent to moving 
from discretionary policy to commitment. The inflation equivalent m easure for a particular 
set of model param eters, 0 , is given by:
tt(0) = s/L d{Q) -  Lc(0) (3.45)
where LC{Q) and Ld(Q) are the values of the optimized loss function for a particular set of 
param eters 0  under commitment and discretion respectively. O ther studies also report the 
percentage gain m easure relative to the commitment equilibria defined as 100 1^ -  '^d[ ^  J • 
The discussions here will focus on the inflation equivalent m easure which is also intuitively 
more appealing.
3 .5 .1  B aseline c losed  econ om y sim ulation
A closed economy is one where trade (the import share a —> 0) and financial (the exchange 
rate channel is tu rned  off) linkages with the rest of the world are shu t off. The model 
20The solution of the model will include a set of dynamic lagrange multipliers.
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collapses to the s tan d a rd  canonical closed econom y rep resen ta tio n  sim ilar to the  one in 
C larida et al. (2001). The aim  is to isolate the  open econom y effects and  help com parison 
w ith previous closed economy stud ies. The m odel is sim u la ted  u sing  10,000 param eter 
draw s random ly selected from the  sta tionary  posterior d istribu tion . Even though  the PTA 
gives som e guidance on the choice of target variab les, th e ir relative w eights in the  loss 
function  are  no t explicitly specified or announced  publicly. For the  base line  scenario, the 
w eights on o u tp u t (A) and  in te rest ra te  sm ooth ing  (<;) a re  chosen  to be 0.5. These weights 
coincide w ith baseline values u sed  in Svensson (2000) an d  D ennis and  S öderström  (2006).
Figure (3.2) p lots the em pirical d istribu tion  of the  estim ated  stab ilization  b ias  w ith de­
tailed s ta tis tic s  reported in Table (3.3).21 The m ean  of the  inflation equivalent m easu re  is 
calcu lated  to be 0.65%  w ith a s ta n d a rd  deviation of 0 .32. The estim ate  is com parable w ith 
the  re su lts  reported  in D ennis and  Söderström  (2006) u sing  th e  sam e loss function  p a ra m ­
e ters across four closed economy m odels (ranging betw een 0.15%  to 1.43%) once param eter 
un certa in ty  is taken  into account.
3 .5 .2  Size o f the stabilization  bias
Using the sam e se t of baseline loss function p a ram ete rs , th e  full open econom y model 
is s im ulated  to calcu late  the stabilization b ias  for th e  SOE. The estim ated  m ean  of the 
d istribu tion  is 1.24% with a s tan d a rd  deviation of 0 .33. The s ta n d a rd  deviation is sim ilar 
to th a t of the  closed econom y while the m ean  is m uch  higher. The values of the  optimized 
loss function u n d e r both  com m itm ent and  d iscre tionary  policy are  h igher due  to the  im pact 
of in te rna tiona l shocks. W hen the  exchange ra te  is included in the  loss function , even w ith 
a relatively sm all weight (// =  0.1), the  value of the  optim ized loss functions are  rem arkably  
higher. This largely reflects the relatively high variance  of th e  real exchange ra te  en tering  
into the  objective function, the estim ated stabilization  b ias m ore th a n  doub les to 2 .75% .22
To help the  com parison  and check on the ro b u s tn e ss  of th e  re su lts , five o ther different 
com binations of policy preferences are calcu lated  w ith the  density  p lo ts show n in Figure 
(3.2).23 The size of the stabilization  b ias is estim ated  to vary betw een 0 .82-4 .16%  w ith s ta n ­
dard  deviations betw een 0 .23-0 .57  depending on the  loss function  p aram eters . Across all 
loss function param eterizations, the  estim ated stab ilization  b ias  is m uch  g rea te r com pared
21 Figure (3.2) and Table (3.3) contain simulation results for other policy parameters that will be discussed later.
22The implication of including the exchange rate as one of the objectives will be discussed in more detail in the 
next sub-section.
23The chosen loss function parameters are by no means exhaustive, instead, these are chosen to provide a 
reasonable comparison with previous studies.
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with the closed economy baseline simulation. Furtherm ore, the size of the stabilization bias 
in the SOE appears to be higher than the closed economy results (between 0.05-3.6%) re­
ported in Dennis and Söderström (2006) across a range of loss function param eterizations.
One im portant observation from the sim ulation resu lts is th a t the estim ated stabilization 
bias for a SOE is m uch higher compared with the closed economy case. The conclusion is 
robust across different loss function param eterizations and model param eters. As the econ­
omy becomes more open, the cost of discretionary policy relative to commitment equilibrium 
is higher. In the closed economy, only expectations of future domestic inflation m atters. In 
which case, the stabilization bias only relates to the tradeoffs between stabilizing domestic 
inflation and output in the face of cost push disturbances.
For a small open economy, the policy tradeoffs are m uch more complex with the presence 
of imperfect import price pass-through and international disturbances. First, policies that 
move the short-term  interest rate to offset the im pacts of dem and or supply disturbances 
will also affect the exchange rate. This, in tu rn , affects the rate of inflation. Both output and 
inflation objectives cannot be achieved sim ultaneously resulting in a higher stabilization 
bias. Second, the presence of incomplete pass-through in import prices represents an 
additional channel for the central bank  to m anipulate expectations of future imported goods 
inflation and the exchange rate. Any attem pts by the central bank to try and stabilize 
domestic or foreign disturbances will indirectly affect the LOP gap (i/’t — -[q t + (1 -  c*)st]) 
via exchange rate movements. In addition to the inflation-output tradeoff, the stabilization 
bias also includes the tradeoff between import inflation and the LOP gap.
The empirical results suggest the gains from com mitment policy are remarkably higher 
for a SOE. The size of the stabilization bias under the baseline param eterizations is nearly 
twice as large for a SOE relative to th a t usually found for closed economies. The result offers 
a possible explanation for the motivation behind m any SOE central b an k s’ move towards 
an inflation targeting framework as a way of anchoring expectations and minimizing the 
discretionary bias.
3 .5 .3  The increasing desire for exchange rate stab ility
There has been increasing debate on whether SOE central banks should focus more on 
exchange rate stabilization. In the case of New Zealand, this desire was reflected in the u p ­
dated PTA in 1999 to minimize exchange rate fluctuations in the operation and implemen-
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tation of m onetary policy over the business cycle. Subsequently, following several public 
com m ents by the New Zealand Finance M inister expressing discomfort over the high volatil­
ity of the New Zealand dollar, the RBNZ was granted the capacity to intervene if the foreign 
exchange m arket became “disorderly”.24 The RBNZ first publicly acknowledged the use of 
its new intervention capacity on 11 Ju n e  2007, it is useful to investigate how this increasing 
preference for minimizing exchange ra te fluctuations im pacts on the size of the stabilization 
bias. The changing policy preference may not be unique to the case of New Zealand with 
other SOE’s such as Australia and Canada currently also facing unprecedented rises in 
commodity prices.
To address this im portant policy question, Figure (3.3) plots the estim ated stabilization 
bias with respect to the the weights on ou tpu t (A) and exchange rate (<fi while fixing the 
weight on the interest rate sm oothing term  (p) to be 0.5.25 The first observation is th a t 
the size of the stabilization bias is a non-decreasing function with respect to the weight 
placed on ou tpu t for a given weight on the exchange rate. This essentially replicates the well 
docum ented closed economy result, where discretion policy will resu lt in inflation variability 
being too high, and output variability too low, relative to the commitment equilibrium. The 
higher preference for ou tput stability in the face of cost push shocks will induce greater 
incentive for the central bank to m anipulate private agent’s expectations, increasing the 
size of the stabilization bias.
The second observation is th a t for a given weight on output, the stabilization bias is 
a monotonic increasing function with respect to the weight placed on the exchange rate. 
This offers some interesting insights into the operation of monetary policy for a SOE. Un­
der commitment, the central bank trades off some volatility in the ou tput gap in order to 
achieve greater stability in domestic inflation and the LOP gap, hence indirectly lowering 
the variability of the exchange rate .26 Monacelli (2005) found similar results looking at 
productivity shocks only. The intuition is th a t commitment policy helps anchor inflation 
expectations, therefore resulting in more stable inflation accompanied with less frequent 
changes to the interest rate. This in tu rn  translates into more stable exchange rate fluc­
tuations via the UIP in equation (3.11) for a given level of risk premium  shock. Higher 
preference for lower exchange rate fluctuations is equivalent to placing more weight on in-
24 See RBNZ press release on 30th March 2004, h ttp : //www. rbnz . govt .nz/news/2004/0148546.htm l.
25The simulation results are generated using the mean of the posterior distribution of the model’s structural 
parameters.
26 Detailed simulation results of the unconditional variance of the state variables are available from the author 
upon request.
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flation variability. However, th is  will induce  g rea te r flu c tu a tio n s in o u tp u t relative to the 
d iscre tion  outcom e, hence increasing  the  size of the  stab ilization  b ias.
An im p o rtan t policy im plication is th a t  a  h igher preference for exchange ra te  stab ility  will 
re su lt in larger gains from com m itm ent. The u p d a tin g  of the  PTA to include the exchange 
ra te  a s  one of the  policy objectives essen tia lly  req u ires  the RBNZ to im plem ent m onetary  
policy in a m ore tim e-consisten t m anner. The ability of th e  cen tra l b a n k  to fully com m it 
to p rean n o u n ced  policies is viewed as  a  m u ch  m ore im p o rtan t m echan ism  in achieving a 
m ore stab le  exchange ra te  along side of its  o th e r  policy objectives.
3 .5 .4  R obustness analysis
O ne of the  crucial a ssu m p tio n s  underly ing  the  se t of estim ated  p a ram ete rs  is the d e tre n d ­
ing m ethod  used  to ex trac t the cyclical com ponen t of the  o u tp u t da ta . Canova (1998) 
em phasized  different detrend ing  m ethods can  im ply qu ite  d ifferent b u s in e ss  cycle d y n am ­
ics an d  therefore affects th e  se t of e stim ated  p a ram ete rs  underly ing  the model. Cho and  
M oreno (2006) highlighted the  coefficients on the  real in te re s t ra te  in the IS curve, and  the 
m arg inal cost in the Phillips Curve are  p a rticu la rly  sensitive to d ifferent detrend ing  m e th ­
ods em ployed. The form er p a ram ete r governs the  tran sm iss io n  m echan ism  of m onetary  
policy on consum ption  w hile the la tte r  re la te s  to the  tradeoff betw een inflation and  o u tpu t. 
B oth of th ese  pa ram ete rs  a re  crucial to the  optim al policy analysis  p resen ted  here. To a s ­
se ss  the  ro b u s tn e ss  of the  conclusions highlighted  above w ith respec t to the  different d a ta  
trea tm en ts , the model ou tlined  in (3.2) is re -estim ated  u sing  d ifferent detrend ing  m ethods 
(linear an d  quad ra tic  trend) for dom estic an d  foreign o u tp u t.27
The estim ation  re su lts  confirm s Cho and  M oreno’s (2006) previous analysis. One 
advan tage  of u sing  a m icro-founded m odel is th a t it allows one to uncover w hich “deep” 
p a ra m e te rs  are  particu larly  sensitive to th e  d ifferent d e trend ing  m eth o d s.28 Two p a ram e­
te rs  w ere identified, the elasticities of in tertem poral su b s titu tio n  (a) and  lab o u r supp ly  [p). 
a re la tes  to the elasticity  of consum ption  w ith respect to changes in the  real in te rest rate, 
while p  re la te s  to the tradeoff betw een o u tp u t an d  dom estic inflation in the  Phillips Curve. 
The m ean  of a is estim ated  to be 1.19, 1.27 and  0 .84 for the HP, linear an d  qu ad ra tic  trend  
respectively. W hile the linear trend  estim ate  falls w ith in  the HP tre n d ’s 95%  probability  
in terval, the  quad ra tic  tren d  estim ate  is s ta tis tica lly  sm aller. On the  o th e r h and , the  m ean
27Detailed sta tistics of the estim ation resu lts  are available upon request.
28In Cho and Moreno (2006), the param eters in front of the real in terest ra te  and m arginal cost in the IS and 
Phillips curves are com binations of the “deep" param eters.
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estim ate  of <p for the HP and linear tren d  is very sim ilar, a ro u n d  0 .62  and  0 .60  respectively, 
while the q u ad ra tic  trend  is slightly h igher a ro u n d  0 .76. The price stick in ess  param eters , 
0H and  Op w hich also re la tes to the  degree of tradeoff betw een inflation and  o u tp u t is ob ­
served to be fairly ro b u st ac ro ss  the  different de trend ing  m ethods. The sam e applies to the 
re s t of the p aram eter es tim ates  underly ing  the  model.
D espite som e sm all differences in som e of th e  key p a ram ete rs  underly ing  the model, 
the  general conclusion highlighted in sec tions (3.5.2) an d  (3.5.3) ho lds acro ss  the  different 
detrend ing  m ethods. For the  base line  loss function  p aram eteriza tions, the  estim ated  size 
of the  stabilization  b ias for the  SOE is still m ore th a n  double th a t of the  closed econom y, 
0.92%  relative to 0.40%  using  a linear trend , and  1.27% relative to 0.63%  u sing  a qu ad ra tic  
trend . S im ulation  re su lts  con tinue  to show  a m onotonically  increasing  re la tionsh ip  betw een 
the  weight on the  exchange ra te  and  the  size of the  stab ilization  b ias.
3 .6  C oncluding rem arks
T his paper develops an  em pirical m odel to investigate the degree of inefficiencies arising  
from d iscretionary  policy relative to the  com m itm ent equilibrium . M uch of the  d iscussion  
is devoted to analyzing the policy tradeoffs faced by the  cen tra l b a n k  w ith in  a  SOE, and  
how th a t differs from a closed economy. Two key re su lts  em erge from the  analysis. F irst, 
the  estim ated  size of the stab ilization  b ias  for a  SOE is found to be nearly  twice a s  large 
relative to th a t u su a lly  found in the closed econom y co u n te rp a rt. The resu lt is ro b u st ac ross 
different loss function  param eteriza tions an d  m odel p aram eters . As the econom y becom es 
m ore open, th e  cost of d iscretionary  policy relative to com m itm ent equilib rium  is higher. 
Second, the size of the  stabilization  b ias in creases  w ith the  policym aker’s preference for 
stabilizing exchange ra te  fluc tuations. This im plies th a t a stro n g er a ttitu d e  tow ards p re ­
com m itm ent of policy will help  m inim ize the inefficiency arising  from the  stabilization  b ias 
w hen the  exchange ra te  is included a s  one of th e  stabilization  objectives.
Two p a ram eters , the  elastic ities of in tertem poral su b s titu tio n  and  labour supply , were 
identified to be p articu larly  sensitive to the  different d a ta  trea tm en ts . Both param eters , 
w hich relate to th e  elasticity  of consum ption  w ith respect to ch an g es in the real in te rest ra te  
and  the tradeoff betw een o u tp u t and  dom estic inflation in the  Phillips Curve, a re  crucial to 
the analysis p resen ted  here. D espite som e sm all differences in th ese  param eters , the  key 
insigh ts highlighted  in the pap er hold across d ifferent de trend ing  m ethods.
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The ana lys is  was re s tric ted  to  a re la tive ly  s im p le  sp e c ifica tion  o f the  m odel w ith  on ly  
tw o sources o f n o m in a l r ig id itie s , and a lin e a r p ro d u c tio n  fu n c tio n  in  labor. However, the  
re s u lts  suggests th a t i t  w ou ld  be w o rth w h ile  exp a n d in g  the  ana lys is  to  in co rpo ra te  o th e r 
fac to rs  in flu e n c in g  the  size o f the  s ta b iliza tio n  b ias  from  p re -co m m itm e n t, in c lu d in g : (i) 
ca p ita l a c cu m u la tio n  and inves tm en t r ig id itie s : (ii) la b o u r m a rk e t r ig id itie s ; and (iii) e xp lic it 
o p tim iz in g  behav io r o f the  cen tra l b a n k  in  e s tim a tin g  the  m odel. In  a d d ition , the  key re su lts  
and po licy  im p lic a tio n s  h ig h lig h te d  rests on the  a ssu m p tio n  o f UIP. W h ile  the  UIP h y p o th ­
esis is an ongo ing  debate in  the lite ra tu re , i t  w o u ld  be u se fu l to  re lax  th is  a ssu m p tio n  in  
fu tu re  w o rk .
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Table 3.1: Prior d is trib u tio n s  s ta tis tic s
Param eter D om ain D ensity M ean Std  dev. 2.5% 97.5%
h [0, 1] Beta 0 .500 0 .200 0 .128 0.871
a Normal 1.000 0 .400 0 .376 1.923
V 5?+ G am m a 1.000 0 .400 0 .375 1.922
V 3f?+ G am m a 1.000 0 .400 0 .377 1.917
9 h [0, 1] Beta 0 .500 0 .150 0 .214 0 .787
Of [0 , 1] Beta 0 .500 0 .150 0 .213 0 .786
ÖH [0, 1] Beta 0 .500 0 .200 0 .128 0.871
6 f [0, 11 Beta 0 .500 0 .200 0 .132 0 .870
4>\ 5R+ G am m a 1.500 0 .250 1.050 2.031
0 2 3ft+ G am m a 0 .250 0 .100 0 .094 0 .479
P r [0. 1] Beta 0 .500 0 .200 0 .128 0.871
P r . [0, 1] Beta 0 .500 0 .200 0 .129 0.871
P a [0 , 1] Beta 0 .500 0 .200 0 .127 0 .869
P v* [0 , 1] Beta 0 .500 0 .200 0 .129 0 .872
Oa 3f?+ InvG am m a 1.000 0 .300 0 .598 2 .000
(J« 5R+ InvG am m a 1.000 0 .300 0 .597 1.997
o q 3R+ InvG am m a 1.000 0 .300 0 .598 1.988
SR+ InvG am m a 1.000 0 .300 0 .602 1.989
V tx p 5R+ InvG am m a 1.000 0 .300 0 .600 2 .000
Or 5R+ InvG am m a 1.000 0 .300 0 .600 1.997
" V ?R+ InvG am m a 1.000 0 .300 0 .597 1.991
<J r* InvG am m a 1.000 0 .300 0.601 1.997
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Table 3.2: Posterior estim ates and MCMC diagnostic statistics
p a ram e te rs Post Mean Post Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G Flat prior
h 0 .937 0.011 0.914 0.955 0.001 0 .254 1.042 0 .953
a 1.195 0 .097 1.012 1.396 0 .0 1 0 0 .113 1.122 1.101
V 1.016 0.049 0.918 1.102 0 .009 0 .106 1.124 0.811
f 0 .620 0 .079 0.483 0.779 0 .013 0.501 1.021 0.442
Oh 0 .927 0.021 0.884 0.967 0 .003 0 .554 1.013 0 .950
Of 0.771 0.021 0.731 0.807 0 .003 0 .332 1.030 0 .832
6 h 0.581 0.053 0.458 0.683 0 .008 0 .413 1.030 0 .648
6 f 0 .460 0 .030 0.399 0.517 0 .004 0 .065 1.125 0 .440
<Pi 1.247 0.102 1.051 1.483 0 .017 0 .722 1.006 1.112
02 0 .498 0 .025 0.448 0.537 0 .004 0 .052 1.182 0.414
Pr 0 .775 0 .028 0.722 0.831 0 .004 0 .228 1.057 0 .775
P r * 0 .819 0 .018 0.779 0.855 0 .002 0 .374 1.020 0 .833
P a 0.891 0 .015 0.861 0.919 0 .002 0 .210 1.041 0 .910
Pv- 0 .812 0 .030 0.757 0.865 0 .005 0 .412 1.026 0 .818
CTa 0 .900 0.097 0.676 1.041 0 .014 0 .064 1.147 0 .964
3 .633 0 .178 3.342 3.995 0 .028 0.051 1.151 4.062
a q 6.171 0 .163 5.874 6.495 0 .026 0 .237 1.056 6 .510
1.219 0 .068 1.074 1.347 0 .0 1 0 0 .087 1.122 1.079
X p 2 .540 0 .190 2.096 2.842 0 .024 0 .547 1.018 2.401
( ? r 0 .799 0 .054 0.702 0.901 0 .009 0 .616 1.012 0 .802
( T y ‘ 0 .480 0 .044 0.407 0.569 0 .007 0 .700 1.006 0 .459
@ T  * 0 .638 0.052 0.561 0.748 0 .009 0 .597 1.013 0.599
Log m arg inal likelihood -1072 .5  -1053 .9
1. The param eters a  and  ß  w ere fixed at 0 .3  and 0 .99  respectively.
2. Posterior s ta tis tic s  are com puted after 75% burn in, the acceptance rate for both of the Markov ch a in s w as around 20%.
3. NSE is  the N um eric Standard Error a s  defined in Geweke (1999) .
4. The P-Value refers to test of two m ean s generated from two in d ependent ch a in s, the test s ta tistics  is  com puted with 
L  =  0 .08, see  G eweke (1999).
5. B-G is  the univariate "shrink factor" for m onitoring the betw een and w ithin  chain  variance, see  Brooks and Gelm an (1998).
Table 3.3: Estimated stabilization bias from commitment policy
A V Loss Percent Inflation Prob in terval S td
Vt ( A r t ) 2 3 <7? Commit. D iscretion gain equiv. 2.5% 97.5% dev
Closed econom y 2.90 3.42 13.81 0 .65 0 .16 1.32 0.32
0.5 0 .5 0 .0 4.20 5.85 26.63 1.24 0.84 2.01 0.33
0.5 0 .5 0.1 19.82 27 .50 27.70 2 .75 2.28 3.51 0 .30
1.0 1.0 0 .0 5.57 7.47 25.03 1.36 1.09 1.93 0.23
1.0 1.0 0.1 16.81 26 .10 35.21 3.03 2.46 3 .90 0 .35
1.0 1.0 0.2 30.81 48.42 35.84 4 .16 3.21 5.51 0.57
0.0 1.0 0 .0 0.58 3.16 78.55 1.56 0.86 2.22 0 .38
1.0 0 .0 0 .0 3.38 4.23 16.29 0.82 0.22 1.67 0.41
1. The closed  econom y is  sim ulated  in the ab sen ce o f international sh ock s and th e  exchan ge rate.
2. The percentage gain  m easure is calculated  by ^1 — 100.
3. The inflation equivalent m easure is  calcu lated  by ^ /L ,j(0 )  — Lc (0 ) .
54
CHAPTER 3. STABILIZATION BIAS FOR A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
Table 3 .4: Posterior p a ram ete r es tim ates  ac ro ss  d ifferent d e trend ing  assu m p tio n s




Q uad tra tic  
(95% interval)
h 0.94  [ 0 .91, 0 .95  ] 0 .92 [ 0 .90 , 0 .94  ] 0 .95 [ 0 .93 , 0 .96  ]
a 1.19 [ 1.01, 1.40 ] 1.27 [ 1.13, 1.47 ] 0 .84 [ 0 .76 , 0 .96  ]
V 1.02 ( 0 .92 , 1.10 1 0 .93  [ 0 .85 , 0 .99  ] 0 .92 [ 0 .86, 0 .98  ]
<P 0.62 [ 0 .48, 0 .78  ] 0 .60  [ 0 .47 , 0 .78  ] 0 .76  [ 0 .62 , 0 .97  ]
6 h 0.93  [ 0 .88, 0 .97  ] 0 .94  [ 0 .90 , 0 .97  ] 0 .93  [ 0 .88, 0 .97  ]
Of 0 .7 7 ( 0 .7 3 ,0 .8 1  ] 0 .78  1 0 .73 , 0 .83  j 0 .76  ( 0 .71, 0 .80  j
S h 0 .58  [ 0 .46 , 0 .68  ] 0 .54  [ 0 .44 , 0 .62  ] 0 .52 ( 0 .44, 0.61 ]
8 p 0 .46  ( 0 .40, 0 .52  ] 0 .44  [ 0 .39 , 0 .48  ] 0 .37 [ 0 .30 , 0 .44  ]
<t> i 1.25 [ 1.05, 1.48 ] 1.26 [ 1.12, 1.44 ] 1.28 [ 1.14, 1.47 ]
4> 2 0 .50  [ 0 .45, 0 .54  ] 0 .3 6 ( 0 .3 2 ,0 .4 1  ] 0 .48 [ 0 .43, 0 .53  ]
P r 0 .77  ( 0 .72 , 0 .83  ] 0 .79  [ 0 .75 , 0 .84  ] 0 .77 ( 0 .73, 0 .82  ]
Pr* 0 .82  [ 0 .78 , 0 .86  ] 0.81 [ 0 .77 , 0 .84  ] 0 .82 [ 0 .78, 0 .85  ]
P a 0.89  [ 0 .86, 0 .92  ] 0 .88  [ 0 .85 , 0 .90  ] 0 .89  [ 0.86, 0 .92  ]
P y ' 0.81 [ 0 .76. 0 .87  1 0.82 ( 0 .78 , 0 .86  ] 0 .80  [ 0.72, 0 .87  1
Oa 0 .90  [ 0.68, 1.04 ] 0.91 [ 0.77 , 1.03 ] 1.03 [ 0.88, 1.19 )
Os 3 .63  [ 3.34, 3 .99  ) 3.79  [ 3 .47 , 4 .07  ] 3.82 ( 3 .50, 4.21 ]
o„ 6 .17  [ 5.87, 6 .49  ] 7.17 [ 6.87 , 7 .58  ] 6.31 ( 5.98, 6 .62  ]
OlTlI 1.22 1 1.07, 1.35 ] 1.15 ( 1.05, 1.23 ] 1.16 [ 1.03, 1.31 ]
O 7T f 2.54 [ 2.10, 2 .84  ] 2.21 ( 1.92, 2 .49  ] 2.50 I 2.01, 2 .86  ]
(J j’ 0.80  [ 0.70, 0 .90  ] 0 .8 2 ( 0 .7 2 ,0 .9 1  ] 0.78 [ 0.70, 0 .85  ]
Oy- 0.48  [ 0 .41, 0 .57  ] 0 .52 [ 0.44 , 0.61 ] 0 .48  [ 0.41, 0 .56  ]
CT j' * 0.64  [ 0.56, 0 .75  ] 0 .66  ( 0 .60 , 0 .72  ] 0 .65  [ 0.57, 0 .74  ]
1. The parameters a and ß  were fixed at 0.3 and 0.99 respectively.
2. Posterior statistics are computed after 75% burn in, the acceptance rate for all the Markov chains was around 20-30%.
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Figure 3.1: Posterior and prior marginal density plot
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Figure 3 .2: In fla tion  equivalent (tr) for various policy preferences 
closed economy A=0.5 v=0.5 <;=0 A=1 v=1 q=0
Mean=0.653 Mean=1.24 Mean=1.36
A=0.5 v=0.5 q=0.1 v=1 q=0.1 a=1 v=1 c;=0.2
Mean=4.16Mean=2.76Mean=3.03
A=0 V=1 q=0 A,=1 v=0
1 2 3 0 1 2  3
Figure 3.3: In fla tion  equivalent (fr) for A and
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3 .A A ppendix
3.A.1 Deriving the d om estic  NKPC
Rewriting the first order condition for dom estic firm ’s pricing decision in  equation  (3.18):
y i  Et S Qt,t+k^t+k 
k =0 l
Ph ,i ( Ph ,m - i V "  V Ph , , - . ) c _  Y Pn,t+kM Ct+k 0 (3.46)
S u b stitu te  Qt,t+k — ß k ( pEtT) from  th e  consum ption  E u ler equation  in (3.5) in
equation  (3.46) yields:
Y ^ W H f p f ' o r p c
k=0
pt~+\ c r +\ Y t+k (  P H , t + k - l \ S"
V P « ,t - 1 ) e _Y >^H,t+k M <Pt+k
0 (3.47)
Since Pt 1Ct a is know n a t da te  t, it can  be tak en  ou t of the  expectation  sum m ation , after 
rearrang ing  yields:
fc= 0
I  Pt-+\C ;+°kYt+k ( PH,t+k - A S" 
\  P h . ,- ,  ) E~ [ ^ C t+kPH,t+k
0 (3.48)
Log linearizing equation  (3.48) a ro u n d  the zero inflation steady  s ta te  to ob tain  the decision 
ru le  for pn.t gives:
OC
PH,t ~  Öh Ph j - l ~  (1 — P0h ) P i [PH,t+k ~ &h Ph ,t+k—i +  rnct+k]
k=o
=  (1 -  ßOH) [pH, t  -  Ö H P H , t - 1 +  m e t } (3.49)
OO
+  ß ö f i i  1 -  ß Ö H ) P t  ^ 2 / ß ^ H  \ p n , t  + k + 1 — Ö u P H , t+ k  +  m c t + k + l ]  
k = 0
Recognizing the la s t term  in equation  (3.49) is equal to ß6n\pH,t+ i -  öhPh j ], the  expression 
can be rew ritten  as:
PH,t -  ÖHPH.t- 1 ~  (1 -  POh ) [PH.t -  SHPH,t- 1 +  rnct] +  ßdH\pH,t+ 1 -  SHPH,t] (3.50)
Log-linearizing th e  dom estic aggregate price level in equation  (3.16) yields:
TTH.t  — (1 _  @h ) { pH, t  ~ P H , t - 1) + Qh Öh K h j -  1 (3.51)
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Combining equations (3.50) and (3.51) yields:
7T//,t -  =  ß E t  +  1 +  A //m C t (3.52)
where X H ( l - j39i i )( l -9i f)On . Rearrange to obtain equation (3.22) in the text:
1
1 + ßÖH
[ßEtnH,t+i +  öHTTH,t- 1 +  A Hmct] (3.53)
3.A .2 Data description
• Domestic output ( y t ) is seasonally adjusted log real GDP for New Zealand detrended 
using the HP filter with A — 1600.
• Overall inflation [ixt ) is the annualized quarter to quarter growth rate of the consum er 
price index (CPI) for New Zealand.
• Import inflation [ n p ^ )  is the annualized quarter to quarter growth rate of the import 
deflator for New Zealand.
• Nominal interest rate (rt) is the 90-day Bank Bill rate for New Zealand.
• Competitive price index (s() is the merchandize term s of trade m easured “at the dock” 
using overseas trade statistics.
• Real exchange rate (gt) is the log of the real exchange rate (using CPI) between New 
Zealand and the U.S.
• Foreign output (yt*) is seasonally adjusted log real GDP for the US detrended using the 
HP filter with A = 1600.
• Foreign real interest rate (ft*) is the short term US real interest rates.
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Chapter 4
U n c o v erin g  t h e  h it -list  fo r
SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS: A
B ayesian  stru ctu ra l  analysis
Abstract’
We estim ate underlying structu ra l macroeconomic policy objectives of three of 
the earliest explicit inflation targeters within the context of a small open economy 
DSGE model. We assum e central banks set policy optimally, such th a t we can 
reverse engineer policy objectives from observed time series data. Jo in t tests of 
the posterior distributions of these policy preference param eters suggest that the 
central banks are very similar in their overall objective. None of the central banks 
show a concern for stabilizing the real exchange rate. All three central banks 
share a concern for minimizing the volatility in the change in the nominal interest 
rate. We also show th a t the resulting optimal policy rule responds to exchange 
rate movements, even in the case where the central banks do not explicitly care 
about exchange rate stabilization. This result is also corroborated by results 
from an alternative simple-rule characterization and estim ation of central bank 
behavior. These last two findings point to the pitfalls of making inferences from 
the level of ad-hoc simple rules about w hat central banks may care about.
4 .1  In troduction
T N  THE RECENTLY popular class of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) mod- 
JL els, private economic agents such as consum ers and firms are often modeled as optimiz­
ing decision m akers. However, central bank behavior is typically described by a reduced-
form m onetary policy rule ra ther than  a set of deeper m onetary policy objectives often
‘ Chapter (4) is a summary of joint work with Timothy Kam (ANU) and Kirdan Lees (RBNZ) published in the 
Journal o f Money, Credit and Banking, volume 41, issue 4, p583-618.
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institu tionally  defined. Em pirical e s tim a tes  ob tained  from reduced-form  m onetary  policy 
ru les are  func tions of both  the  underly ing  s tru c tu re  of the  econom y and  policy objectives. 
C haracterizing  policy from the  level of policy objectives allows one to d istingu ish  changes 
in the policy ru le  th a t re su lts  from ch an g es to s tru c tu ra l p a ram ete rs  in the economy, from, 
changes in policy objectives.
Modeling th e  deeper cen tra l b an k  objectives en ab les  u s  to em pirically infer the  im por­
tance  a cen tra l b an k  p laces on p a rticu la r institu tionally -defined  m onetary  policy objectives 
su ch  as inflation stab ilization  and  o u tp u t stab ilization . In th is  paper, we apply th is  sim ple 
idea to a  new  em pirical problem  for sm all open econom ies. We tre a t the cen tra l b an k  as an  
optim izing agent, th u s  p lacing the  cen tra l b a n k  on the  sam e footing a s  the o th er optim izing 
agen ts in the  m odel econom y. We identify th e  m acroeconom ic objectives of th ree  of the e a r ­
liest explicit sm all-open-econom y inflation ta rg e te rs  - A ustralia , C anada and  New Zealand, 
over the period 1990Q1 - 2005Q 3. We estim ate  the  sam e DSGE m odel for each coun try  
and  reverse engineer stab ilization  objectives th a t a re  conditioned on the s tru c tu re  of each 
economy.
4 .1 .1  C ontributions
A considerab le  n u m b er of s tu d ie s  utilize loss function  p a ram e te rs  for optim al m onetary  pol­
icy experim ents (e.g. R udebusch  and  S vensson, 1999; Levin and  W illiams, 2003; Del Negro 
and  Schorfheide, 2005). However, D ennis (2006) a rg u es th a t typical loss function  param - 
eterizations m ay be in co n sis ten t w ith the  d a ta . In particu lar, th ese  yield aggressive policy 
ru les th a t a re  in co n sis ten t w ith the  observed in te re s t ra te  sm ooth ing  behavior docum ented  
in the lite ra tu re  (see Lowe an d  Ellis, 1997).
This p ap er co n trib u tes  to th is  debate  by explicitly identifying the  loss function  p a ram e­
te rs for th ree  m icrofounded sm all open econom ies conditioned on historical da ta . In p a r ­
ticular, we a sk  the following questions: (i) w h eth er o u r sam ple cen tra l b an k s  explicitly care 
abo u t stabilizing  the real exchange rate; and , (ii) w h eth er the ir policy p references are sim ilar 
overall. In doing so, ou r app roach  yields a deeper in sigh t into in stitu tionally  defined policy 
preferences. T his is in c o n tra s t to em pirical an a ly ses  (e.g. Lubik an d  Schorfheide, 2007) 
th a t inquire in to  the  behavioral resp o n ses  of cen tra l b an k s. We also provide a link betw een 
our em pirical analysis  of uncovering w h at cen tra l b a n k  preferences  are  and  the resu lting  
im plication for policy behavior. We argue  an d  show  th a t  it is s tra igh tforw ard  to derive the
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m apping  from preferences to equilibrium  behavior (i.e. reduced-form  policy rules) for the 
cen tra l b an k s , b u t the converse is not the case, if we begin the  analysis  from a n  ad-hoc 
behavioral rule.
The re su lts  from our analysis will help inform  m onetary  policy experim ents seek ing  o p ­
tim al policy ru les  for open econom y inflation ta rge te rs. E stim ates  of m acroeconom ic policy 
objectives can  potentially  en h an ce  both  the tra n sp a re n c y  and  accoun tab ility  of the  p rac ­
tical im plem entation  of m onetary  policy. M ost inflation  targeting  cen tra l b a n k s  describe 
them selves a s  “flexible" in  the ir approach  to inflation  targeting , im plying cen tra l b a n k s  ob ­
jectives em body factors beyond sim ply inflation. However, while cen tra l b a n k s  are  often 
explicit ab o u t th e  m acroeconom ic variables they  are  concerned  with, the trade-offs across 
these  m acroeconom ic objectives are  never e lucidated . We believe tran sp a ren cy  is enhanced  
by providing explicit s ta tem en ts  of how alternative  stab ilization  objectives are  w eighted (see 
Svensson, 2000) and  ou r analysis provides su ch  s ta tem en ts .
Finally, h istorical estim a tes  of stabilization objectives (conditioned on an  explicit s tru c ­
tu ra l and  m icrofounded model) provide a fram ew ork for cen tra l b a n k  b o ard s or governm ent 
agencies task ed  w ith a ssess in g  cen tral bank  perfo rm ance. For exam ple, c lause  4(b) of New 
Z ealand’s 2008  Policy T argets Agreem ent (PTA) -  the ag reem ent betw een the  G overnor of 
the Reserve B ank  of New Zealand and  the M inster of F inance -  s ta te s  tha t: “In p u rsu in g  
its price stab ility  objective, the B ank shall seek to avoid u n n ecessa ry  instab ility  in o u tp u t, 
in te rest ra te s  and  the exchange ra te ”. Simply observing the uncond itional volatilities of the 
goal variab les in the PTA can n o t provide an  exam ination  of m onetary  policy, since these  
volatilities are  also affected by non-policy s tru c tu ra l fea tu res  of the  econom y.
A nother con tribu tion  from our exercise is to provide a lte rna tive  fu ll-inform ation 
Bayesian estim ates  on a popu lar c lass of open econom y New-Keynesian m odel p a ram ete rs  
u n d e r the a ssu m p tio n  of optim al m onetary  policy. O ur B ayesian  posterio r e s tim a tes  m ay 
be used  for com parison  w ith existing estim ation  stra teg ies  th a t a re  conditional on sim ple 
policy ru les, o r sim ply for u se rs  who wish to ca lib ra te  th e ir m odels for policy sim ula tions.
4 .1 .2  Main findings
We find th a t none of the cen tra l b an k s show a concern  for stabilizing  the  real exchange ra te . 
However, all th ree  cen tra l b an k s  sh a re  a concern  for m inim izing the  volatility in th e  change 
in the  nom inal in te rest ra te . According to o u r analysis, the  Reserve B ank  of A ustra lia
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places the most weight on minimizing the deviation of ou tput from trend. In contrast to 
existing applications of Bayesian econometrics to the evaluation of DSGE models, we also 
compare the posterior distributions of the central b an k s’ preference param eters. Tests of 
the posterior distributions of these policy preference param eters suggest that the central 
banks have very similar preferences.
We also show that the resulting optimal policy rule still responds to exchange rate move­
ments, even in the case where the central banks do not explicitly care about exchange rate 
stabilization. We also estim ate a class of simple rules, as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), 
as an alternative representative of central bank  behavior, and this exercise also corrobo­
rates the exchange rate response result in the optimal policy. The former optimal rules may 
be comparable to the simple rules estim ates. The latter, as we show, may be misleading 
when used in empirical exercises to infer w hat central banks really care about.
4 .1 .3  R elated literature
Several au thors report empirical estim ates of the objectives of the US Federal Reserve sys­
tem. Salemi (1995) provides the earliest estim ates based on a VAR model. In contrast to the 
m andate of the Federal Reserve, Favero and Rovelli (2003), Castelnuovo and Surico (2004) 
and Dennis (2006) find either small or insignificant weights on output stabilization over 
the Volcker-Greenspan period. In addition, Ozlale (2005) and Dennis (2006) find a signifi­
cant weight on interest rate smoothing in the context of aggregate empirical models without 
explicit optimising firms and households. Furtherm ore Cecchetti et al. (2001) presents 
cross country estim ates from a non-structural model th a t has little dynamic structure. Ni- 
m ark (2006) provides estim ates of macroeconomic objectives for both the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) and the Federal Reserve th a t suggest the RBA pu ts more weight on output 
stabilization and interest smoothing than  the US Federal Reserve. However, Nimark’s paper 
uses a closed economy model that is silent on any preference for mitigating exchange rate 
volatility. Given A ustralia’s degree of openness and the focus of this paper, an open econ­
omy model appears necessary to approximate the constrain t the RBA faces in implementing 
monetary policy.
In contrast to Nimark (2006), we estim ate central bank  preferences for Australia, C anada 
and New Zealand, within an  open economy DSGE model. Furtherm ore, the DSGE model 
provides an incomplete exchange rate pass-through channel in import prices such that de-
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viations from the  law of one price (or a lternatively  real exchange ra te  deviations) m a tte r for 
the econom ies. Such  a  m odel provides a ra tionale  for incorporating  cen tra l b an k  p re fe r­
ences over exchange ra te  m ovem ents, a s  ind icated  in p ractice  by New Z ealand’s PTA for 
example.
O ur DSGE m odel ex tends Monacelli (2005) by in troduc ing  endogenous persistence  on 
both  the aggregate dem and an d  supply  sides of the  m odel an d  h a s  sim ilarities w ith J u s -  
tin iano  and  P reston  (2009). T his feature  is crucial for b ringing the  m odel closer to the  data , 
as show n in F ukac and  Pagan (2008). T hus, for exam ple, a  sim pler purely  forw ard-looking 
model u sed  in Lubik and  Schorfheide (2007) m ay be m isspecified.
We use  B ayesian m ethods to estim ate  th e  m odel an d  apply an  identical prior to each  of 
the coun tries in ou r sam ple. We m ake inferences regard ing  cen tra l b a n k  preferences u s ­
ing B ayesian posterior d is trib u tio n s on the m odel p aram eters . O ur B ayesian m ethodology 
closely follows related  p apers in the  lite ra tu re  (see S m ets and  W outers, 2003  and  R abanal 
and  Rubio-Ram irez, 2005  for example). A lthough we focus on policy objectives, the  e s ti­
m ates from o u r DSGE m odel should  also help inform  a  growing em pirical open econom y 
lite ra tu re  (see e.g. Ju s tin ia n o  and  Preston, 2009; Lubik and  Schorfheide, 2005, 2007).
The paper is organized as  follows. Section (4.2) se ts  o u t the  model. Section (4.3) ou tlines 
the em pirical m ethodology and  describes the d a ta  we use. S ections (4.4) and  (4.5) con tain  
our m ain  resu lts . We m ake concluding com m ents in section  (4.6) .
4 .2  The m odel
4 .2 .1  The average household
The stylized econom y is s im ilar to the open econom y m odel in M onacelli (2005) and  J u s ­
tin iano and  P reston  (2009). The econom y h a s  identical h o u seho lds w ith a  to tal population  
of m easu re  1. We assu m e  the functional form for period utility:
U (Ct . Ht , N t )
(Ct - H ty - a N }+tp 
l — a 1 + ’ (4.1)
w here Ct is an  index of consum ption  goods, Ht =  hCt~\ is an  ex ternal h ab it stock, w ith 
h G (0,1) cap tu rin g  the degree of hab it p ersistence  an d  Nt is lab o u r hou rs.
Define the prices for each  differentiated hom e an d  foreign good of type i e [0,1] and  
j  e  [0,1], respectively, a s  Pn.t (i) and PF.t (j). Let Bt be an  Arrow security  th a t pays ou t
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contingent on the s ta te  of the  world and  WtN t be the  to tal wage income. The stochastic  
d iscoun t factor is EtQt,t+i su ch  th a t it will be inversely related  to the g ross re tu rn  on a 
nom inal risk less one-period bond, EtQt<t+i =
The price-tak ing  average household  solves a B ellm an equation  problem:
V (Bt , Ht) =  max U (Ct , Ht , Nt) +  /?Et {V  / / t+1)} ; ß €  (0,1) (4.2)
C t ,N,
sub jec t to the  sequence of budget c o n stra in ts
Bt > f  [  {PH,t (») CH,t (i) +  PF,t (j) CF,t U)\ didj +  EtQt,t+iBt+i -  WtNt . (4.3) 
■ /o  J o
w ith B0 given.
The consum ption  index Ct is linked to a co n tin u u m  of dom estic, Cu.t (i)> a n d foreign 





Ctj,t= c di  , C p t — [ J  CF,t (j ) (4.5)
The elasticity  of su b stitu tio n  betw een hom e and  foreign goods is given by 77 > 0 and  the 
elasticity  of su b s titu tio n  betw een goods w ith in  each goods category (home and  foreign) is 
e > 0. O ptim al allocation of the household  expend itu re  acro ss  each  good type gives rise to 
the dem and functions:
(t-pd)c».‘- (^ 7 ^ )  cf.< |4-6>
for all i , j  e  [0, 1], w here th e  aggregate price levels are  defined as
1 1 j 1
ft»,, t t 1“ * )  ' PF-t = (l„  PFt (4.7}
and  optim al consum ption  dem and of hom e and  foreign goods can  be derived, respectively, 
as
‘ Cu CF,t = a ^ ' j  ' C>.
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S u b s titu tio n  of th ese  dem and  functions into (4.4) yields th e  co n su m er price index as
Pt [(1 -  «) PH~t +  ' l " ■ (4.8)
The in tra tem p o ra l condition  relating  labour supp ly  (the m arg inal ra te  of su b stitu tio n  b e ­
tw een co n su m p tio n  an d  leisure) to the real wage (the m arg inal p roduc t of labour) m u s t also 
be satisfied:
(Ct - H t )a N f  = ^  (4.9)
Finally, in te rtem p o ra l optim ality  for the househo ld  decision problem  m u st satisfy
* m  Mh,+i'h,y= e -'i+i- (4-io)
for all d a te s  a n d  s ta te  L e N, and  nt(ht+1 \hf) d eno tes the probability  m easu re  on the co n tin ­
u a tio n  h isto ry  (or s ta te , in the M arkovian case), conditional on th e  realized history. Taking 
conditional exp ec ta tio n s yields the fam iliar s to ch astic  E u le r equation
ßR-tMt.
( c t + i - H t + 1y °  
V c t - H t  J l.
4.2.2 International risk sharing and relative prices
The re s t of th e  world, deno ted  by v ariab les and  p a ram ete rs  w ith an  asterisk , solves a sim ilar 
problem  to th e  sm all open economy. Specifically, the  re s t of the  world is the lim iting case 
of a  closed econom y, w here o* —> 1. F irst-o rder conditions for optim al labour supply  and  
con su m p tio n , an a lo g u es of (4.9) and  (4.10), also hold for the  re s t of the  world. Given 
identical global p references and  com plete in te rn a tio n a l m ark e ts , we obtain  perfect risk  
sharing ,
ß
Ct+1 -  Ht+i




Q + i -  h i+1
c ;  -  H i
Pt
P t+1 /  Ve*+i
et (4.11)
for all d a te s  an d  s ta te s , w here et is the  nom inal exchange ra te . We also define conventionally 
the real exchange ra te  a s
Qt = etPt*/Pt . (4.12)
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A ssum ing ex an te  identical coun tries, and  no preference sh ocks to the  re s t of the world, 
th is  im plies th a t
ct - hct-i = r  (c; - hc;_x) o}. (4 . 1 3 )
w here i)* =  1 im poses ex an te  sym m etry  of co u n tries  an d  zero n e t foreign a sse t holdings.
Let Ct := li\{Ct/C ss),y*t := ln(Yt7 Y s*s) =  ln(Ct7<7;s), and  qt := In(Q t/Q *J, denote the  p e r ­
centage deviation of hom e consum ption , foreign o u tp u t and  real exchange ra te  from their 
respective steady  s ta te s , w here X ss is the  determ in istic  steady  s ta te  value of a  variable X t . 
Then, a  log-linear approxim ation  of (4.13) is
ct -  hct-i = Vt + -— ~Qt- (4.14)
G
Com plete m ark e ts  th u s  imply th a t global consum ption  will be perfectly correlated  in the 
absence  of deviations in the  real exchange rate.
From (4.11) we can  also derive the no-arb itrage  condition  for exchange ra tes, or the 
uncovered in te re s t parity  condition
R t. -  R* -zß— =  0, (4.15)
' e-t+ i
which m u st hold for all s ta te s  and  da tes  in a  globally com plete m ark e ts  setting . A log-linear 
approxim ation of th is, and  tak ing  expectations w ith respect to th e  tim e-t sigm a algebra, 
yields the fam iliar nom inal in te re s t parity  condition:
Etet+i -  et = r t -  r*t (4.16)
w here et := \n(et / e ss), an d  the  dom estic and  foreign ra te s  of re tu rn  are, rt = Rt -  I and  
r*t = R, -  1, respectively.
We can  define the  te rm s of trad e  a s  the  ratio  of the  foreign goods price index to the hom e 
goods price index. In log-linear te rm s th is  is
St =  PF. t  ~  PH, t -  (4.17)
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4 .2 .3  Production and optim al pricing
There is a  co n tin u u m  of m onopolistically com petitive dom estic p ro d u cers  i e [0,1] th a t p ro ­
duce differentiated  goods and  im port re ta ilers  j  e [0,1] th a t  add  m ark u p s  to goods im ported 
a t world prices. We em ploy sim ilar pricing a ssu m p tio n s  a s  in Ju s tin ia n o  and  Preston (2009) 
and  S m ets and  W outers (2003). In particu lar, th e  conventional Calvo-style optim al pricing 
m odels an d  p artia l inflation indexation for non-optim izing price se tte rs . T his allows infla­
tion to be partly  a ju m p  variable and  also partially  backw ard-looking.
4 .2 .3 .1  D om estic  goods firm s
D om estic goods firm s operate  a linear production  technology, Yjj,t (?) =  ea.tAft (?) w here ea,t is 
an  exogenous dom estic technology shock. D om estic firm s face an  indep en d en t signal th a t 
allows th em  to se t p rices optim ally each period w ith probability  1 Oh - In each period t, 
the  rem ain ing  fraction  On € (0,1) of firm s partia lly  index th e ir price to take into accoun t of 
aggregate dom estic inflation according to the  sim ple ru le
w here 6h € [0,1] m easu re s  th e  degree of inflation indexation . Since all firm s e ither receive 
the sam e signal to re se t prices or do not receive any  signal, they will choose the sam e 
pricing stra teg ies. Given Calvo price setting , it is stra igh tfo rw ard  to define the dynam ics 
of the aggregate price level of the dom estic goods. In p articu lar, define th e  evolution of the 
aggregate hom e goods price index as
C onsider a can d id a te  firm i th a t had  se t its  price optim ally in tim e t, a s  PH,t (?)• Suppose 
a t som e tim e t + s, s > 0, th e  price Pn.t (?) still prevails. T hen  the firm will have to face the 
dem and for its p ro d u c t given by the dem and co n stra in t
Note th a t m ark e t dem and  a t tim e t+ s  will take  in to  acco u n t the  inflation indexation  betw een 






CHAPTER 4. UNCOVERING THE HIT-LIST FOR SMALL INFLATION TARGETERS
Firm s th a t se t optim al prices do so to maxim ize th e ir  p re sen t value of th e  stochastic  
stream  of profits. A cand idate  firm i  solves
OC
max Et V  Q t , t + s OsH Y H , t + s ( i )
sub jec t to (4.20) for t, s e  N and  the technological co n stra in t given by real m arginal cost,
H,t (0
H,t+s  — 1
1
d / /
P H , t + s M C f j , t + s  exp (e//,t+s) (4.21)
w , ,
M C H ,t+ s  = ------- ^ ----- (4.22)
£ a , t + s  *H,t-\-s
Note th a t we also allow for a  s tru c tu ra l shock to real m arginal cost given by tn.t ~  
i.i.d.(0, o h )- This h a s  th e  in te rp re ta tion  of an  ind ep en d en t co s t-p u sh  shock  to dom estic 
goods producers.
The first o rder necessary  condition characterizing dom estic firm s’ optim al pricing func­
tion in a sym m etric equilibrium  is
E t  O 'hQt^t+s^H,t+s ( i )
s = 0
( P h ,i +s - i \ 6h
V P H , t - 1 J
J  P H , t + .  (* )  M C H , t+ s  exp ( t H , t + s ) 0 (4.23)
Let the  hom e goods infiation ra te  be nn.t '•= an d  yt ■— ln(Yt /Yss) be the
percentage deviation of hom e o u tp u t from steady  s ta te . D enote the  real m arginal cost 
in percentage deviation te rm s from its determ inistic  s tead y -s ta te  rncn,ss — [c/(e -  1)] ~1 as 
mcH.t.■ In appendix  (4.A. 1) we derive the log-linear approxim ation  of the optim al pricing 
decision rule, w hich can  easily be expressed as the following Phillips curve for dom estic 
goods inflation:
KH,t -  H,t — 1 = ß  ( E t 7Ttf , t+ l -  + AH + £H .t) (4.24)
w here \ h  = (1 -  /30//) (1 — 9 h ) Qh and
mcH.t W h  ~  (1  +  V7) e a , t  +  OiSt + (Vt ~  h V t - 1 )  +  Qt +  ec,t- (4.25)
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4 .2 .3 .2  Im port reta il firm s
Im port re ta ilers are  a ssu m ed  to p u rch ase  im ported goods a t  com petitive world prices. How­
ever, these  firm s ac t a s  m onopolistically competitively re -d is trib u to rs  of th ese  goods. This 
crea tes a gap betw een the price of im ported goods in dom estic cu rrency  te rm s and  the do­
m estic retail price of im ported goods. Define th is  law of one price (LOP) gap in  log-linear 
te rm s as:
i>F,t = et + p*t -  PF,t ■ (4.26)
The pricing behavior for im ports re ta ilers is sim ilar to th a t of dom estic goods p roducers. In 
short, the  evolution of the im ports price index is given by
PF.,=  I  ( l - # F ) ( P S r ) ‘~‘ + «F PF,t- 1
f~F,t — 1 
P F ,t — 2
Sf
(4.27)
An im porting firm  j  a t som e tim e t + s, s > 0, faces the dem and  for its  p ro d u c t given by the 
dem and co n stra in t
Y F ,t+ s  0 ) Pfj (j) P F .i+ .-O 4" 'Pf j+s 1__
C F, t+ s - (4.28)
Note th a t m arket dem and  a t tim e t+ s  will take  into acco u n t the  inflation indexation  betw een 
L and  t + s. A cand ida te  firm j  solves
max Et Y ]  Qt,t+s0sFYF,t+s 0 )  
PpAj)
P f j . 0 ) (  PF.t +  s -  1
V PF,t- 1
ÖF
e t+ s P F , t + s  0 )  CXP ( t F ,t+ s) (4.29)
sub jec t to (4.28) for l ,s  = 0,1,.... Here we also allow for a  s tru c tu ra l shock  to m arginal 
cost (world price of good j) given by eFt ~  aF). T his h a s  th e  in te rp re ta tion  of an
independen t co s t-p u sh  shock  to im ports retailers.
The first o rder necessary  condition characteriz ing  the  im port re ta ile rs’ optim al pricing 
function in the sym m etric equilibrium  is
E «  d sF Q t , t+ s Y F ,t+ s  ( j )  
8 =  0
/  P F . t + s - I
V PF,t-
<5 f
et+sPF,t+s ( j ) exp (eF,t+s) 0 (4 .3 0 )
Let 7tF t := ln(PF)t/P F,t- i)-  Log-linearizing th is  around  the  no n -sto ch astic  s teady  s ta te  yields
T^F,t =  /3Et (7TFit + l -  ^ F ^ F , t )  +  ^ F ^ F , t - 1 +  ^ F  { ^ F , t  +  t p , t ) , (4 .3 1 )
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w here XF = (1 -  ßOp) (1 -  6f ) 0Fl .
4 .2 .4  Term s of trade, real exchange rate and m arket clearing
We can  derive a re la tionsh ip  betw een the  te rm s of trade, the  real exchange ra te  a n d  the 
LOP gap. Specifically, log-linearizing the real exchange ra te  definition (4.12) a ro u n d  the 
determ in istic  steady  s ta te  we have
Qt =  et +  Pt -  pt . (4.32)
From  (4.26) we can  re-w rite th is  as
qt =  1>F,t + PF,t - P t ~  1>F,t -  (1 -  at) (PF,t ~ PH,t) = i>F,t -  (1 -  a) Si. (4.33)
w here the la s t term  is obtained by log-linearizing the  CPI definition and  th en  usin g  (4.17).
The rem ain ing  m arket-clearing  condition to consider is in th e  p roduct m ark e ts . In the 
re st of the world we have the lim it of a  closed econom y so th a t  yf = c*t for all t. In the 
sm all open economy, th is  requ ires th a t dom estic o u tp u t equals total dom estic an d  foreign 
dem and for hom e produced  goods. In log-linear te rm s th is  is
Vt = cH,t +  c*H t .
Since the  dem and  for hom e and  foreign consum ption  goods can  be w ritten  in log-linear 
form a s  CH,t =  (1 -  a) [arjst +  ct\ and  c*H t — a[rj (st +  ipF,t) + respectively, we can  w rite
Vt — (2 -  a) at]st + (1 -  a) ct +  ot-qipFi + cty*t . (4.34)
4 .2 .5  Log-linear approxim ation o f the m odel
In th is  section  we sum m arize the log-linearized equilibrium  conditions. The consum ption  
Euler equation  is ob tained  by log-linearizing (4.10) an d  tak ing  expectations conditional on 
the tim e-t sigm a algebra:
ct -  hct- 1 = Et (ct+ 1 -  hct) -  -— -  (rt -  Et7rt+i ) . (4.35)a
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D om estic goods inflation is given by (4.24) and  su b s titu tin g  ou t the term  mcH,t-
T^H.t — ß ^ t  { ^ H , t+ 1 “  ^ H ^ H , t )  +  1
+ A H <PVt ~  (1 +  V3) £a,t +  OcSt + - — -  (ct -  hct-i) 
1  —  n
+ A H t H , t (4.36)
Im ports inflation is given by (4.31) and  su b stitu tin g  ou t the  term  w ith (4.33):
TTF,t = jöEt (TXp,t+\ -  ^F^F,t) +  SpFF,t- 1 + AF [<?t ~ (1 ~ &) S t ] + \ F£F,t (4 .3 7 )
Leading (4.32) one period, first-differencing, taking the tim e-f conditional expectations op­
erator, and  th en  com bining w ith (4.16) yields the  real in te re s t parity  condition,
Et (qt+ 1 -  qt ) = (rt -  Et7rt+i) -  (r* -  Et7rt*+1) + eq>t. (4.38)
F irst differencing the te rm s of trad e  equation  (4.17) we have
St — St- 1 = FF,t — 7TH,t +  £ s , t -  (4.39)
Goods m arke t clearing (4.34) in com bination w ith (4.26) yields
yt =  (1 -  a) ct + onjqt + ai]st + ay*t (4.40)
F irst-differencing the CPI definition yields CPI inflation,
7rt =  (1 -  ct) irH,t +  onrF,t (4.41)
Exogenous s tochastic  processes for term s-of-trade, technology and  rea l-in terest-parity  
shocks:
£ji,t i T Vj ti Pj £ (0,1), Vj ~  i.i.d. (0, oj ) (4.42)
for j  = s, a, q. Recall the m arginal cost shocks in the hom e goods and  im port re ta ilers profit 
functions are  e# ~  i.i.d.(0,an)  and  eF ~  i.i.d.(0,aF), respectively.
Finally, for sim plicity we a ssu m e  th a t the foreign processes {n*.y*,r*} a re  given by un -
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0 b2 0 Vt-i
\  0 0 c3 J y r*t_ l
where  (i/w. ft> v y , t , tv .t)  ~  W (0./3).
a v  0 0
0 oy• 0
0 0 or.
'  1 '
uy',t
\  Ur" ,t J
(4.43)
4 .2 .6  Central bank preferences
Since the m odel p ossesses incom plete exchange ra te  p a ss  th ro u g h  in the sh o rt ru n  (which 
gives rise to p e rs is ten t gaps in the law of one price for im ported  goods) th ere  is a  po ten tial 
role for the cen tra l b an k  to m inim ize these  gaps. A lternatively, given the  te rm s of trad e  st 
from equation  (4.33), the  cen tra l b an k  can  ta rg e t th e  real exchange ra te  qt to stabilize these  
law of one price gaps, ipF.t-
Let 7ft := denote the an n u a l inflation  ra te  in  the  quarte rly  model. For co m p u ­
tational and  estim ation  pu rposes, we su p p o se  the  one-period general loss function  for the 
cen tra l b an k  is q u ad ra tic :2
L(Ttt,yt ,q t,r t -  rt- i )  = - (4.44)
The pa ram ete rs  py,p (l,ß r e  [0,-t-oo) exp ress th e  concern  w ith o u tp u t stabilization , real ex­
change ra te  stab ilization  and  targeted  in te rest ra te  sm ooth ing  respectively. T hese objectives 
are  expressed  relative to a concern  for a n n u a l inflation, 5ft , th a t  is norm alized to one. This 
specification of m acroeconom ic objectives enco m p asses  th e  expressed  goals of so-called 
“flexible" inflation targeting  cen tral b an k s  by allowing for positive w eights to the  a rg u m en ts  
o ther th a n  inflation in the loss function .
In addition  to  the  o u tp u t argum en t, o u r loss function  specification inc ludes a w eight 
on the change in the in te rest ra te . C entral b a n k s  typically change policy in successive in ­
crem ental changes in the  policy ra te  in th e  sam e direction  an d  m any p ap ers  included the
*Our earlier estimates have also utilized assumptions on { n * , y * , r’ } as being generated by a VAR(l) process and 
also a limiting closed-economy New-Keynesian model under a first best fiscal-monetary policy arrangement. The 
former is statistically more flexible than our current assumption, and the latter is a stricter theoretical restriction 
on the data. We found that these assumptions do not matter very much. Thus, a reasonable middle ground for 
statistical flexibility and parsimony in our model parameterization would be to use our current assumption.
2Our aim is recover the macroeconomic objectives of open economy central banks. We take no stance on 
normative design aspects of what these objectives should be. Rather, we simply seek what our three open economy 
inflation targeters have tried to achieve over the sample period.
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change in the interest rate in the loss function (see Svensson (2000), for example). Empiri­
cally the change in the interest rate term  m atters. Dennis (2006) shows th a t a high weight 
should be attached to the change in interest rates to capture the dynamics on interest rates 
in the US data. Furtherm ore, we allow for the possibility th a t our open economy central 
banks may be concerned with stabilising the real exchange rate. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) 
suggest there are costs to exchange rate volatility th a t generates consum ption volatility and 
costly hedging activities on the part of firms, although Bergin et al. (2007) dem onstrate th a t 
the costs of exchange rate volatility may be small.
From a public finance perspective, such assignm ents of policy objective functions are 
clearly ad hoc. For example, the literature following the method of deriving an  approxim ate 
private-welfare-based loss function in Woodford (2003) would argue th a t the loss function 
param eters are not “free” bu t m ust be constrained by the preferences of the representative 
household. However, in defence of our approach we make three argum ents.
First, mapping a second-order approximation of the welfare maximizing central-bank 
loss function from household preferences in closed form (see e.g. Benigno and Woodford, 
2008) generally imposes highly nonlinear structu ra l restrictions on the loss function p a­
ram eters. Since these restrictions on the approxim ate loss function are likely to be mis- 
specified with respect to, or too dem anding on, the empirical data generating process, we 
have chosen to treat the loss function param eters as free. Second, from an empirical per­
spective our loss function cap tures the goal variables Australia, C anada and New Zealand 
have institutionally defined as m onetary policy objectives. In the case of New Zealand, there 
is a legislated set of policy objectives: price stability, output, in terest rates and the exchange 
rate. Finally, our formulation of objectives is consistent with the m onetary policy literature 
th a t seeks to evaluate the efficacy of alternative m onetary policy rules using quadratic loss 
functions (see e.g. Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999; Levin and Williams, 2003).
4 .2 .6 .1  O ptim al tim e-co n s is ten t m onetary p o licy
To keep the empirical s tructu re  arising from optimal policy manageable, we assum e that 
the central bank  m ust implement optimal policy which is time consistent. In particular, 
we restrict our notion of time-consistency to a class of dynamic games characterized by 
Markov-perfect equilibrium payoffs and strategies.3
3 Our methodology also encodes the option for solving and estim ating the model u nder the  assum ption  th a t 
central banks comm it to an  ex-ante optimal m onetary policy plan. However, th is alternative assum ption  would be 
beyond the scope of th is paper.
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Define W  (et ,zt_i) as the value function of the central ban k ’s optimal action a t time t 
given state  zt_ i := { c t-u y t- i^ H ^ t- i^ F ^ - i}  and et := {nfi y*t , r*t , {cj,*}), for j  = s,a ,H ,F ,q . A 
strategy of the central bank  is a sequence of policy functions {rt {tt , z t _ i ) } ^ 0 and the pri­
vate sector’s collective strategy would be the sequence of allocation and pricing functions 
{ct,^H,t^F,t,Qt,st ,y t}^l0- In principle, we can and we do, characterize our Markov-perfect 
equilibrium as if it were supported by central bank strategies th a t involve picking a se­
quence of all pricing and allocation functions, and private sector strategies then would be 
to pick expectations of such future outcomes under the central ban k  strategy which are 
consistent with the equilibrium definition. More precisely, we define an  equilibrium under 
tim e-consistent optimal m onetary policy as follows.
Definition 1 (Linear-quadratic Markov-perfect equilibrium (LQ-MPE)) A LQ-MPE in this 
economy is a sequence o f allocation and pricing functions,
{ u t f t i  z t — 1)  }  t = 0  ;:= { Ctl 7rH, t i  ^F, t i  Qt j r t }  s t: U t } t = 0  >
that satisfies:
(i) The central bank’s Bellman equation,
W (ct , zt—i) = min L (nt ,y t,q t,rt -  rt- 1 ,) + fiEtW  (et+ i ,zt ) (4.45)
subject to (4.35)-(4.41),
(ii) Private sector competitive equilibrium conditions (4.35)44.41) with conditional expecta­
tions consistent with the solution to the problem (4.45), and
(iii) Given the exogenous stochastic processes (4.42)-(4.43).
Notice th a t the central bank  takes private expectations as given when it sequentially 
optimizes. We com pute solutions to the familiar LQ-MPE problem using the algorithm of 
Dennis (2004a). In the existing Bayesian literature on such models, one often estim ates a 
reduced form Taylor type rule. However, when the central bank  optimizes under discretion, 
it can be shown, as in Dennis (2004a), th a t policy preference param eters and deep param ­
eters place non-linear constra in ts on a reduced-form policy feedback rule. To m ake the 
model stochastically richer, we will linearly append a noise term  to the resulting optimal
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interest rate rule, rt (et ,z t- 1), denoted as er,t ~  i.i.d.(0. a?.), which has the usual interpretation 
of an exogenous monetary policy shock.
4 .3  Em pirical in v estig a tio n
The first question we would like to ask is the following: Do these flexible inflation-targeting 
central banks place much weight on exchange rate deviations? Existing papers have fo­
cused on whether and how much central banks respond  to exchange rates at the behavioral 
level of reduced form interest-rate rules (see Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007 and Justin iano  
and Preston, 2009). The second question is whether the preferences of the central banks 
are “different” or “similar”. We address these empirical questions using Bayesian empirical 
m ethods on the model structure we have.
4 .3 .1  E stim ation  strategy
We are interested in estim ating the structural or deep parameters of our model and vari­
ations of it. We classify a candidate model M  by its list of parameters, 0 . We proceed by 
estim ating two versions of the model for each country. The first version utilizes the gen­
eral one-period loss specification in (4.44). We will call this larger model M\ in subsequent 
discussions.
The set of parameters to be estim ated are the following central back preference pa­
rameters, {/jy,/ir,/if/}, the private sector deep parameters, {h,a,(j),r].SH,SF,0H,9F} and the 
parameters for exogenous processes {a i , b2, 03, pa, p,, • ps , oh , 0f , er«, Oq, *, oy•, ar*, or}.4
The second version, which we shall denote as model M2, u ses (4.44) but restricting pq = 
0. We can then address the first question by using Bayesian posterior odds com parisons to 
see if a model with or without pq =  0 is more probable, all other things equal.
Our estim ation procedure u ses the random-walk-Metropolis Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) method. We outline this popular algorithm in Appendix (4.A.2) . Table (4.1) su m ­
marizes the prior marginal density functions we use on each estimated parameter in the 
models. We use fairly agnostic or dispersed prior densities as evident in the wide 95% con­
fidence intervals around the prior m ean s .5 To ensure that theoretical restrictions on the
4There is very little information in the d a ta  to help u s  pin down the discount factor 3 and  im ports share  in 
domestic consum ption, a, so we set these a s  0.99 and 0.45, respectively.
5We have also conducted alternative MCMC sim ulations based on competing prior density specifications. Our 
reported resu lts  are  generally robust to these prior specifications. These less in teresting resu lts  are no t reported 
in the paper.
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param ete r space  are satisfied, we draw  from prior densities th a t are restric ted  to the  ap p ro ­
priate  su p p o rts . For exam ple, we define a prior density  for th e  Calvo p a ram eter 6h to have 
the dom ain  (0,1).
For each  cand idate  0 , the linear ra tional expecta tions (RE) system  including the optim al 
m oneta iy  policy problem  is solved to obtain  an  affine solu tion , {A (0) . C (0)}, in te rm s of 
the endogenous s ta te  variab les yt and  the c en tra l-b an k  policy decision variables, x t (which 
is ju s t  the  sca la r rt in o u r case):
6+ i =  A (0 )&  +  C ( 0 ) e t+1 (4.46)
w here := (yt , x t ). We can  m ap som e of the  variab les in to a vector of observable variables, 
y° u sing  an  observation  equation:
yt° =  G&. (4.47)
We se t th e  length  of the  p a ram e te rs’ M arkov chain  to be N  =  2 x 106 draw s and  remove the 
first ha lf of the  sam ple (the “b u rn - in ” period) to rem ove any effect of the  initial condition of 
the M arkov chain  { 0 n}neN and  also perform  som e diagnostic  te s ts  to check th a t ou r MCMC 
procedure h a s  converged to its stab le , invarian t d istribu tion .
4.3.2 Data
Each m odel we consider h a s  n ine s tru c tu ra l shocks. To avoid s tochastic  singularity , we
m atch  th ese  to nine observable tim e series for each  of ou r sam ple countries: A ustralia ,
C anada  and  New Zealand. We u se  quarterly  d a ta  over the  period 1990Q1 to 2005Q 3.6
The tim e series d a ta  are  from the IMF’s International Financial Sta tistics  d a tab ase , w ith the
exception of A u stra lian  and  New Z ealand CPI inflation series, w hich were obtained from the
Reserve B ank of A ustra lia  and  the  Reserve B ank  of New Zealand, respectively. The d a ta  we
collect (with th e ir  correspond ing  theoretical co u n te rp a rts  in p aren theses) are  im port price
inflation in hom e cu rrency  as a proxy for foreign goods inflation (71>,t := pp,t -  PF,t-1). hom e-
US real exchange ra te  (qt), the  ‘te rm s of trad e ’ co n stru c ted  a s  the  ratio  of im port prices to
export prices (st := pF.t ~ P//,t). hom e real GDP (yt), hom e CPI inflation (7rt), hom e nom inal
6The Reserve Bank of New Zealand officially began targeting inflation in February 1990 and Canada followed 
one year later. The Reserve Bank of Australia suggests that inflation targeting was officially adopted in the first half 
of 1993. However, Bernanke et al. (1999) note that Australian interest rates rose dramatically in the late 1980s 
with no noticeable increase in inflation and conclude the RBA possessed objectives for inflation that predate the 
announced adoption of inflation targeting. Since we seek to define preferences via the underlying interest rate rule, 
we define the inflation targeting period in Australia as beginning slightly earlier than some other commentators.
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(overnight cash) in te rest ra te  (rd, the  US CPI inflation ra te  from FRED (7rt*), US o u tp u t (yf*), 
and  the US federal funds ra te  (rf*).
We detrend  using  the  H odrick-Prescott filter and  co n stru c t an  o u tp u t gap of deviations 
of o u tp u t from th is  trend . We use  the  H odrick-Prescott filter b ecau se  we p u rsu e  a positive 
ra th e r  th an  a norm ative descrip tion  of policy objectives and  over ou r sam ple period, m o n ­
etary  policy h a s  been driven by an  o u tp u t gap m ethodology. T his is tru e  of A ustralia  (see 
the  sm all A ustra lian  m odel described in Beechey et al., 2000), C an ad a  (in p a rticu la r the 
Q uarterly  Projection Model, described in Coletti et al., 1996) an d  New Z ealand (see the New 
Z ealand’s core policy model, the  F orecasting  an d  Policy System , detailed in Black et al., 
1997b and  for a  m ore recen t descrip tion  of the  role of th e  o u tp u t gap in policy, H argreaves 
et al., 2006). Over the  la tte r p a r t of our sam ple, o u tp u t gaps filtered w ith a m ultivariate 
filter have been  used , a lthough  th ese  m easu re s  a re  no t quan tita tively  d issim ilar (see H a r­
greaves et al., 2006  for example). We also filter th e  te rm s of trad e  and  real exchange ra te  
d a ta  u sing  the  HP filter for sim ilar reaso n s. As ro b u s tn e ss  checks, we have repeated  the 
reported  exercises u sing  an  alternative  d e trend ing  m ethod . The m ain  conclusions from our 
m odel com parison  exercises do no t change.
4.4 Results
Before we tu rn  to ad d ressin g  ou r first em pirical question  of w h e th e r the  cen tral b a n k s  in 
question  care  explicitly ab o u t the  exchange rate , we will d iscu ss  th e  estim ates  of param eters  
in the m odels them selves and  show  th a t the  e stim a tes  are  qu ite  p lausib le  economically. 
In section (4.4.2) we take  u p  the  first m ain  question . In section  (4.4.3) we repeat the 
sam e exercise u n d e r an  alternative  d a ta  d e -trend ing  assu m p tio n , to en su re  th a t o u r re su lt 
is ro b u st to th is  assu m p tio n . In section  (4.4.4) we will ad d re ss  the  second question  of 
w hether th ese  cen tra l b a n k s  are  sim ilar in th e ir policy preferences. Finally, in section (4.5) 
we highlight th e  im plications of o u r policy-preferences analysis for reduced-form  behavioral 
policy resp o n ses  and  also com pare the re su lt w ith estim atio n s of a  c lass  of Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2007)-type ad  hoc sim ple ru les.
4 .4 .1  Structural param eter estim a tes
The estim ated  p rior and  posterior density  functions on the  key s tru c tu ra l model p a ra m ­
eters for A ustralia , C anada  and  New Z ealand are displayed in figures (4.1) -(4.3) . Mean
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estim ates, s tan d a rd  deviations, and  95 p ercen t confidence in tervals for the posterior e s ti­
m ates are  reported in tab les (4.3) -(4.5) .
In addition , the tab les repo rt su m m aries  of d iagnostic  te s ts  for convergence of the 
M arkov ch a in s  of the param eters . The convergence te s t s ta tis tic s  were com puted  by tak ing  
a su b sequence  of the to tal 2 million draw s, w ith a length  of 0 .5  million draw s, to reduce 
com putational b u rd en . The NSE in the fifth co lum n refers to th e  num eric  s ta n d a rd  error 
a s  an  approxim ation to th e  tru e  posterior s ta n d a rd  e rro r described  in Geweke (1999). The 
p-values in the  six th  colum n refer to the equality  te s t betw een the  m ean s calcu lated  using  
the  first and  second h a lf of the  chain . In each  of th e  m odels, th e re  are  only one or two 
pa ram ete rs  th a t did no t satisfy the equality  te s t a t the  5 percen t level. None of the  te s t 
s ta tis tic s  are  significant a t the  1 p ercen t level and  th e re  is no obvious p a tte rn  to w hich 
coefficients fail the  equality  test.
The seventh  colum n show s the un ivaria te  “sh rin k  fac to rs” u sin g  the  ratio  of betw een- 
and  w ith in-chain  variances a s  in B rooks an d  G elm an (1998). A sh rin k  factor close to 1 is 
evidence of convergence to a s ta tio n ary  d istribu tion . A lm ost all of the  sh rin k  factors were 
less th a n  1.1 and  the m axim um  value ac ro ss  the  six m odels is 1.26. The p a ram ete rs  w ith 
a sh rin k  factor g rea te r th an  1.1 are th o se  p a ram e te rs  th a t did no t satisfy  the  5 p ercen t 
equality  test. Overall, the  evidence suggests  th a t the M arkov ch a in s  have converged to 
the ir s ta tio n ary  d istribu tion .
4 .4 .1 .1  A ustralia
The m arginal posterior density  es tim ates  for the  key p a ram e te rs  for A ustra lia  are  displayed 
in figure (4.1) for the case  w here the  cen tra l b an k  is restric ted  to p u t no w eight on exchange 
rate  variability.
The full se t of model es tim ates  is reported  in tab les  (4.2) for m odel M\  and  table (4.3) for 
m odel A/2. O ur posterior m ean  estim ates  of the  Calvo-type frequency of price changes are  
0H ^  0.77 for Mi and  0H ^  0.8 for A/2, and, 0F ^  0.68 for Mi  and  0F ^  0.72 for A/2, respectively, 
in the hom e goods and  im ported goods sectors. T his sugg ests  th a t in the  hom e goods sector, 
the average d u ra tio n  th a t prices rem ain  fixed is betw een  4 .3  to 5 q u a rte rs  across the  two 
m odels. Sim ilarly, for the  im ported goods sector, average prices s tay  the  sam e for 3 to 3 .6  
q u a rte rs  on average. The “backw ard-look ingness” in the  Phillips curves, rep resen ted  by Sh 
and  SF, is qu ite  low, especially, for the im ported  goods sector. The high degrees of price 
stick iness im ply th a t inflation is no t very sensitive to changes in m arg inal cost (or LOP
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gap) movements, and therefore, a smaller and slower transm ission of m onetary policy to 
inflation.
In contrast, consum ption is very sensitive to real-interest-rate changes because the es­
timate of a, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, is quite close to 1. The degree of habit 
persistence is quite high, h «  0.9. This has the opposite effect on the sensitivity of con­
sum ption to real-interest-rate changes. The uniform w ithin-sector dem and elasticity of 
substitu tion estim ate is rj «  0.36 (Mi) or rj «  0.17 (M2). This is lower than  typical calibra­
tions. For example, Monacelli (2005) sets rj m 1.6. A low rj implies tth or domestic ou tput 
gap is not very sensitive to term s of trade movements compared to usual calibrations, all 
else equal. The inverse labour supply elasticity is 0 ^  1.5.
4 .4 .1 .2  Canada
The marginal posterior density estim ates for the key param eters for C anada are displayed 
in figure (4.2) . The full set of model estim ates is reported in table (4.4) for model M\ and 
in table (4.5) for model A/2.
Notable exceptions for C anada’s results are that the degrees of backward-looking behav­
ior in firm s’ pricing are m uch higher than  the estim ates for Australia. Here we have Sh and 
öp estim ated in the order of 0.65 and 0.8 respectively.
4 .4 .1 .3  New Zealand
The marginal posterior density estim ates for the key param eters for New Zealand are dis­
played in figure (4.3) for the case where ^f/ = 0. The full set of model estim ates are reported 
in table (4.6) for model A/j and table (4.7) for model M2.
The private sector deep param eters in New Zealand are quite sim ilar to Australia with the 
notable exception th a t the uniform within-sector dem and elasticity of substitu tion estim ate 
of rj «  1 is m uch higher than  in Australia or Canada. This implies a greater elasticity of 
substitution of consum ption between home and foreign goods in the model. It also implies 
that New Zealand’s ou tput gap will be very responsive to term s of trade movements.
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4 .4 .2  Are the central banks concerned  about “exchange rate vo la til­
ity ”?
Our first empirical question asks whether these flexible inflation-targeting central banks 
care about the real exchange rate explicitly. Consider two competing models of central 
banks for a dataset y. Denote a flexible inflation targeter with one-period payoff sum m arized 
by (4.44) as Afl := {0 : 0 < /i(; € 0}. Let the alternative central bank that does not target 
exchange rate deviations be given by A/2 := {0 : 0 = /i,, G 0}.
Table (4.8) sum m arizes our model com parison based on the posterior odds ratio or 
Bayes factor, which in our case, is the ratio of the marginal likelihoods of the two competing 
models. The marginal likelihood of each model for a given data  set is numerically computed 
using the modified harm onic m ean estim ator in Geweke (1999). For each of the three 
countries, there is a “better fit” of the data for model M2 than  Mi. For example, consider 
Canada which has the lowest Bayes factor of 2.97 x 104 across the three economies. In order 
to infer th a t the Bank of C anada explicitly targets exchange rate volatility (Ah), one would 
need to have a prior belief on Mi which is 2,970 times stronger than  one’s prior belief on 1\I2. 
Our result in favour of M2 is corroborated by the observation th a t the posterior densities 
of yq, in the case of model M \, estim ated for all three countries is very tightly centered 
around a positive num ber close to zero. Our result suggests th a t these small open economy 
inflation targeters do not explicitly target exchange rate fluctuations via their interest rate 
decisions.
4 .4 .3  R obustness o f result
We also ensure th a t the previous model com parison result is not an artifact of our data  
de-trending assum ption. We report an alternative set of results, sum m arized in Table (4.9) 
, which assum es that the cyclical com ponents of the ou tput gap, the term s of trade, the 
real exchange rate, and consum ption are constructed by removing a linear trend from each 
series. For each of the three countries, there is a “better fit” of the data for model M2 than
Mi.
4 .4 .4  Central banks’ objectives and sim ilarities
In this section we address the second empirical question of w hat are the features of these 
central b anks’ preferences and whether they are sim ilar in a statistical sense. More pre-
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cisely, we will be looking a t the  “degree of overlap” betw een th e  m arginal posterior d is tr ib u ­
tions, and  also th e  jo in t posterior d istribu tions, on th e ir preference param eters .
Inspection  of th e  re su lts  displayed in tab les (4.2) -(4.8) , reveal th a t the  following fea tu res 
drive cen tra l b a n k  objectives in A ustralia , C an ad a  and  New Zealand. F irst, these  cen tral 
b a n k s  care  a  lot ab o u t sm ooth ing  in te rest ra te  m ovem ents. Second, there  is no t a  lot of 
w eight placed on the  o u tp u t gap, a re su lt consis ten t w ith a s trong  inflation targeting  focus 
for th ese  cen tra l b an k s . Finally, these  cen tra l b a n k s  place v irtually  no w eight on exchange 
ra tes.
C ro ss-co u n try  com parisons of the preference p a ram ete rs  reveal w hether o u r th ree  open 
econom y inflation  ta rg e te rs  po ssess  sim ilar objectives. Figure (4.4) g rap h s the posterior 
d is trib u tio n s  of bo th  th e  o u tp u t stabilization  pa ram ete r and  the  in te rest ra te  sm oothing 
p a ram ete r for each  cou n try  on the sam e axes. The degree to w hich each coun try  sh a re s  
sim ilar stab ilization  objectives is illu stra ted  by the  degree of sim ilarity  betw een the posterior 
d istrib u tio n s.
To m easu re  the  c loseness of two d is tribu tions, D eJong et al. (1996) c o n s tru c t a  m etric 
u sin g  th e  C onfidence In terval Criterion (CIC). The CIC is:
w here Pj(sj) is th e  d is trib u tio n  of the sim ulated  model s ta tis tic  and  s*. i =  l , . . (Jn, are  the 
d is trib u tio n s  of in te re s t w here a = \  and  b =  1 -  a are  p a rticu la r quan tiles  of a  reference 
d is trib u tio n  D(si ) th e  ta ils of w hich are  tru n ca ted  by the  p a ram e te r 7. T his im plies th a t the 
CIC is in fact b o u n d ed  by 0 an d  (1 - 7 )_1 (such th a t the CIC is only bounded  betw een 0 and  
1 for the  special case  w hen  7 =  0). The CIC s ta tis tic  can  be th o u g h t of a s  m easu ring  the 
overlap in two d is trib u tio n s.
A CIC s ta tis tic  close to the  upper bound  (1 -  7 )_1, im plies the  d is trib u tio n s are  very 
sim ilar. A CIC close to zero im plies the  d is tribu tions are  no t particu larly  sim ilar because  ei­
th e r  th e  location of th e  d is trib u tio n s  is different or the reference d istribu tion  is particu larly  
diffuse.
D eJong et al. (1996) advocate using  the following m easu re  a s  a  te s t for any  difference in 
location of th e  d istrib u tio n s:
(4.48)
, EPj(si) — ED(si)
dji = ----- / . . . .  =---y/var(D(si))
(4.49)
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such that a large difference in expected values (and hence expected location) generates 
a large test statistics while diffusion in the reference distribution D(Si) reduces the test 
statistic.
Inspecting figure (4.4) , the ou tput stabilization param eter in the top half of the figure 
shows th a t all three countries place some weight on output stabilization. C anada appears 
to put the least weight on output stabilization with the left m ost posterior distribution with 
a posterior mode of 0.147. The corresponding distribution for New Zealand is very similar 
in both shape and location, with a posterior mode of 0.217. With 7 =  0.1 the CIC re tu rns 
a value of 0.864, indicating th a t C anada and New Zealand share a similar concern for 
ou tput stabilization. The A ustralian posterior distribution places a higher weight on output 
stabilization with a posterior mode of 0.384. The CIC between Australia and Canada is 
m uch sm aller -  0.186 although the CIC re tu rn s  a statistic of 0.475 for the overlap between 
output stabilization in Australia and New Zealand.
The panel in the bottom half of figure (4.4) shows the overlap of the preference for 
interest rate smoothing across the three countries. All three countries show some interest 
rate sm oothing behavior. Australia appears to place the least weight on smoothing the 
interest rate, re turning a posterior model of 0.493 while the corresponding param eter is 
0.647 for C anada and 0.732 for the case of New Zealand. However, the CIC statistics 
emphasize sim ilarities ra ther than  differences. The overlap in preferences for smoothing 
interest rates is 0.830 between Australia and Canada, 0.829 for Australia and New Zealand, 
and 1.0364 for C anada and New Zealand (which is greater than  one since 7 = 0.1, implying 
(1 - 7)-1 «  1.1).
A natural question is w hether the overall macroeconomic objectives of each country are 
identical. This is a joint test of w hether the distribution of the preferences for macroeco­
nomic stabilization and interest rate smoothing are the same. Rather than  averaging the 
CIC criterion across the preference param eters, we construct a multivariate version of the 
CIC by generating a three dimensional histogram  of joint draws from the posterior. For 
convenience we set 7 = 0 and compare the volumes generated by integrating over the pref­
erence param eters for each country. We use 500,000 draws from the posterior and use a 
total of 625 bins to characterise the joint distribution.
This jo in t test re tu rn s  a high degree of similarity across the distributions. Between 
Australia and Canada, we find th a t 90.6 percent of the draws can be characterised by the 
sam e distribution; and this figure rem ains high between Australia and New Zealand (93.4
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percent) and  betw een C an ad a  and  New Z ealand (94.3 percent). T h u s o u r re su lts  indicate 
th a t  th e  p references of th ese  th ree  sm all open econom y inflation ta rg e te rs  are, in fact, p retty  
sim ilar.
4 .5  Im p lication s for reduced-form  sim p le p o licy  rule anal­
y se s
In th is  section , we provide the  link betw een o u r em pirical analysis  of uncovering w hat 
cen tra l b a n k  preferences a re  and  the re su ltin g  im plication  for policy behavior. W hile it 
is s tra igh tfo rw ard  to derive the m apping  from preferences to equilib rium  behavior for the 
cen tra l b an k s , the converse is no t th e  case, if one begins the  analysis  from an  ad-hoc 
behavioral rule. T h u s analyses, su ch  a s  Lubik a n d  Schorfheide (2007), m ay not be very 
inform ative if one w ishes to a sk  the sort of questio n  we ad d ressed  in th e  previous sections.
The estim ated  M arkov-perfect equilib rium  in each  of the  m odels reported  in Tables (4.2) 
to (4.7) im plies a  reduced-form  optim al m oneta ry  policy decision ru le .7 In th is  section 
we show  th a t  ou r es tim ates  acro ss  all sam ple d a ta  se ts  im ply reduced-form  policy ru les 
th a t  respond  to exchange ra te  m ovem ents. T his re su lt rem ains, even in the case w hen the 
cen tra l b a n k  h as  no explicit concern  for stab iliz ing  the  exchange ra te  in its  loss function. 
To conserve space, we only report the exam ple from A ustralia .
A rep resen ta tio n  of the  resu lting  (m ean or m edian) M arkov-perfect equilibrium  ru le  for 
A ustra lia , w hen p,, > 0 can  be expressed  as:
rt =  0.16?’t- i  — O.llct + 0.047T/rt — 0.057th.i ~ 0.23qt — 0.01st — 0.11yt — 0.0l7T(
+ 0.01 7t( -  0.037Tt_i + P 2,s((l -  a)0.74)_1[At/>Fjt -  A et -  7rt* + 7r*]
+ other exogenous terms. (4.50)
w here P 2s ~  -0.04 an d  a = 0.4.8
7The full set of results, computational method, and further discussions can be found in a Supplementary 
Appendix to this paper.
8The variable associated with the parameter P ‘2 ,s ((l -  a)0.73)_1 comes from the terms-of-trade growth identity 
in equation (4.39) in the paper, repeated here as:
si -  st-i =  np.t ~  KH.t +  fs,t-
From this, and the relationship between terms of trade and the real exchange rate (equation (4.33) in the paper) 
and the nominal exchange rate (equation (4.32) in the paper), we have the expression, re-written as:
e.s =  —-— [AxpF.t ~ Aet -  tt,* + 7rt] -  n F,t +  *H,t■
1 — Oe
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The averaged representation for the optimal reduced form policy rule for Australia, when 
pq = 0, has the following form:
rt =  0.12rt_i -  0.07ct -  0.047th,t +  0.027rF,t -  0.21 qt -  0.01s,. -  0.07yt -  O.OItt,
+ 0.007T, -  0.037rt_! + P 2,s((l -  a)0.75)_1[A^F,t -  Aet -  ix*t  +  7rt]
+ other exogenous terms. (4.51)
where P 2 ,s ~  -0.03 and a  =  0.4.
Across all three country data sam ples, the overall policy response elasticities w hen pq =  0 
are quite similar in sign but more attenuated in m agnitude to the case when pq > 0. This 
is especially the case, for our response variable of interest: (i) the level of the real exchange 
rate, (ii) the response to nominal exchange rate growth.
This result show s that behavioral response to exchange rates is not inconsistent with a 
central bank that has no explicit concern for stabilizing m ovem ents in the real exchange  
rate. Furthermore, it provides an optimal policy basis for results found in existing work 
using ad-hoc Taylor type rules -  e.g. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) -  that som e central 
banks do respond to m ovem ents in nominal exchange rate growth. That the central banks 
still respond optimally to exchange rate m ovem ents even when pq — 0 reflects the endoge­
nous law-of-one-price gap feature of the Monacelli (2005)-style model we use. Monacelli 
(2005) showed that in a model such as ours, it is no longer sufficient for policy to stabilize 
a m easure of domestic goods price inflation and output gap. There still exists a monetary- 
policy trade-off arising endogenously from the law-of-one-price gap in imperfect imports 
price pass-through. This also justifies our assum ption, and Monacelli’s, of central banks 
having CPI inflation as an argument in the loss functions. In any case, one could always 
re-write using equations (4.39) and (4.41), an expression for CPI inflation as
= nH + a{As t -  e s ,t ) ,
so that the central banks not only care about dom estic goods inflation, but also variations 
to the growth rate in the terms of trade between hom e and foreign goods.
Therefore, the previous exercise of asking whether central banks explicitly care about 
exchange rate m ovements, can only be addressed by explicitly modeling and estim ating
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their objective functions. We have shown in this exercise that, given policy preferences, the 
resulting reduced form policy rule encom passes the resu lts of existing work using ad-hoc 
Taylor-type rules, in term s of responses to exchange rate movements. However, the reverse 
analysis, using reduced form rules, may not provide any conclusive evidence for deducing 
what central banks may care about. In fact, we re-estim ate the Lubik and Schorfheide 
(2007) simple rule in our model, in the following section.
4 .5 .1  Sim ple rules and behavioral response
We now take the simple Taylor-type rule used in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), and re- 
estim ate th a t in the context of our model and data  set (which is defined over more time 
series variables). This exercise provides a simpler alternative description of central bank 
behavior. The simple rule specification is:
rt = pTrt- 1 + (1 -  Pr)(V>7r7Tt + xpyyt + V’AeAc't) + e f , (4.52)
where pr , t/v > V’y > V;Ae are the policy responses to the lag of the nominal interest rate, inflation, 
the ou tput gap and the change in the nominal exchange rate respectively, and is an 
exogenous policy shock.
To address the question in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), we examine two specifications: 
(i) with the central bank  responding to the change in the nominal exchange rate (that is, 
allowing ^  0) and (ii) imposing no response to the change in the nominal exchange rate 
(that is, V’Ae — 0). The resu lts from estim ation of these simple policy rules are presented in 
table (4.10) .
Comparison of the log data densities shows evidence th a t the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) responds to changes in the exchange rate. The Bayes factor is 1.78. That is, one 
would have to place a weight of 1.78 on the RBA not responding to nominal exchange rate 
growth to find both propositions equally likely). C anada does not respond to the change in 
the exchange rate (the Bayes factor is 0.03) and New Zealand does respond to the change 
in the exchange rate (the Bayes factor is 6.25). The Bayes factor for the model comparison 
exercise in the case of Canada is negligibly small. One might argue for a model of a Bank 
of Canada operating a simple rule with exchange rate response is ju s t as equally probable 
as one without.
These resu lts are contrary to Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) who find that Australia
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and New Zealand do not respond  to change in th e  exchange ra te  b u t find som e evidence 
th a t C anada does respond to changes in the exchange rate . The difference in ou r re su lt 
to Lubik and  Schorfheide (2007) is no t su rp ris in g . A key om ission from the  Lubik and  
Schorfheide (2007) paper is the  lack of an  endogenous te rm s of trad e  specification and  
the lack of im perfect p ass-th ro u g h  of nom inal exchange ra te  changes into dom estic im port 
prices. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) note:
One issu e  is ou r assu m p tio n  of exogenous te rm s  of trad e  m ovem ents, an o th e r 
is the lack of im perfect p a ss-th ro u g h  of nom inal exchange ra te  changes into do­
m estic im port prices. Overall model m isspecification  is of concern  a s  it can  lead 
to b iased param eter estim ates, prevent identification  of th e  tru e  s tru c tu ra l p a ­
ram eters and  m ay imply incorrect m odel selection.
In addition, there  is no endogenous p ersistence  in th e  Lubik and  Schorfheide (2007) 
Phillips equation . The p ersistence  in inflation is solely driven from the  shocks and  a Phillips 
equation  is m ore likely to fit the  d a ta  (see e.g. F u k ac  an d  Pagan, 2008), if one in troduces 
endogenous persistence  in  the  inflation process.
Furtherm ore , Lubik and  Schorfheide (2007) es tim ate  on a longer d a ta se t (from 1983Q1 
to 2002Q 4 for A ustralia  and  C anada and  from 1988Q1 to 2002Q 4 for New Zealand) th a t 
con tains inform ation from th e  pre-inflation  targeting  period for these  coun tries. It is likely 
th a t estim ation  on a single m onetary  regime p roduces tigh ter es tim a tes  th a n  the  Lubik and  
Schorfheide (2007) paper th a t  sp a n s  both the  pre-infla tion  targeting  era and  the in fla tion­
targeting  period.
In sum m ary , ou r re su lt from estim ating  the  sim ple policy ru le  of Lubik an d  Schorfheide 
(2007) w ithin ou r m odel and  d a ta  set, co rrobora tes the  re su lt derived from optim al policy 
in the previous sections. Specifically, bo th  ap p ro ach es yield a positive behavioral response  
of policy to nom inal exchange ra te  growth. However, the  sim ple ru le app roach  is only ju s t  
th a t -  it c an n o t tell u s  m ore abo u t w hat m ight explicitly concern  cen tra l b an k s .
4 .6  C onclusion
We estim ate  the  m acroeconom ic policy objectives of the  cen tra l b a n k s  of A ustralia , C anada 
and New Z ealand w ithin the  context of an  optim izing DSGE m odel. O ur p aram eter e s ti­
m ates reveal th e  objectives of these  sm all open econom y inflation targeters. We find key
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differences in the structural param eters of each economy th a t imply different behaviour 
in the setting of monetary policy across countries -  even if these countries share identical 
m onetary policy objectives.
We emphasize the similarities rather than  the differences in the macroeconomic objec­
tives of the central banks of Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Over the period con­
sidered, all three central banks show no concern for mitigating exchange rate volatility as 
an objective in its own right. However, all three central banks show a substantial concern 
for interest rate smoothing. The Reserve Bank of Australia shows the most desire to miti­
gate volatility in the ou tput gap bu t in all three cases the estim ated weight on the ou tput 
gap is substantially  lower than  the weight on the deviation of annual inflation from target. 
Nevertheless, all central banks would be sensibly classified as flexible in their approach to 
inflation targeting.
We further showed that the resulting optimal policy rule still responds to exchange rate 
movements, even in the case where the central banks do not explicitly care about exchange 
rate stabilization. We also estimated a class of simple rules, as in Lubik and Schorfheide 
(2007), as an alternative representative of central bank  behavior. While our results here 
are opposite to that of Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), they corroborate the exchange rate 
response resu lt in the optimal policy rules. Furtherm ore, the difference in our findings 
relative to Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) confirm their doubts on their own results and 
their conjecture th a t a richer model with endogenous term s of trade and imperfect imports 
price pass through may alter their model comparison results.
Our analysis has im portant implications for assessing the accountability and tran s­
parency of m onetary policy. By jointly estim ating the param eter estim ates conditional on 
the same DSGE model we can make inferences about objectives conditional on the envi­
ronm ent each central bank operates under. Such joint estim ates result in very different 
conclusions relative to uninformed inference based on the unconditional distributions of 
goal variables such as annual inflation, the ou tput gap, interest rates and the exchange 
rate. Future work could usefully extend the model to incorporate the potential effects of 
labour m arket behavior, credit constraints and policy making under model uncertainty on 
the estim ates of central banks objectives.
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Table 4.1: Prior param eter densities for all models.
Prior m ean 2.5% 97.5% D om ain D en sity  fu n ction
h 0 .6 0 0.19 0 .93 (0,1) B eta
o 1.00 0.27 2 .19 R + G am m a
<t> 1.50 1.01 1.99 R + G am m a
V 1.00 0.27 2 .19 R + G am m a
6 h 0 .7 0 0.25 0 .98 (0,1) B eta
6 f 0 .7 0 0.25 0 .98 (0,1) B eta
e H 0 .5 0 0.13 0 .87 (0,1) Beta
Of 0 .5 0 0.13 0 .87 (0,1) B eta
a i 0 .5 0 0.19 0 .96 (0,1) B eta
b2 0 .5 0 0.19 0 .96 (0,1) B eta
C3 0 .5 0 0.19 0 .9 6 (0,1) B eta
P a 0 .5 0 0.13 0 .87 (0,1) B eta
Pn 0 .9 0 0.23 1.00 (0,1) B eta
P s 0 .2 5 0.01 0 .72 (0,1) B eta
P<1 0 .5 0 0.13 1.07 R + G am m a
l l y 0 .5 0 0.09 1.24 R-f. G am m a
P r 0 .5 0 0.09 1.24 R-}- G am m a
O H 2 .6 6 0.91 7.32 R -f Inverse G am m a
o f 2 .6 7 0.91 7 .33 R -f Inverse G am m a
O a 1.19 0.52 2 .66 R -f Inverse G am m a
Oq 0 .5 3 0.32 0 .87 R -f Inverse G am m a
O s 1.19 0.52 2 .66 R-}- Inverse G am m a
O n . 1.19 0.52 2 .66 R-f. Inverse G am m a
O y . 1.19 0.52 2 .66 R -f Inverse G am m a
O r . 1.19 0.52 2 .66 R + Inverse G am m a
(T  t 1.19 0.52 2 .66 R-}- Inverse G am m a
1. For ß q =  0 the  prior and  posterior d istribu tions will be degenerate a t zero.
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Table 4.2: Posterior param eters and convergence diagnostics: Australia (nq ^  0).
P ost Mean P ost Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
ß 0.990 0 .000 0.990 0.990 0 .000 1.000 1.000
a 0.450 0 .000 0.450 0.450 0 .000 1.000 1.000
h 0.917 0.022 0.871 0.953 0.002 0.234 1.029
a 0.809 0.259 0.395 1.440 0.045 0.464 1.026
0 1.586 0.245 1.111 2.059 0.011 0.993 1.000
4 0.363 0.101 0.210 0.594 0.012 0.351 1.021
6 h 0.257 0.101 0.096 0.504 0.013 0.353 1.023
6 f 0.046 0.027 0.010 0.109 0.001 0.651 1.001
O h 0.777 0.026 0.726 0.829 0.003 0.666 1.004
O f 0.682 0.036 0.612 0.754 0.004 0.951 1.000
tn 0.259 0.084 0.113 0.439 0.002 0.041 1.003
b 2 0.719 0.061 0.583 0.822 0.003 0.955 1.000
C3 0.891 0.059 0.770 1.005 0.001 0.258 1.001
Pa. 0.809 0.035 0.735 0.870 0.002 0.657 1.001
Pq 0.684 0.050 0.576 0.773 0.004 0.832 1.000
Ps 0.811 0.049 0.696 0.893 0.004 0.830 1.001
Pq 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.012 0 .000 0.729 1.001
P v 0.412 0.156 0.165 0.766 0.021 0.759 1.003
P r 0.61  \ 0.186 0.307 0.988 0.028 0.198 1.062
O H 1.057 0.317 0.565 1.827 0.031 0.576 1.005
o f 4.430 1.629 1.393 7.121 0.288 0.517 1.021
Oa 5.178 1.021 3.395 7.325 0.162 0.154 1.079
oq 0.746 0.123 0.542 1.023 0.009 0.736 1.001
Os 5.452 0.543 4.494 6.515 0.061 0.061 1.066
G  T\ * 0.418 0.043 0.341 0.509 0.001 0.435 1.000
O y . 0.547 0.071 0.421 0.701 0.002 0.888 1.000
O r . 0.220 0.021 0.182 0.265 0 .000 0.954 1.000
O r 0.363 0.051 0.273 0.471 0.002 0.111 1.004
1. The num erical s tandard  error (NSE) as  given in Geweke (1999).
2. The p-value is com puted using  L =  0.08 in Geweke (1999).
3. The B-G univariate "shrink  factor" a s  in Brooks and  G elm an (1998).
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Table 4 .3: Posterior param eters and convergence diagnostics: A ustralia (gq = 0).
Post Mean Post Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
ß 0.990 0 .000 0.990 0.990 0 .000 1.000 1.000
a 0.450 0 .000 0.450 0.450 0 .000 1.000 1.000
h 0.925 0.022 0.876 0.963 0.003 0.899 1.000
o 1.029 0.241 0.661 1.646 0.036 0.014 1.244
<P 1.492 0.261 0.968 1.995 0.016 0.172 1.011
V 0.219 0.097 0.079 0.430 0.014 0.008 1.231
6 h 0.399 0.162 0.142 0.717 0.021 0 .0 0 0 1.382
6 f 0.047 0.025 0.010 0.108 0.001 0.436 1.002
Oh 0.797 0.026 0.743 0.845 0.003 0.824 1.001
Of 0.720 0.035 0.649 0.785 0.005 0.701 1.004
O l 0.257 0.084 0.1  10 0.433 0.002 0.984 1.000
O2 0.750 0.063 0.617 0.861 0.005 0.144 1.022
C3 0.891 0.060 0.772 1.007 0.001 0.621 1.000
Pa 0.728 0.101 0.465 0.847 0.013 0.019 1.197
P<i 0.703 0.049 0.602 0.796 0.004 0.719 1.001
Ps 0.852 0.048 0.737 0.927 0.006 0.870 1.001
P v 0.404 0.354 0.202 1.482 0.021 0 .0 0 0 1.697
P r 0.517 0.153 0.265 0.845 0.022 0.287 1.035
OH 2.058 0.994 0.728 4.223 0.167 0.137 1.098
o f 1.504 1.290 0.355 5.405 0.168 0.227 1.063
Oa 6.758 1.105 4.692 8.891 0.167 0.006 1.280
Oq 0.819 0.121 0.602 1.069 0.009 0.130 1.022
Os 5.716 0.661 4.388 7.167 0.086 0.013 1.162
O n * 0.419 0.043 0.341 0.509 0.001 0.651 1.000
O y * 0.533 0.071 0.410 0.686 0.002 0.411 1.001
O r * 0.219 0.021 0.182 0.265 0 .000 0.866 1.000
Or 0.342 0.042 0.267 0.430 0.001 0.986 1.000
1. The num erical s tandard  error (NSE) as  given in Geweke (1999).
2. The p-value is com puted using  L = 0.08 in Geweke (1999).
3. The B-G univariate "shrink factor” a s  in Brooks and Gelman (1998).
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Table 4.4: Posterior param eters and convergence diagnostics: C anada ± 0).
P ost Mean P ost Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
ß 0.990 0 .000 0.990 0.990 0 .000 1.000 1.000
a 0.450 0 .000 0.450 0.450 0 .000 1.000 1.000
h 0.912 0.030 0.850 0.966 0.003 0.415 1.010
a 1.241 0.354 0.557 1.875 0.061 0.409 1.032
<t> 1.477 0.248 1.009 1.976 0.006 0.057 1.004
V 0.416 0.119 0.206 0.668 0.010 0.443 1.009
6 h 0.644 0.179 0.227 0.937 0.024 0.221 1.050
6 f 0.776 0.145 0.423 0.977 0.020 0.546 1.012
O h 0.933 0.017 0.901 0.966 0.002 0.099 1.060
O f 0.849 0.031 0.785 0.907 0.002 0.407 1.006
U l 0.266 0.084 0.119 0.442 0.002 0.976 1.000
b 2 0.748 0.064 0.611 0.865 0.003 0.706 1.000
C3 0.893 0.061 0.770 1.009 0.001 0.566 1.000
P a 0.433 0.151 0.144 0.723 0.022 0.522 1.013
PQ 0.704 0.048 0.607 0.795 0.004 0.852 1.000
P s 0.229 0.167 0.011 0.607 0.024 0.122 1.077
ß q 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.015 0 .000 0.511 1.002
ß y 0.157 0.094 0.033 0.409 0.012 0.891 1.000
ß r 0.855 0.424 0.186 1.779 0.068 0.014 1.266
o h 20.646 1.569 18.025 24.428 0.243 0.270 1.053
o f 0.752 0.411 0.287 1.869 0.036 0.431 1.008
Oa 2.121 1.004 0.584 4.539 0.144 0.590 1.009
O'l 0.841 0.111 0.640 1.077 0.008 0.659 1.001
Os 2.271 0.369 1.584 3.014 0.035 0.296 1.017
O-n, 0.367 0.040 0.296 0.452 0 .000 0.964 1.000
O y. 0.533 0.071 0.406 0.687 0.002 0.651 1.000
Or , 0.222 0.022 0.183 0.269 0 .000 0.102 1.000
Or 0.360 0.045 0.281 0.457 0.001 0.726 1.000
1. The num erical s tan d ard  error (NSE) as  given in Geweke (1999).
2. The p-value is com puted using  L =  0.08 in Geweke (1999).
3. The B-G univariate "shrink factor" a s  in Brooks and Gelman (1998).
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Table 4.5: Posterior param eters and convergence diagnostics: C anada ( p q =  0).
P ost Mean P ost Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
ß 0.990 0 .000 0.990 0.990 0 .000 1.000 1.000
a 0.450 0 .000 0.450 0.450 0 .000 1.000 1.000
h 0.906 0.030 0.851 0.964 0.003 0.290 1.015
o 1.285 0.338 0.578 1.875 0.055 0.175 1.075
<P 1.456 0.254 0.961 1.952 0.006 0.036 1.004
V 0.476 0.114 0.268 0.704 0.009 0.812 1.001
6 H 0.657 0.177 0.237 0.929 0.023 0.129 1.084
6f 0.873 0.082 0.684 0.989 0.007 0.146 1.026
e H 0.922 0.016 0.891 0.952 0.001 0.367 1.009
Of 0.852 0.037 0.760 0.905 0.003 0.039 1.088
ui 0.265 0.084 0.119 0.443 0.001 0.670 1.000
b2 0.718 0.066 0.578 0.840 0.003 0.552 1.001
C3 0.897 0.059 0.775 1.011 0.001 0.897 1.000
P a 0.366 0.137 0.120 0.639 0.016 0.530 1.009
P<l 0.731 0.044 0.640 0.812 0.003 0.720 1.001
ps 0.257 0.180 0.012 0.658 0.025 0.583 1.009
ß v 0.147 0.069 0.049 0.313 0.006 0.941 1.000
ß r 0.672 0.233 0.248 1.106 0.033 0.061 1.110
OH 20.462 3.145 13.842 24.834 0.545 0.214 1.081
OF 0.682 0.490 0.277 2.347 0.033 0.197 1.036
Oa 2.397 1.618 0.774 6.779 0.221 0.169 1.085
Oq 0.780 0.104 0.600 1.004 0.004 0.568 1.001
o s 2.154 0.362 1.448 2.856 0.039 0.712 1.002
On * 0.368 0.040 0.297 0.453 0 .000 0.755 1.000
Oy» 0.546 0.073 0.419 0.704 0.001 0.073 1.002
Or , 0.220 0.021 0.183 0.266 0 .000 0.409 1.000
Or 0.315 0.035 0.252 0.389 0.001 0.787 1.000
1. The numerical standard error (NSE) as given in Geweke (1999).
2. The p-value is computed using L =  0.08 in Geweke (1999).
3. The B-G univariate "shrink factor" as in Brooks and Gelman (1998).
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Table 4 .6: Posterior param eters and convergence diagnostics: New Zealand ( f i q ^  0).
Post Mean Post Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
ß 0.990 0 . 0 0 0 0.990 0.990 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0
ÜC 0.450 0 . 0 0 0 0.450 0.450 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0
h 0.785 0.040 0.729 0.896 0.004 0.195 1.060
o 1.568 0.396 0.822 2.257 0.070 0.186 1.085
<i> 1.550 0.247 1.053 2.028 0.013 0.654 1.001
P 1.011 0.329 0.421 1.683 0.041 0.805 1.001
6 h 0.175 0.074 0.055 0.338 0.006 0.761 1.001
6 f 0.087 0.045 0.020 0.193 0.003 0.483 1.003
Oh 0.775 0.029 0.711 0.825 0.004 0.786 1.002
6 f 0.697 0.021 0.649 0.729 0.002 0.004 1.171
U l 0.237 0.085 0.100 0.422 0.002 0.104 1.004
b2 0.698 0.050 0.587 0.791 0.004 0.310 1.013
C3 0.890 0.060 0.770 1.007 0.001 0.187 1.001
f->a 0.544 0.187 0.165 0.830 0.031 0.625 1.011
P<1 0.695 0.039 0.596 0.760 0.004 0.576 1.006
Ps 0.682 0.068 0.547 0.827 0.006 0.952 1 . 0 0 0
P' l 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.018 0 . 0 0 0 0.965 1 . 0 0 0
l l y 0.273 0.138 0.100 0.623 0.020 0.574 1.010
M r 0.850 0.252 0.312 1.221 0.034 0.007 1.287
O H 2.100 1.298 0.579 4.984 0.230 0.984 1 . 0 0 0
o f 0.775 0.362 0.307 1.647 0.031 0.032 1.064
O a 20.023 1.870 15.376 22.747 0.277 0.003 1.368
oq 0.800 0.135 0.590 1.122 0.015 0.723 1.003
O s 2.656 0.471 1.858 3.689 0.045 0.093 1.056
O n . 0.412 0.043 0.335 0.503 0 . 0 0 0 0.924 1 . 0 0 0
Oy* 0.553 0.073 0.423 0.708 0.002 0.177 1.003
C7 y + 0.222 0.022 0.184 0.269 0 . 0 0 0 0.049 1.001
O r 0.374 0.059 0.268 0.500 0.003 0.486 1.004
1. The num erical s tan d ard  error (NSE) as given in Geweke (1999).
2. The p-value is com puted using  L =  0.08 in Geweke (1999).
3. The B-G univariate "shrink factor" a s  in Brooks and Gelman (1998).
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Table 4.7: Posterior param eters and convergence diagnostics: New Zealand [fiq =  0).
P ost Mean P ost Std 2.5% 97.5% NSE p-value B-G
ß 0 .990 0 . 0 0 0 0 .990 0 .990 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0
a 0 .450 0 . 0 0 0 0 .4 5 0 0 .450 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0
h 0.812 0 .036 0 .752 0.891 0 .005 0 .999 1 . 0 0 0
(7 1.312 0 .318 0 .674 2 .015 0 .046 0 .236 1.062
(t> 1.586 0 .264 1.041 2 .082 0 .010 0 .149 1.011
V 0 .917 0 .307 0 .369 1.553 0.031 0 .617 1.005
S h 0 .173 0 .074 0 .043 0 .324 0 .007 0 .275 1.019
5 f 0 .083 0 .044 0 .019 0 .190 0 .002 0 .390 1.004
e H 0 .767 0 .027 0 .712 0 .819 0 .003 0 .073 1.074
6 f 0 .683 0 .020 0 .645 0 .725 0 .002 0.017 1.095
O l 0 .240 0 .079 0 .103 0 .408 0 .002 0.501 1 . 0 0 0
1)2 0 .722 0 .048 0 .612 0 .809 0 .004 0 .414 1.007
0 3 0.891 0 .060 0 .769 1.006 0.001 0 .274 1 . 0 0 0
P a 0.622 0 .209 0.101 0.821 0 .024 0 .005 1.296
P q 0 .708 0 .035 0.631 0 .769 0 .003 0 .199 1.017
Ps 0 .717 0 .057 0 .606 0 .830 0 .006 0 .695 1.003
P y 0 .217 0 .113 0.091 0 .534 0 .013 0 .573 1.006
Mr 0 .732 0 .222 0 .394 1.322 0 .030 0.232 1.058
o h 1.325 1.558 0 .629 6 .497 0 .089 0 .004 1.348
o f 0 .909 0 .478 0 .319 2.141 0.051 0 .394 1.012
0,1 17.959 1.596 15.579 2 1 .3 6 5 0 .246 0 .044 1.164
oq 0 .794 0 .128 0 .587 1.097 0 .009 0 .544 1.003
oH 2.633 0 .454 1.738 3 .530 0.041 0 .003 1.114
O n . 0 .412 0 .042 0 .336 0.501 0 . 0 0 0 0 .492 1 . 0 0 0
O y * 0 .546 0 .072 0 .417 0 .702 0 .002 0 .368 1.001
Ö" 7 •* 0.222 0 .022 0 .184 0 .269 0 . 0 0 0 0 .967 1 . 0 0 0
Or 0 .338 0 .047 0 .255 0.441 0 .003 0 .080 1.018
1. The num erical standard error (NSE) a s  given in G eweke (1999).
2 . The p-value is  com puted u sin g  L  =  0.08 in G eweke (1999).
3. The B-G univariate “shrink factor" a s  in Brooks and G elm an (1998).
Table 4.8: Posterior odds model comparison.
C ountry (M odel, M , ) p { y \ M i ) 1 - ,  p { y \ M i )
1 p ( j/I M i )
B ayes factor
A ustra lia  (7. =  1) -1955 .0
A ustra lia  ( i  =  2) -1941 .7 -13.3 5.97 x 105
C an ad a  (7  =  1) -1815 .6
C an ad a  ( 7  =  2) -1805 .3 -10.3 2.97 x lO'1
New Z ealand ( 7  =  1) -1994 .6
New Z ealand ( 1  =  2) -1980 .5 -14.1 1.33 x 106
1. : p q >  0 and  M 2 : p q =  0.
2 . Marginal likelihood for G eweke's p  =  0.1 are reported, w here p  €  (0, 1).
3 . The B ayes factor is ca lcu lated  a s
4. T hese re su lts  are robust to alternative detrending m ethods.
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Table 4.9: Posterior odds model com parison under linearly de-trended data.
Country (Model, M , ) p ( y \ M i ) ln p (vIWi) Bayes factor
A ustra lia  (i — 1) -2083 .8
A u stra lia  (i — 2) -2001 .2 -82.6 7.46 x 1035
C an ad a  (i =  1) -1932 .9
C an ad a  (t =  2) -1909 .4 -23 .5 1.61 x 1010
New Z ealand  (i  =  1) -2132 .4
New Z ealand  (i — 2) -2056 .8 -75 .6 6.80 x 1032
1. M \  : ß q > 0 and M 2 : p q =  0.
2. Marginal likelihood for Geweke's p  =  0.1 are reported, where p €  (0, 1).
3. The Bayes factor is calculated as .
Table 4.10: Posterior odds model com parison under the Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) sim ­
ple rule.
P aram eter M ean Probability  int. D ist m ean std . dev
A u stra lia
res tric ted  case: x p A , - .  = 0, log d a ta  d ensity  -1371 .422
P R 0 .698 0 .630 0 .769 B eta 0.5 0.2
'IpT X 2.077 1.771 2 .372 G am m a 1.5 0.3
Tpy 0.342 0 .246 0 .437 G am m a 0.5 0.1
u n re s tric ted  case , log d a ta  den sity  -1370 .844
P R 0 .710 0 .656 0 .769 B eta 0.5 0.2
2 .080 1.847 2 .3 2 0 G am m a 1.5 0.3
* P y 0.339 0 .253 0 .414 G am m a 0.5 0.1
tp A e 0.009 0 .000 0 .023 Uniform -0.5 0 .5
C an ad a
res tric ted  case: V’Ae =  0, log d a ta  density  -1219 .062
P R 0 .768 0 .736 0 .798 B eta 0 .5 0.2
Ip T X 1.322 1.226 1.430 G am m a 1.5 0.3
i ’y 0 .296 0 .208 0 .379 G am m a 0.5 0.1
u n re s tric ted  case , log d a ta  den sity  -1 222 .524
P R 0.741 0 .689 0 .794 B eta 0 .5 0.2
IP  7T 1.253 1.194 1.318 G am m a 1.5 0.3
V»w 0.233 0.181 0 .287 G am m a 0.5 0.1
1pAe 0 .002 0.002 0 .002 Uniform 0 0.5
New Z ealand
res tric ted  case: V’Af =  0, log d a ta  density  -1447 .368
P R 0.674 0.601 0 .749 B eta 0 .5 0.2
2 .017 1.619 2 .448 G am m a 1.5 0.3
0 .393 0 .273 0 .515 G am m a 0.5 0.1
u n re s tric ted  case, log d a ta  d ensity  -1445 .536
P R 0 .666 0.592 0 .742 B eta 0 .5 0.2
ip* 1.940 1.620 2 .257 G am m a 1.5 0.3
0 .405 0 .287 0 .525 G am m a 0.5 0.1
Ip A e 0 .036 0 .000 0 .079 Uniform 0 0.5
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Figure 4.1: Posterior distribution of key param eters: Australia. Prior (dashed) and Poste­
rior (solid).
Figure 4.2: Posterior distribution of key param eters: Canada. Prior (dashed) and Posterior 
(solid).
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Figure 4.3: Posterior distribution of key param eters: New Zealand. Prior (dashed) and 
Posterior (solid).
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4 .A A ppendix
4.A.1 Log-linear approxim ations to  firm s’ optim al pricing rule
4.A. 1.1 D om estic  goods pricing
Given our specific assum ption  on period utility  of househo lds, re-w rite the  first-o rder con­
dition in (4.23), using  the s-period iterate  on th e  E u ler opera to r (4.10) to replace QM+S, 
as
E t J 2  W h Y  {Ct+s p  / / -+ s )  Yt.+s (i )
s = 0  t + s
Ph'1 (  )  ( e  -  l )  Ph^ sM C h^H,t V p h ,i - i  )  U - i )  H,t+S
T r i v t *  tViic a rn nn r l  tViP» r lp fp rm in ic tic  cfpaHtr cfofp  tn  n h ta i r
n v n  ( c tt . . i
PH,t  ~  &HP H, t  — l
oo
~  ( 1  -  ß 0 H )  E t  ( W h Y  \p n , t+ s  -  &HPH,t+s - 1 +  m C H ,t+s  +  t H<t+s]
s = 0
=  (1 -  ß d H ) [pH. t  -  & H P H , t -  1 +  m CH,t  +  e// ,t ]
OQ
+  ß 0 H  (1  -  ß ö f l )  E f  Y ,  { ß ^ ü Y  [PH,t+s+ 1 -  ^H PH ,t+ s +  W C / / ) i + s + i +  C / / , t + s + l ]  . 
s = 0
This expression can be w ritten  recursively as
PH,t ~  0 n P H , t - 1  ~  ( 1  — @6h ) \p h ,t -  ö n P H , t - i +
+ ßÖH [E.tpH,t+1 -  <h/P//,t-i] • (4.53)
Log-linearizing (4.19) yields
P//,* = (1 -  0 H ) p H , t  + Qh P H J -  1 + (4.54)
S u b stitu tin g  (4.54) into (4.53) yields th e  expression  (4.24).
Now, equating  firm s’ labor dem and (4.22) to h o u seho lds labor supp ly  (4.9):
M  C  H , t t a , tP H  ,t
Pt
(Ct -  Hty  N f (4.55)
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Log-linearizing this, and using the log-linearized production function yt = nt + ea,t> we have
m cH,t = P t ~  PH,t + (Ct “  hct~1) + VUi ~  (1 + <p) ta,t- (4.56)
Utilizing the log-linearized CPI index which implies pt — pH.t — - a  (PH.t -  PF,t) = qs(, and also 
(4.14), in (4.56) we obtain (4.25).
4.A. 1.2 Imports pricing
Re-write (4.30) as
E ,£ {ßeFy  ' H YFf+, U )
G+s
PF,t
PiF,t+ s  — 1
PF,t- 1
Sp
—  J e t + s P p t + a  O') exp (e F , t+ s )
Log-linearizing, and substituting with ip F ,t+ s  + £F,t.+s = et+s + Pt+S, we obtain
OO
PF,t -  &FPF,t — \ ~  ( 1  —  ßeF) E t  ^  (ß0Fy  [PF,t+s  +  4>F,t+s +  t F , t + s  ~  0 F p F , t + s - 1 ]
s=0
Log-linearize (4.27) to get
PF,t = (1 -  0f ) pf,i + 0FPF,t — 1 + 0F&F^ F,t — l ■ (4.57)
Making use of the last two expressions yields (4.31).
4.A .2 Pseudo-code for MCMC procedure
Algorithm 1 The RW-metropolis algorithm for a linear RE model:
1. Begin with an initial prior 0O e 0  and its corresponding prior density p(0o\M) for model 
M.
2. Solve the linear RE model to obtain (4.46) and construct observation equation (4.47).
3. For each n = 0,1,...TV, Use (4.46)-(4.47), the given data set y = cmd 0n to compute
the model likelihood, L(0n\y,M) using a Kalman filter. Then calculate the associated 
posterior density. p(On\y, M) = Z t i f l t » . ) -
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4. Generate a new candidate draw using a random walk model: 9n+1 = 6n + zn+i, where 
we assume zn+1 ~  TV (0, sE), and s > 0 is a scalar factor for scaling the size of the jump 
in the draws. Compute the associated posterior density, p (0n+1|y, M) by repeating Step 
3, for 9n+1.
5. Compute the acceptance probability, a (9n,9u+x\y) := min { (j/Mp>
6. Repeat Steps 3-4 for N sufficiently large to ensure that the seguence {0n}?^=o Is drawn 
from an ergodic distribution, tt.
7. Under some sufficient conditions, we can apply the ergodic theorem of an irreducible 
Markov chain and approximate the posterior expected value of a (bounded) function of 
interest, f  (9) using the sample mean of the functions, TV-1 f  (On)-
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Chapter 5
The Role of International 
shocks in Australia’s bu sin ess  
cycle
Abstract*
This pap er exam ines the  sou rces of A u stra lia ’s b u s in e ss  cycle fluc tuations. The 
cyclical com ponent of GDP is ex tracted  u sin g  th e  Beveridge-Nelson decom posi­
tion  and  a s tru c tu ra l VAR m odel is identified u sin g  ro b u s t sign restric tio n s d e­
rived from a s tru c tu ra l sm all open econom y m odel. In c o n tra s t to previous VAR 
stud ies, in tern a tio n a l factors are found to co n trib u te  to over ha lf of the  o u tp u t 
forecast e rro rs w hereas dem and  shocks have relatively m odest effects.
5.1  In troduction
f  V  ^HEFfE IS little c o n sen su s  on the role played by th e  re s t of the world in a sm all open 
JL econom y’s b u s in e ss  cycle. In the case of A ustralia , D ungey (2002) e s tim a tes  a  s tru c ­
tu ra l vector au to regression  (SVAR) model, w hich im plies th a t in te rn a tio n a l factors accoun t 
for 32 per cen t of o u tp u t forecast erro rs over a  one y ear horizon, while dom estic GDP shocks 
rem ain  the  dom in an t contribu tor. A SVAR m odel for A ustra lia  by B rischetto  and  Voss (1999) 
reveals th a t only a ro u n d  5 per cen t of o u tp u t forecast e rro rs  stem s from foreign factors. On 
the o ther h an d , u sing  an  estim ated  New K eynesian dynam ic s to ch astic  general equilibrium  
(DSGE) model, N im ark (2007) concludes foreign sh o ck s explain over 50 per cen t of the 
variance in A ustra lian  o u tp u t a ro u n d  its tren d  while dom estic o u tp u t sh ocks acco u n t for
’Chapter (5) was previously published as "The Role of International Shocks in Australia's Business Cycle", RBA 
Research Discussion Papers, RDP2008-08.
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only 8 per cent. Using a different criteria, D ungey and  Pagan (2000) sim u la te  d a ta  from a 
SVAR m odel and  find th a t recessions w ould have been less severe in the  absence  of foreign 
d is tu rb an ces , while cum ula ted  m ovem ents d u rin g  the  expansion  p h rase  w ould also have 
been  sm aller.
This p ap er argues th a t  the  different findings of the  s tu d ie s  cited above can  be understo o d  
as resu ltin g  from the difficulty of deciding how to appropriately  identify the s tru c tu ra l d is ­
tu rb an ces  relevant to a  sm all open economy. Identifying restric tions for SVAR m odels m ay 
in troduce  su b s ta n tia l m isspecifications th a t could lead to invalid inference. At the  sam e 
tim e, identification  of s tru c tu ra l d is tu rb an ces  by m ean s of cross-equation  restric tio n s from 
a sm all DSGE m odel m ay be a  too strin g en t m ethod to cap tu re  the  com plex dynam ics of the 
d a ta  genera ting  process. T his pap er co n trib u tes  to th is  debate  by developing a  VAR m odel 
of the  A ustra lian  econom y usin g  ro b u s t sign restric tio n s derived from an  estim ated  DSGE 
model. O ne key elem ent of th is  app ro ach  is th a t it allows for a  theoretically  co n sis ten t view 
of the  re la tionsh ips betw een the  se t of m acro  variab les w ithou t im posing the full DSGE 
stru c tu re .
Earlier sign restric tion  VAR s tu d ies  focus m ainly on identifying a su b se t of s tru c tu ra l 
d is tu rb an ces, exam ples include F a u s t (1998) and  Uhlig (2005) w ho identify only m onetary  
policy shocks. More recen t s tu d ies  by Canova and  De Nicolo (2002) and  P eersm an  (2005) 
apply the sign restric tion  m ethodology to identify all sh ocks in the VAR model. All these  
stud ies, however, a re  b ased  on large econom ies w ith little d iscussion  of th e  role of exchange 
ra tes. O ne exception is F a rra n t an d  P eersm an (2006), who investigate the role of exchange 
ra te s  in an  open econom y setting . However, the  role of in te rn a tio n a l factors is no t explicitly 
d iscussed  in th a t study.
The use  of restric tions derived from a theoretical model to aid VAR estim ation  is no t 
new. McKibbin et al. (1998) u se  the  M cK ibbin-Sachs Global (MSG2) m odel to re s tric t the 
long-run  behav iou r of a  VAR, while the  sh o rt-ru n  fea tu res  are  left un restric ted . D ungey and  
Pagan (2009) try to reconcile th e ir earlier SVAR m odel w ith restric tio n s im plied by a  sim ple 
open econom y DSGE model. P eersm an  and  S trau b  (2004) u se  a calib rated  real b u s in e ss  
cycle (RBC) m odel to derive sign restric tions in order to identify technology shocks.
The s ta rtin g  point of th is  p ap er is to use the Beveridge-Nelson decom position to ex trac t 
the cyclical com ponent of GDP, w hich will be used  a s  a  m easu re  of A u stra lia ’s b u s in e ss  
cycle. A slightly modified version of the  sm all open econom y m odel proposed in M onacelli 
(2005), and  Gali and  M onacelli (2005) is then  estim ated  u sing  m axim um  likelihood. The
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estim ated model is used to determine a set of robust sign restrictions for the VAR analysis. 
The small open economy assum ption is imposed on the VAR model by restricting the impact 
of domestic variables on foreign variables. The ultim ate aim of the analysis is to m ap the set 
of statistical relationships estim ated from the reduced form VAR back into a set of s tructu ral 
disturbances for economic interpretation. To do this, an  algorithm similar to th a t proposed 
by Canova and De Nicolo (2002) is used to trace out all possible orthogonal vector moving 
average (VMA) representations of the VAR th a t are consistent with the sign restrictions 
derived from the estim ated DSGE model. Since there is not enough information to uniquely 
identify a set of s tructu ral disturbances, the m edian impulse approach suggested in Fry 
and Pagan (2005) is used to sum m arise the results.
The analysis reveals several interesting results. First, the Beveridge-Nelson decomposi­
tion produces a plausible m easure of Australia’s ou tput fluctuations. The characteristics 
of the cyclical behaviour m atch previous business cycle studies using factor models such 
as Gillitzer et al. (2005). Second, in contrast to previous SVAR studies for Australia, foreign 
factors account for over half of the ou tput forecast errors whereas innovations from output 
itself have only a m odest effect. The resu lt is robust across different foreign specifications 
using data for the United S tates and the Group of Seven (G7) Countries.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section (5.2) describes the Beveridge- 
Nelson decomposition used to extract the cyclical com ponent of GDP. Section 3 outlines the 
estim ated small open economy DSGE model together with the data used in the analysis. 
A set of robust sign restrictions are derived from the estim ated DSGE model for the open 
economy VAR. Section (5.4) describes the estim ation and identification of the open economy 
sign restriction VAR model. Section (6.4) sum m arizes the estim ation results. Finally, 
Section (6.5) reviews the m ain findings.
5 .2  The cy c lica l com p on en t o f GDP
The first step of the analysis of this paper is to obtain a m easure of the cyclical com ponent of 
GDP. The cyclical com ponent is defined as the difference between actual and the perm anent 
component of GDP.1 The perm anent com ponent is exctracted by m eans of a Beveridge- 
Nelson (BN) decomposition, which is preferred to one popular alternative, the Hodrick-
'The term s perm anent com ponent and trend are used interchangeably, a s  are cyclical com ponent and the cycle. 
A detailed review of various detrending m ethods can be found in Canova (1998).
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Prescott (HP)-filter as the BN-decomposition allows for correlation between the innovations 
to the permanent and cyclical components.
A time series yt with an ARIMA(p, l,q) representation can be decomposed into a perm a­
nent (rt) and cyclical (ct) component using the BN decomposition as follows:
yt =  Tt  + ct (5.1)
where 77 =  p + Tt~\ + aet is the unobserved perm anent component, which is assum ed to 
follow a random walk with an average growth rate of p\ and ct =  (j)p(L)ct + ipq(L)et + (1 -  <y)et 
is a stationary and invertible ARMA(p,q) process, where 0P(0) = 0 and 'I>f/(L) = 0.
Likelihood ratio tests suggest that an ARIMA(2,1,1) model provides the best empirical fit 
for Australian quarterly real GDP between 1980Q4 and 2 006Q 1.2 Figure 5.1 show s that the 
BN-cycle is more volatile than the cycle derived using the HP-filter (based on the sm oothing  
parameter A = 1600). This is particularly so in the first half of the sam ple3 which displays 
more pronounced cycles. The two cycles have a similar peak frequency (estimated using the 
periodogram) around 17 quarters over the sample, with the BN cycle containing noticeably 
more high frequency oscillations. Figure 5.1 also show s the coincident (GKR) index of 
Australian economic activity derived by Gillitzer, Kearns and Richards (2005) using a factor 
model. This index provides a plausible m easure of the Australian b u sin ess cycle using a 
large number of macroeconomic variables.
The three series each imply a different underlying model, the aim here is to compare and 
contrast the different cyclical behaviour across the three detrending assum ptions rather 
than to judge which is the best method to use.4 For all three series, the two recessions 
during the early 1980s and 1990s are apparent. The BN-cycle and GKR index coincide 
with respect to the timing of recessions, suggesting a bottoming out of economic activity 
around 1983Q1 and 1991Q1. The HP-cycle is a bit slower at picking up the recessions.5 
In addition, the BN-cycle identifies two episodes of weak economic activity over the sample 
period. The first, in 1986, coincides with Paul Keating’s Banana Republic remark over 
concerns about Australia’s foreign debt position, a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate
2The BN decomposition is computed based on the method suggested by Newbold (1990).
3The standard deviation of the BN-cycle is 3.9 per cent compared with 1.4 per cent for the HP-cycle over the 
whole sample.
4Another approach is to explicitly estimate the permanent component using a structural vector error correction 
model (SVECM) as in Pagan and Pesaran (2008).
5Thc IIP filter can be thought of as a two-step filter: in the first step it renders y t  stationary: in the second it 
smooths the resulting stationary series with asymmetric moving average (MA) weights, which can contribute to a 
delay in identifying the recessions.
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and  a dow n tu rn  in househo ld  expenditure . The slowdown of the econom y following the  end 
of the Sydney Olympic gam es and  th e  in troduction  of the goods and  services tax  in 2000  is 
also ap p aren t.
5 .3  A S ty lised  Sm all Open E conom y DSGE Model
This section p re sen ts  the  estim ated  sm all open econom y DSGE model. The model is based  
on a slightly modified version  of th a t  proposed by Monacelli (2005) and  Gali and  Monacelli 
(2005). The key advan tage  of u sing  th is  m odel is due  to its  sim plicity and  the  m odel includes 
the se t of variab les th a t a re  crucial for sm all open econom y stu d ies. It also em beds th e  key 
theoretical linkages often found in larger sm all open econom y DSGE m odels. V ariants of the 
proposed m odel have been  heavily u sed  in o th er applied m acroeconom ic research . R ecent 
exam ples include Lubik an d  Schorfheide (2007) looking a t the role of the exchange ra te  
in the cen tra l b a n k ’s reaction  function  and  D ungey an d  Pagan (2009) com pare the  m odel 
s tru c tu re  to th e ir earlier SVAR m odel (see D ungey an d  Pagan (2000)).
Del Negro and  Schorfheide (2009) argue m odel m isspecification, in a sense  th a t the  
m odel im poses invalid restric tio n s on the m oving average rep resen ta tio n  of the m acroeco­
nom ic tim e series, rem ain s the  key challenge for u sin g  DSGE m odels in em pirical policy 
stud ies. A lthough the  specific q uan tita tive  pred ic tions of DSGE m odels m aybe q u estio n ­
able, the  theoretical linkages em bedded in DSGE m odel rem ains usefu l for the u n d e rs ta n d ­
ing of con tem poraneous re la tio n sh ip s  am ong key m acroeconom ic variables. T his is the  key 
m otivation for using  som e b u t no t all of the  DSGE m odel’s p red ictions in the form of ro b u st
sign restric tions. The estim ated  m odel is sim u la ted  to provide these  se t of restric tions for
$
the  VAR analysis.
The m odel co n sis ts  of an  open econom y IS equation  and  a Phillips curve incorporating  
im perfect exchange ra te  p ass-th ro u g h . The m onetary  au th o rity  se ts  in te rest ra te s  according 
to a  Taylor-type reaction  function , while the  exchange ra te  depends on the in te rest ra te  
differential betw een the dom estic an d  foreign econom ies. The variab les for the re s t of the 
world are  tak en  to be exogenous processes. The open econom y IS equation  derived from 
the  co n su m er’s optim ising problem  is:
Vt =  riiyt-i +  (1 -  n i)E tyt+i -  n2(rt -  Etnt+i)
+ n3E t Ayt*+1 -  n4zt + n5E, A ^t+1
(5.2)
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where: n \ , . . . ,ns are parameters;6 yt is the aggregate output gap; rt is the nominal interest 
rate; 7rt is the inflation rate; y*t is the foreign output gap; and zt represents technology 
disturbances that follow an AR(1) process.7 ipt. =  (1 -  y)st -  qt can be interpreted as the 
law o f one price gap which measures the deviation of the domestic price of imported goods 
from the world price, where st is is the terms of trade, defined as export prices relative to 
import price, and qt is the real exchange rate. A non-zero ipt implies imperfect exchange rate 
pass-through to import prices. The backward looking component, yt~ 1 , in the IS equation 
is motivated by the assumption of habit persistence in consumer preferences.
The open economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) derived by solving the firm’s 
pricing decision can be written as:
=  Pi TTt — 1 +  (1 — 9\ )E t^ t + \ + 92Ut +  9z f t  +  Or,t (5.3)
where t represents a cost push shock. The Phillips curve is based on the assumption of 
monopolistically competitive firms, subject to pricing constraints (Calvo pricing and index­
ation). If (?3 = 0, Equation (5.3) collapses down to a familiar closed economy Phillips curve 
where inflation dynamics are partly driven by past and expected inflation, in addition to the 
output gap. The open economy dimension includes the effects from the exchange rate as 
an important part of the monetary policy transmission process.
The assumption of perfect capital markets yields the standard uncovered interest parity 
(UIP) condition (which links the expected exchange rate depreciation to the interest rate 
differential):
qt =  E tqt+1 +  (rt -  E t7Tf+i) -  (r* -  E ti\*t+1) +  U,ht (5.4)
where U,ht is a time-varying risk premium that follows an AR(1) process.
The monetary authority is assumed to set the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor 
rule based on contemporaneous inflation and output as well as an interest rate smoothing 
term:
rt = prTt - 1 +  (1 -  Pr)[0l7Tt +  <hyt] + <Y,t (5.5)
where represents a non-systematic deviation from the reaction function. To complete
6It is important to note that without further restrictions, it is not possible to separately identify the parameter 
r]/i and the variance of the unobserved stochastic shock z t . However, this will not affect the sign restrictions used 
for the VAR model.
7A  positive innovation to technology will increase the potential output of the economy hence has a negative 
effect on the output gap.
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the  descrip tion  of the s tru c tu ra l m odel, the  te rm s of trad e  st , the  foreign o u tp u t gap yt*, 
foreign in te rest ra te s  r t* and  foreign inflation 7tt* a re  a ssu m ed  to follow exogenous AR(1) 
processes.
The s tru c tu ra l m odel can  be sum m arised  as:
-4o Vf — A \ Y t - \  + Ä 2 E t Y t + i +  t t  (5.6)
w here Yt =  [yt , r t ,n t ,qt ,st , r t*, y f , 7rt*, t/’t , z t .Uqit\  is a  11 x 1 vector con ta in ing  the  s ta te  variab les 
of m odel and  et =  [e2,t , er>t, en>t, e9it, eS)t, er*,i, is an  8 x 1 vector of s tru c tu ra l innova­
tio n s.8 The so lu tion  of the m odel can  be rep resen ted  a s  a first o rder VAR:
Yt — B\Yt- i  + (5.7)
5 ,3 ,1  Data D escription
D ata from 1980Q1 to 2006Q1 for the  A ustra lian  econom y is used  to estim ate  the  s tru c tu ra l 
m odel and  the  VAR.9 The s ta rtin g  period coincides w ith previous SVAR s tu d ies  of the  A us­
tra lian  econom y including Dungey and  Pagan (2000). Q uarterly  observations on real to tal 
GDP (yt), q uarterly  headline CPI inflation (excluding in te re s t ra te s  and  taxes) (7p), the (goods 
and  services) te rm s of trad e  (st), the  real exchange ra te  (qt), th e  nom inal in te rest ra te  (m ea­
su red  by the  90-day  b an k  bill rate) (rt), US GDP (y,*), US CPI inflation q u a rte r-o n -q u arte r  
(7q*) and  US nom inal in te rest ra te  (r,*) are  sourced  from the Reserve B ank  of A ustralia , the  
A ustra lian  B ureau  of S ta tis tic s  and  the  IMF’s In te rn a tio n a l F inancial S ta tis tic s  d a ta b a se .10
The cyclical com ponent of GDP for bo th  A ustra lia  an d  the  US -  th a t is, the  o u tp u t gap 
m easu res  -  are  co n struc ted  using  the  BN decom position  described earlier. D ue to the 
u n u su a l upsw ing in A ustra lia ’s te rm s of trad e  betw een 2004 and  2006, th is  tim e series is 
detrended  u sin g  a n  HP filter to en su re  sta tio n arity  of the  se r ie s .* 11 All variab les a p a r t from 
inflation and  in te re s t ra te s  en te r in logs.
8In the numerical simulation and estimation of the model, the structural equation is solved using a solution 
algorithm described in Uhlig (1995).
9The effective sample period is from 1980Q4 to 2006Q1 after differencing and construction of the cyclical 
component of GDP.
10Data for the G7 economies is also taken from the IMF's IFS and combined using the following weights: the US 
(0.49); Japan (0.16): Germany (0.10): the UK (0.07); France (0.07); Italy (0.07); and Canada (0.04).
11 The HP filter imposes the requirement that the permanent component of the ToT series is an 1(2) process, that 
is the ToT series is subject to shifts in the trend growth rate. The IIP filter was used as a simplistic assumption 
and close examination does reveal a small albeit insignificant upward trend in the growth rate of the ToT.
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5 .3 .2  E stim ating th e  DSGE Model
The parameters of the DSGE model are estimated using constrained maximum likelihood 
(ML). The likelihood function is computed via the state-space representation of the model’s 
solution in Equation (5.7), together with the measurement equation linking the observed 
data and the state vector:
Zt = OYt (5.8)
where: Zt denotes the observed data; and the matrix G specifies the relationship between 
the state variables and the observed data. The posterior parameter distribution is simulated 
using the Metropolis Hasting (MH) algorithm described in An and Schorfheide (2007).
The ML estimates are generated conditional on the OLS estimate of the model’s four ex­
ogenous processes that explain developments in the rest of the world: the terms of trade st , 
foreign inflation 7tt*, interest rates rt* and output yt*. There are two advantages in estimating 
the observed exogenous processes independently of the model. First, it reduces the num­
ber of parameters to be estimated in the simulation algorithm. Second, Fukac and Pagan 
(2006) argue that rigid restrictions imposed by DSGE models on the data may yield invalid 
estimates of the model’s observable shocks (that is, shocks that are mapped into actual 
data, such as the foreign output gap y f).
The ML estimate of the model’s parameters from the 1.5 million Markov chain draws are 
summarised in Table 5.1 of the Appendix.12 The set of Markov chain diagnostic tests imply 
that the simulated chains attain their stationary distributions.13 The degree of backward 
lookingness is estimated to be 0.09 for the IS equation (rij) and 0.27 for the Phillips curve 
(^J. The estimated coefficient on the real interest rate (77.2) in the IS equation is relatively 
small suggesting output variation is relatively insensitive to interest rate changes. The 
response of inflation to output gap changes (#2 ) is also estimated to be low. The Taylor rule 
displays a significant degree of interest rate smoothing behaviour with pr estimated to be 
0.90. The estimated weight on output is slightly higher than the weight on inflation and 
consistent with standard calibrated values used in the literature. However, the estimation 
covers a period before the inflation targeting regime, it is no surprise that there is a wide 
confidence interval around the Taylor-rule coefficient on output, fa.
12A 50 per cent burn-in is discarded before computing the summary statistics.
13There is only one exception, 7 1 4 , which is significant at the 5 per cent level. However, a small Brooks and 
Gelman statistic of 1.12 indicates that the chain has converged.
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5 .3 .3  Q ualitative A nalysis o f the DSGE M odel’s Im pulse R esponse  
F unctions
This section present the impulse response functions of the model. The IRFs are sim ulated 
by sampling the empirical distribution of the estim ates of the DSGE model. This takes 
into account the uncertainty of the responses associated with param eter uncertainty. The 
median (solid lines) along with the 5th and 95th percentile (dotted lines) responses are 
shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. The IRFs of the model are broadly consistent with other 
open economy studies based on New Keynesian models. Moreover, the initial responses 
of key variables are generally quantitatively significant providing a useful set of robust 
sign restrictions for the VAR analysis. The discussion here will focus more on the initial 
responses ra ther than  the dynamic adjustm ents to the shocks.
A positive technology shock will increase the potential ou tpu t of the economy (rt in 
equation 5.1), because of nominal rigidities actual ou tput will take time to ad just to the 
new higher potential level of output, the ou tput gap falls. This causes the interest rate to 
fall. The real exchange rate depreciates to reflect the change in the in terest rate differential, 
which contributes to a small increase in the inflation rate, despite the boost to productivity.
A cost push  shock increases inflation, and leads to an increase in interest ra tes that 
causes the exchange rate to appreciate and ou tpu t to contract.
A negative shock to the risk premium causes lower inflation and output, due to an 
appreciating exchange rate. The central bank  responds by reducing the interest rate. An 
unexpected tightening of m onetary policy has a negative effect on the ou tput gap, with lower 
inflation and an appreciated exchange rate.
Turning to external factors, following a positive shock to A ustralia’s term s of trade, the 
output gap increases, the real exchange rate appreciates, and inflation and in terest rates 
rise. An exogenous increase in the foreign interest rate leads to a depreciation of the do­
mestic currency, which is sufficient to raise the ou tput gap and together these forces push 
up inflation. Given the simple structu re of the model, an increase in foreign inflation has 
a similar bu t opposite effect on the domestic economy as increases in the foreign nominal 
interest rate. An increase in foreign output actually decreases the domestic ou tput gap, 
while both domestic inflation and interest rates stay relatively static and the depreciating 
exchange rate helps balance the international consum ption risk sharing condition.14
14Gali and Monacelli (2005) provide a detailed account of the way in which such a shock can lower domestic 
potential output.
110
CHAPTER 5. INTERNATIONAL SHOCKS ON AUSTRALIA’S BUSINESS CYCLE
5 .3 .4  Robust Sign R estriction s
The focus of the  s tu d y  is to g a ther a  se t of sign restric tio n s from the im pulse re sponses 
of the DSGE m odel to identify the s tru c tu ra l shocks of a  sm all open econom y VAR. The 
com plete se t of estim ated  IRFs from the  DSGE m odel provides m ore sign restric tions th an  
are  necessary  to d isen tang le  the eight s tru c tu ra l shocks. B earing in m ind the potential 
m isspecification issue , not all the  restric tions from th e  m odel are  im posed upon  the  VAR. 
One can  th in k  of the  se t of sign restric tions im posed in the  pap er a s  the  m in im um  se t 
of restric tions needed to d isen tang le  the eight shocks. The chosen  se t of sign restric tions 
is broadly co n sis ten t w ith restric tions implied by o ther s ta n d a rd  open econom y s tru c tu ra l 
m odels.15 The se t of sign restric tions adopted  a re  p resen ted  in Table 5.2.
There are  a  few im portan t th ings w orth highlighting. F irst, given th a t the th ree  fo r­
eign variab les en te r the  s tru c tu ra l m odel as exogenous driving processes, the se t of sign 
restric tions im posed on the foreign econom y follows the dynam ic resp o n ses  implied by a 
canonical closed econom y New K eynesian m odel. The resp o n ses  of the  dom estic variables 
to the th ree  foreign shocks are  left un restric ted . Second, the  te rm s of trad e  is trea ted  as 
an  endogenous variable and  its response  to o ther shocks a p a rt from the o u tp u t shock  are  
also left u n re s tr ic te d .16 W ith the p resence  of sticky hom e prices in the sh o rt run , the te rm s 
of trade  resp o n d s to o ther variables in the system  via changes to dom estic inflation. Third, 
the o u tp u t shock  can  be viewed as any th ing  th a t m oves o u tp u t and  in te rest ra te s  together 
b u t is orthogonal to all o ther shocks in th e  system . Lastly, the  sign restric tions are  im posed 
for the initial two q u a rte rs  only.
5 .4  E stim atin g  a VAR m odel
This section  se ts  ou t the  sm all open econom y sign restric ted  VAR m odel estim ated  using  
the d a ta  described in Section 6.A.2. An eight-variable VAR(2) is fitted to quarterly  o b se r­
vations from 1980Q4 to 2006Q1 w here the n u m b er of lags a re  determ ined  by the Akaike 
Inform ation C riteria.
15Additional and/or alternative choices can potentially give different impulse response functions for the VAR, 
in particular the response to domestic shocks. However, the results of international shocks (the key focus of the 
paper) should remain fairly robust because there are no explicit restrictions imposed on the domestic economy 
from international shocks.
16The terms of trade is defined here as the domestic currency relative price of exports over imports.
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Consider a general VAR(p) model with n variables Yt:
BYt = A(L)Yt- i  + et (5.9)
where: A(L) = A\L + ■ ■ ■ +  APLP is an pth order m atrix polynomial; B is an  (n x n) matrix of 
coefficients th a t reflect the contem poraneous relationships among Yt; and et is a set of (n x 
T) normally distributed structu ra l d isturbances with m ean zero; and variance covariance 
m atrix E, E ,j = 0 Mi ^  j.  The structu ra l representation in Equation (5.9) has the following 
reduced form:
where IT(L) = B~ x A{L) and et is a set of (n x T) normally distributed reduced-form errors 
with m ean zero and variance covariance m atrix V, Vitj ±  0 Vi,j. The aim is to map the 
statistical relationships sum m arised by the reduced form errors et back into economic rela­
tionships described by et . Let P — B~l . The reduced form errors are related to the structural 
disturbances in the following m anner:
for some matrix H such th a t HH'  = PE P '. An identification problem arises if there are not 
enough restrictions to uniquely pin down H from the m atrix V 17
5 .4 .1  Id en tifica tio n  Through S ign  R e str ic t io n s
The identification of structu ra l shocks is often a controversial issue, with different identi­
fying assum ptions leading to quite different conclusions. Typical restrictions employed in 
the literature are based on restricting the short-run  or long-run impact of certain shocks 
on a subset of variables to be zero. The Choleski decomposition is an example of one 
such strategy where the contem poraneous im pact of shocks follows a recursive ordering. 
One noticeable feature of standard  empirical DSGE models is th a t they almost never imply 
zero contem poraneous impacts. This is also the case with the estim ated structural model 
presented in Section 5.3.
The central idea behind structu ra l VAR analysis is to decompose the set of reduced form 
shocks, characterised by V, into a set of orthogonal structu ra l d isturbances characterised
17There are n2 unknowns elements in H with only n(n + l)/2  unique elements in V.
Yt = n(L)Yt_! + et (5.10)
et = Pet and V = E(ete't ) = HH' (5.11)
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by E. However, there  are an  infinite n u m b er of w ays in w hich th is  orthogonality  condition 
can  be achieved. Let H be an  orthogonal decom position  of V  =  H I V . The m ultiplicity 
a rises  from the fact th a t for any  o rthonorm al m atrix  Q (where QQ' =  I), su ch  th a t V = 
HQQ'H' = I IH'  is also an  adm issib le  decom position  of V.  T his decom position  does no t have 
any  econom ic con ten t, b u t nevertheless, p ro d u ces a  se t of u n co rre la ted  sh ocks ct =  IIet , 
w ithout im posing any  zero con tem poraneous restric tions.
The identification stra tegy  u sed  here  closely follows C anova an d  De Nicolo (2002), Uhlig 
(2005), and  P eersm an (2005) in u sing  qualita tive in form ation  directly  from IRFs to achieve 
identification. Canova and  De Nicolo (2002) proposed  an  algorithm  to trace  o u t all possible 
orthogonal vector moving average (VMA) rep re sen ta tio n s  of the  VAR co n sis ten t w ith a given 
se t of sign restric tions. See the  A ppendix for a  m ore detailed  descrip tion  of the  algorithm .
5 .4 .2  Finding the M edian Im pulse
The next step  is to co n stru c t a  su m m ary  m easu re  from all th e  VAR rep resen ta tio n s  con ­
s is te n t w ith the given se t of sign restric tions. A com m on approach  is to exam ine all of the 
feasible IRFs implied, and  repo rt the m ed ian  resp o n se  a t each  horizon for each  variable. 
However, Fry and  Pagan (2005) criticise th is  ap p ro ach  since the  im plied ‘m ed ian ’ IRF m ay 
not actually  be a feasible response  (since it is likely to con sis t of selected p a rts  of p a th s  
implied by different cand ida te  functions). In o ther w ords, inference is difficult becau se  the  
orthogonality  condition m ay be violated.
Fry and  Pagan suggest locating a u n iq u e  identification  m atrix  su ch  th a t all of the feasible 
im pulses are  c losest to its m edian  while m a in ta in ing  the  orthogonality  condition. E ach  
feasible VAR rep resen ta tio n  can  be d is tingu ished  by th e  ro ta tion  angle, 9. So the  objective 
is to choose 9 so a s  to m inim ise:
m atrix  of s tan d ard ised  im pulses for th e  j th  ro tation; an d  is the  m edian  im pulse over all 
possible ro ta tio n s .18 Full de ta ils  of the  m ethodology and  im plem entation  are  provided in 
the Appendix.
18In Fry and Pagan (2005), q is se t to 1 focusing only on the initial period impulse.
(5.12)
w here: the index i refers to th e  horizon for w hich th e  im pu lses are  calcu lated ; 0] is an  n x n
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5 .5  S ign-restricted  VAR R esu lts
The identification schem e based  on the  sign-restric ted  VAR allows for a s tru c tu ra l in te rp re ­
ta tion  of the  effects of shocks. The im pulse response  of the o u tp u t gap, th e  in te rest rate, 
inflation, the real exchange ra te  and  the te rm s of trad e  w ith resp ec t to th e  th ree  foreign 
shocks are  show n in Figure (5.4). An exogenous increase  in the  foreign in te re s t ra te  re su lts  
in a depreciation  of the exchange ra te  w hich ra ises  dom estic inflation. In c o n tra s t to the  
DSGE model, the  depreciation  of the  exchange ra te  is m ore g radua l, reach ing  a  peak  a t 8 
q u a rte rs  before re tu rn in g  to equilibrium . A m ore im portan t difference from the DSGE re ­
su lts  is th a t  o u tp u t falls, w hich ap p ears  to reflect the  decline in  foreign o u tp u t (not shown) 
and  would also help to explain why dom estic in te re s t ra te s  decline.
In co n tra s t to the DSGE estim ates, the sign-restric ted  VAR estim a tes  im ply th a t an  in ­
crease  in foreign o u tp u t leads to a positive dom estic o u tp u t gap, reach ing  a peak  after 4 
q u arte rs . The positive dom estic o u tp u t gap im plies increased  infla tionary  p ressu re , w hich 
induces a  tightening of m onetary  policy over tim e to b ring  bo th  o u tp u t an d  inflation back  
to steady  s ta te . The response  of the dom estic econom y following a foreign inflation shock  is 
very sim ilar to th a t implied by the DSGE model. The exchange ra te  ap p rec ia tes  in response  
to the lower real in te rest ra te  differential. This leads to a fall in the o u tp u t gap and  s u b ­
sequently  a decline in  inflation. There is a  sm all m onetary  loosening  to  b rin g  b o th  o u tp u t 
and  inflation back  to equilibrium .
Figures (5.4) and  (5.5) display  the  sum m ary  IRFs from the s ign -restric ted  VAR for the re ­
m ain ing  five dom estic shocks. A positive o u tp u t shock  (that is, a negative technology shock) 
ra ises the in te re s t ra te  co n sis ten t w ith the sign restric tion . T his shock  also  ind u ces infla­
tionary  p re ssu re  and  th e  in te re s t ra te  rem ains above its s teady  s ta te  level for som e time. 
An un an tic ip a ted  tigh ten ing  of m onetary  policy lowers bo th  inflation and  o u tp u t while the 
exchange ra te  app rec ia tes in response  to h igher real in te re s t ra tes . After the  shock, the 
in te rest ra te  falls so as to stim u la te  o u tp u t and  b ring  inflation back  to its  s tead y -sta te  level. 
Following a positive co s t-p u sh  shock, the dom estic in te re s t ra te  increases, the  exchange 
ra te  app rec ia tes and  the  o u tp u t gap falls. A negative shock  to the  risk  p rem ium  triggers 
an  appreciation  of the exchange ra te  leading to lower inflation. The m onetary  au tho rity  
responds to th is  by lowering the  dom estic in te rest rate. In c o n tra s t to the  s tru c tu ra l model, 
the effect of the  m onetary  response  is estim ated  to outw eigh the  effect of the h igher ex­
change rate , leading to h igher o u tp u t. A te rm s of trade  shock  h a s  a positive effect on both
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o u tp u t and  inflation leading to a tigh ten ing  of m onetary  policy. The exchange ra te  also 
responds to the  h igher te rm s of trade , help ing to stab ilise  bo th  o u tp u t and  inflation.
The re su lts  highlight im po rtan t differences betw een th e  resp o n ses  of the  SRVAR 
com pared w ith the estim ated  DSGE model. T his fu rth e r em phasizes Del Negro and  
Schorfheide’s 2009 conclusion th a t  m odel m isspecification  rem ain s the  key challenge in 
applied m acroeconom ic research . However, th is  is no t to say  th a t all the  restric tio n s are  
invalid, som e rem ain  useful especially w hen  th e  d a ta  can  no t be u sed  to help d istingu ish  
com peting theories as  in the  case of exactly identified VARs. P eersm an  and  S trau b  (2009 
forthcoming) u se  a sim ilar app roach  to try  an d  d isen tang le  the  response  of h o u rs  worked 
following a productivity  shock  in the  eu ro  area.
5 .5 .1  Main Drivers of Output Over th e  B usiness Cycle
V ariance decom positions are  often u sed  to determ ine  the  relative con tribu tion  of shocks to 
the forecast e rror variance of a  variable of in te rest over different horizons. As a benchm ark ,
I first p resen t a variance decom position based  on the Choleski decom position. The v ariab les 
are ordered according to the  convention th a t  th e  m ost exogenous (or predeterm ined) v a ri­
ables ap p ear first. The variance decom position  re su lts  reported  in Table (5.3) are  based  on 
the following ordering: foreign o u tp u t, foreign inflation, the  foreign in te rest ra te , the te rm s 
of trade, the o u tp u t gap, inflation, the  in te re s t ra te  and  the real exchange ra te . Investiga­
tion of o th er ordering schem es, w here the  order of o u tp u t am ong the dom estic variab les 
varies from first to last, reveals little difference in  th e  variance decom position re su lts  for 
ou tpu t. The b en ch m ark  re su lts  show  th a t a t the  one-year horizon, shocks to the  dom estic 
o u tp u t gap accoun t for a ro u n d  two th ird s  of the  to tal variance in the  o u tp u t gap while o ther 
dom estic factors play only a m odest role. Foreign shocks acco u n t for ju s t  over one q u a rte r  
of the o u tp u t gap forecast erro r variance, w ith th e  biggest co n trib u to r being foreign o u tp u t 
accounting  for a ro u n d  16 per cent. At longer horizons, the role of dom estic o u tp u t shocks 
decreases slightly while o th er dom estic factors play a  slightly larger role. The con tribu tion  
from all foreign factors stay s  fairly c o n s ta n t ac ro ss  th e  different forecasting  horizons.
Looking a t the  variance decom position  of the  shocks identified by the  sign-restric ted  VAR 
model reveals som e im po rtan t differences (Table 5.4). These re su lts  suggest th a t dom estic 
o u tp u t shocks only acco u n t for 4-5  per cen t of the  varia tion  acro ss  all horizons. At the 
sh o rte r horizons, all th ree  foreign factors com bine to acco u n t for m ore th an  60 per cen t of
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the output gap forecast error variance. A sizeable share of this appears to be due to foreign 
monetary policy innovations, although this may, in part, reflect factors th a t are outside of 
the model, such as global confidence, th a t are transm itted to the domestic economy via 
international financial m arkets. This view is consistent with the findings in Dungey and 
Pagan (2000), which shows that international financial linkages are im portant when m od­
elling the Australian economy. At the longer forecasting horizon, all three foreign factors 
m aintain their influence on domestic ou tput gap variations with both the foreign interest 
rate and foreign output remaining the dom inant contributors. Although the model treats 
the term s of trade as endogenous, realistically it can be thought of as exogenous, a t least 
over longer horizons. So in this respect the term s of trade could be thought of as another 
foreign factor. The term s of trade account for a quarter of the variation in ou tput across all 
bu t the shortest of horizons. This is consistent with the significance of commodities in A us­
tralian exports. Turning to domestic factors, interest rate shocks are estim ated to have only 
a small influence on output gap fluctuations, while inflation (cost-push) and exchange rate 
(risk premium) shocks each contribute around 5-8 per cent to the variance of the ou tput 
gap. This is broadly similar to the Choleski baseline results.
One may ask w hat is the role of foreign factors among other adm issible rotations since 
it is impossible to distinguish them statistically. To check the sensitivity of the variance 
decomposition results around the optimised m edian impulse, the chosen m edian rotation 
is dropped and the next median impulse is found by re-optimising Equation (20) over the 
remaining admissible rotations. Repeating th is procedure 50 times around the ‘m edian re­
gion’ reveal foreign factors explains between 45 per cent to 60 per cent of the unconditional 
variance in output, with foreign interest rates rem aining the dom inant contributor. To give 
a more complete picture, Figure 5.6 plots the forecast error variance for the ou tpu t gap 
attributed to foreign factors at both the one-year and 50-quarter horizon across all 2000 
admitted ro tations.19 The first point to note is th a t the resu lts presented above lie exactly 
on the mode of the distribution, while the baseline Choleski decomposition lies in the thin 
tail of the distribution. Looking at the range of values from the sign-restricted VAR anal­
ysis, it appears that the true im portance of foreign factors may not be easily captured by 
Choleski decompositions that impose contem poraneous (zero) coefficient constrain ts.20
19The contribution from domestic factors can  be easily read off the g raphs since the two factors m ust sum  to 
100 .
20Estim ating the sign restricted VAR over the shorter sam ple 1992:Q 1 - 2006:Q 1 suggests th a t if anything foreign 
ou tpu t shocks have become more im portant for explaining the variance of the domestic ou tp u t gap, while shocks 
to foreign in terest rates have become less so. However, th is sam ple may be too short to produce reliable estim ates
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Variance decompositions may reveal which shocks are im portant a t explaining the fore­
cast errors of ou tput across different horizons. However, Fry and Pagan (2005) argue they 
may not be very useful in understanding the natu re  of business cycle fluctuations. One 
useful statistic is to decompose the historical observation of ou tput into its MA representa­
tion in term s of shocks, that is:
k
yt = ^  Cj(L)cj't + initial condition (5.13)
where Cj (L)  is the impulse response to the shock j . 21 Historical decompositions are partic­
ularly useful in relating certain events th a t have happened over the business cycle.
Figure (5.7) plots the historical decomposition of output into foreign (output, inflation 
and in terest rates) versus domestic factors. During the two recessionary periods (the early 
1980s and 1990s), both domestic and foreign factors had contributed negatively to ou t­
put. This observation is consistent with the resu lts reported in Dungey (2002). From the 
early 1990s onwards, the Australian economy experienced relatively stable and low in­
flation combined with robust ou tput growth. Coincidentally, foreign and domestic shocks 
appear to have had offsetting effects so as to m oderate domestic business cycle fluctuations 
during this period. For example, the slowdown in the economy after the Sydney Olympic 
games together with the introduction of GST in 2000 was somewhat offset by buoyant con­
ditions before the bursting of the ’dot-com’ bubble in the US. A buoyant housing m arket 
and strong household consum ption in the early part of this decade was m oderated by a 
tem porary dow nturn in the US economy following the terrorist attacks in Septem ber 2001. 
The pattern  continued in late 2003 where slowing conditions in the Australian housing 
m arket were offset somewhat by a relatively strong US economy.
5 .5 .2  R obustness ch eck s
5 .5 .2 .1  G7 as th e  Foreign E conom y
To check the robustness of these results, the sign-restricted VAR model is re-estim ated 
using G7 data as the foreign economy. It is certainly the case that China has become 
increasingly more im portant for the A ustralian economy, as of 1 October 2009 the RBA 
of the relatively high dimensional VAR.
2'Since the entire history of shocks are not observed, the decomposed components of yt may not add up exactly 
for the initial periods of the sample. In the case of output, this is around 6-8 quarters, which are dropped from 
the decomposition results shown in Figure 6 below.
117
CHAPTER 5. INTERNATIONAL SHOCKS ON AUSTRALIA’S BUSINESS CYCLE
calculates the share of the Chinese currency in the Trade weighted index (TWI) to be over 
16%. However, over a large part of the sam ple th is paper considers, the G7 countries 
remained as Australia’s dom inant trading partners. According to the RBA Bulletin (2002), 
the weight of the Chinese currency in A ustralia’s TWI ranged from 2% in 1980 to 8.5% in 
2002, whereas the G7 countries accounted for 77% to 52% over the sam e period.
The overall conclusion using the G7 datase t is supported although m inor differences 
do arise.22 The combined contribution of foreign shocks accounts for around 63 per cent 
of the forecast error variance for the ou tpu t gap a t the one-year horizon, similar to that 
reported earlier. At the 50-quarter horizon, this increases to 76 per cent in contrast to 59 
per cent based on using only US data. C onsistent with the earlier estim ates, innovations 
from domestic ou tput play a sm aller role in explaining domestic ou tpu t gap forecast errors. 
However, within the set of international variables, foreign output now takes on a larger role 
compared with foreign interest rates. This tends to suggest th a t in terest rates may have 
been picking up other global factors in the resu lts based on US ou tpu t alone.
5 .5 .2 .2  U sing th e  HP filter  as a ltern ative  detren d in g  m eth od
Another im portant assum ption behind the discussions above is th a t the results are based 
on cyclical movements extracted from the BN decomposition. As an additional robustness 
check, the VAR is re-estim ated using cyclical m ovements extracted from the HP filter.
Across all horizons, the three foreign shocks together contribute around 50% of the 
forecast errors for output, whereas domestic ou tpu t shocks only account for under 9%. In 
contrast to the BN decomposition, foreign ou tpu t shocks are now the dom inant contributor 
a t around 30% and foreign inxterest rate shocks around 17%. The results dem onstrate that 
the key determ inant of the ou tput forecast error rests with the sign restriction identification.
5 .6  C onclusion
This paper uses a small open economy VAR model to investigate the sources of business 
cycle fluctuations for the Australia economy. The VAR is identified using robust sign restric­
tions derived from an estim ated small structu ra l (DSGE) model. The resu lts suggest that 
international factors account for over half the domestic ou tput fluctuations while demand 
22 Detail statistics are not reported but are available upon request.
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type shocks play a small role. The result appears to be robust to alternative detrending of 
the data and using different representation as the foreign economy.
The paper tries to address some of the shortcom ings in the earlier sign restriction lit­
erature th a t the sign restrictions are arbitrarily imposed by selecting a set of robust sign 
restrictions from an estim ated structural model. However, the analysis does not tackle the 
question which model is more valid. A m onte carlo study would be better place to study the 
usefulness of sign restrictions and th a t is left to fu ture work.
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Table 5.1: Maximum likelihood estim ates of the structu ra l model
Param eters MLE s ta t is t ic s  D iagn ostics
Mean Std 2 . 5 % 9 7 . 5 % NSE p-value B-G
nl 0.09 0.06 0.01 0 .24 0 .00 0 .06 1.03
n2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0 .04 0 .00 0 .75 1.00
n3 0.21 0.10 0.05 0 .43 0.01 0.54 1.01
n4 0.26 0.09 0 .15 0 .50 0.01 0.02 1.12
u5 - 0.70 0.16 - 1.11 - 0 .43 0.02 0.56 1.01
fll 0.27 0.05 0.16 0 .37 0.01 0.93 1.00
<?2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0 .04 0 .00 0 .09 1.01
</3 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.01 0 .00 0 .24 1.00
P r 0.90 0.02 0.84 0 .93 0 .00 0.07 1.11
<P\ 1.31 0.22 1.02 1.87 0.03 0.24 1.05
(p2 1.56 0.38 0.78 2 .30 0 .05 0 .16 1.09
P z 0.78 0.07 0.62 0 .89 0.01 0.22 1.04
P u 0.98 0.01 0.95 1.00 0 .00 0.94 1.00
O z 2.10 0 .16 1.83 2 .52 0.02 0 .95 1.00
O n 1.03 0.22 0.72 1.54 0.03 0 .36 1.03
O r 1.10 0.08 0.97 1.28 0.01 0.92 1.00







O r * 1.07
O n ' 1.67
O y • 4.14
1. The posterior s ta tistics  are com puted based  on 1 million MCMC draw s after a  50% b u rn  in  period.
2. NSE refers to the  num erical s tandard  error of the  Markov chain.
3. p value re la tes  to the test of two m eans between the first and second half of the  stationary  Markov chain.
4. B-G refers to the Brooks and Gelman (1998) univariate shrink  factor. A shrink  factor close to 1 is an  indication of a tta in ing  
a  s tationary  distribution.
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Table 5.2: SRVAR sign restrictions
r* 7T* y r 7T Q s
Foreign in te res t t - i - - - - -
Foreign o u tp u t t t - - - - - -
Foreign inflation t I t - - - - -
O u tp u t (composite) 0 0 0 t t - - -
M onetary policy 0 0 0 - t 4 - -
C ost p u sh 0 0 0 4 t t t -
Risk p rem ium 0 0 0 - - 4 t -
T erm s of trade 0 0 0 - t t t t
1. indicates no restrictions and  0 indicates no contem poraneous impact.
Table 5.3: Baseline Choleski variance decomposition of output, interest, inflation and real
exchange rate
Horizon Foreign
in te re s t
Foreign
o u tp u t
Foreign
inflation





1 0.3 2.0 7.5
O u tp u t
89 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2
4 3.3 15.7 7.5 65 .8 0.9 3.5 2.3 1.0
8 3.1 14.8 8.9 62.1 1.9 4.5 3.3 1.4
12 3.0 14.5 9.1 60.1 2.8 5.3 3 .7 1.5
50 3.0 14.4 9.1 58 .6 3.8 5.8 3.8 1.6
In te re s t ra te
1 0.7 0.1 1.2 3.7 90 .5 1.6 0 .0 2.1
4 1.9 9.8 5.3 17.2 53.7 10.8 0.7 0.7
8 5.1 16.7 4.5 24 .9 35 .7 12.3 0.3 0.4
12 6.4 19.7 3.7 28 .4 29.2 11.5 0.4 0.7
50 8.9 23 .0 2.9 29.1 22 .5 9.1 1.1 3.4
Inflation
1 3.0 0.9 0.1 0 .7 0.0 94 .9 0.0 0.4
4 2.7 2.4 1.8 0 .9 12.1 74.1 4.0 2.0
8 3.7 5.8 2.2 4.4 12.5 64 .3 4.2 3.0
12 5.1 8.4 2.0 6.8 11.6 58.2 4.5 3.4
50 7.4 1 1.7 1.8 8.8 10.3 50.8 4.6 4 .6
1 0.7 0.1 0.0
E xchange ra te  
0.1 3 .0 0.0 87 .8 8.2
4 0.7 0.1 6.8 3.2 2.8 3.9 80 .5 2.1
8 4.5 1.2 14.3 2.2 2.8 5.3 68 .0 1.7
12 9.3 2.8 17.6 1.7 6.5 5.3 55.1 1.7
50 11.7 4.0 17.0 1.8 13.5 5.4 44 .6 2.0
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Table 5.4: SRVAR variance decomposition of output, interest, inflation and real exchange 
rate using BN decomposition
Horizon Foreign
in te re s t
Foreign
o u tp u t
Foreign
inflation





1 49.1 0 .0 1.5
O u tp u t
5.2 0.2 0.7 7.4 35 .9
4 41 .7 17.1 1.8 4.4 0 .5 5.2 4.8 24 .5
8 40 .5 17.0 1.9 4.4 0 .5 6.6 4.8 24.3
12 40.1 16.7 1.9 4.3 0 .5 7.2 4.8 24 .6
50 39 .4 16.6 2.0 4.4 0 .5 7.5 5.0 24 .6
In te re s t ra te
1 2.4 2.2 5.6 11.1 3.1 6.6 59.4 9.5
4 1.8 3.7 3.6 8.1 1.4 13.7 46.4 21 .2
8 1.6 20 .3 1.9 7.3 1.4 10.3 34 .4 22 .6
12 1.3 32 .5 1.5 7.2 1.4 8.0 28.9 19.2
50 1.1 54 .7 1.6 5.2 1.0 5.5 18.6 12.3
InflaUon
1 25.7 0.8 1.2 0.1 8.2 63.1 0.5 0.4
4 19.6 3.1 1.6 3.7 6 .0 44 .2 19.8 2.1
8 16.2 11.9 1.7 6.1 4.9 37 .2 19.2 2.8
12 14.1 21 .4 1.5 6.5 4.3 32 .3 17.5 2 .5
50 10.8 38 .9 1.8 5.1 3.3 24 .6 13.2 2.3
1 0.5 2.2 23 .3
E xchange ra te  
43 .9  2 .7 1.0 26.2 0.1
4 8.6 3.2 18.9 27 .6 3.2 6.1 30.2 2.3
8 13.2 11.9 12.7 20 .2 4 .0 12.6 21.1 4 .4
12 13.5 25 .8 8.8 13.8 3.5 14.0 14.3 6.3
50 10.7 40 .0 7.8 9.4 2 .5 11.9 10.1 7.5
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Table 5.5: SRVAR variance decomposition of output, interest, inflation and real exchange 
rate using HP filter
Horizon Foreign
in te re s t
Foreign
o u tp u t
Foreign
inflation





4 17.5 30 .8 0.7
O u tp u t
8 .7 0.2 0.1 12.1 30 .0
8 17.7 29 .0 1.9 8.4 0.3 0.5 13.2 29.1
12 17.4 28 .6 2.2 8.7 0.3 1.0 12.9 28 .9
50 17.2 28 .3 2.4 8.9 0.3 1.2 12.8 28 .8
1 0.3 11.0 6.6
In te re s t ra te  
2 .3  8.2 12.4 57.9 1.3
4 2.1 21 .7 18.5 2.1 1.7 13.0 34 .6 6.3
8 1.6 17.5 13.4 3.3 2 .6 12.4 37.1 12.1
12 1.9 15.3 16.3 4.2 2 .6 11.1 35 .5 13.1
50 1.8 13.5 28.1 3 .8 2.2 9.5 29.9 11.2
1 24 .9 0.1 0.5
Inflation
0.1 56 .4 2.9 11.4 3.7
4 18.8 0 .5 1.5 3.2 38.1 3.3 28 .0 6.5
8 16.4 0 .6 1.9 6.8 32 .3 3.4 29 .5 9 .0
12 15.7 0 .6 4.7 7.2 30 .7 3.3 29.1 8 .8
50 14.7 1.7 10.1 6.7 28 .3 3.2 26 .8 8.5
1 21 .8 9 .3 3.5
E xchange ra te  
2 .0  0 .0 7.6 52.3 3.6
4 8.7 5.4 12.9 1.2 1.0 9.1 45 .9 15.8
8 8.7 12.4 13.6 1.3 1.5 9.0 35.9 17.6
12 9.6 19.4 12.1 1.5 1.6 8.1 31 .0 16.7
50 9.9 23 .0 11.6 1.6 1.5 7.5 28 .9 15.9
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Figure 5.1: Cycles in A ustralian GDP
------ BN
------ HP
Note: GKR is the cycle derived by Gillitzer, Kearns and Richards (2005) using a factor model.
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Figure 5.2: Structural model IRF of technology, m onetary policy, cost push, risk premium  
shock.
Output Real exchange rate
5 10 15
Real exchange rate
Output Real exchange rate
Output Real exchange rate
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Figure 5.3: S tructural model IRF of TOT, foreign interest, inflation and output shock.
Output Interest rate Inflation Real exchange rate
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Figure 5.4: SRVAR IRF of foreign output, interest, inflation and domestic ou tput shock.
Note: * indicate impulse responses where sign restrictions are imposed.
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Figure 5.5: SRVAR IRF of monetary policy, cost push, risk premium  and TOT shock.
TOT shock Risk premium Cost push
> i  i
r> ^  K j
Monetary policy
I I Io o o  
b) io o
Note: * indicate impulse responses where sign restrictions are imposed.
128
CHAPTER 5. INTERNATIONAL SHOCKS ON AUSTRALIA’S BUSINESS CYCLE
Figure 5.6: SRVAR variance decomposition of foreign vs domestic factors Across 2000 Ro­
tations.
Forecast variance explained by foreign factors -  one year horizon
8 0 0 1-------------- 1-------------- t-------------- i-------------- t-------------- i-------------- t---------
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
% explained
Forecast variance explained by foreign factors -  50 quarter horizon
800
% explained
Figure 5.7: Historical decomposition of ou tput using US data. 
Historical Decomposition foreign vs domestic -  optimal impulse
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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5 .A A ppendix
5.A.1 Sign restriction  algorithm
(5.14)
col j  
4
-s in  (0itj) 
cos (0ij)
1
where 6tj  € [ 0.7r ]. This provides a way of systematically exploring the space of all VMA 
representations by searching over the range of values of dij . While Canova and De Nicolo 
(2002) propose setting a up grid over the range of values for djj,  the following algorithm 
generates the Q’s randomly from a uniform distribution:
1. Estimate the VAR in Equation (5.10) using OLS to obtain the reduced form variance 
covariance matrix V and compute V ;
2. Compute the Choleski decomposition of Vu  and V22. where H u  = chol(Vu ) and H22 = 
chol(y22)\
3. For both the foreign and domestic block, draw a vector of 0iyj from a Uniform [ 0,7r ] 
distribution;
4. Calculate Q = n’L“/ EIjU+i Q i A 0i,i)'
5. Use the candidate rotation matrix Q to compute tt = HQet and its corresponding 
structural IRFs C(L) for domestic and foreign shocks;
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6. Check w hether the IRFs satisfy all the sign restrictions described in Table (5.2). If so 
keep the draw, if not, drop the draw;
7. Repeat (3)-(6) until 2000 draws, satisfying the restrictions, are found.
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Chapter 6
International transm ission  of 
sh o c k s : A tim e-varying Factor 
Augmented  VAR approach  to the 
Open E conomy
A bstract *
This pap er ex tends the open econom y FAVAR m odels w ith tim e-varying coeffi­
c ien ts an d  s tochastic  volatility to exam ine possib le changes to the tran sm issio n  
of foreign m oney supply, dem and  and  supp ly  sh ocks to th e  U.K. The proposed 
model cap tu re s  the  changing  co-m ovem ents am ong the  m acroeconom ic tim e se ­
ries by allowing the ir dependence on com m on factors to evolve over tim e. It also 
allows for sto ch astic  volatility in the innovation  p rocess of the factors. The m ain 
re su lts  are  a s  follows: A foreign m onetary  policy easing  h a s  su b stan tia lly  differ­
en t effects on the  U.K. in the  period after 1990. In p articu lar, the resp o n se  of 
the dom estic econom y in the  period before 1990 resem bles a classic  beggar-thy- 
neighbor scenario , w ith in creases  in foreign m oney supp ly  resu lting  in a  fall in 
U.K. real activity. In the  la te r period, the resp o n se  is positive b u t insignificant. 
O ur estim ates  a ttr ib u te  th is  change to a  fall in exchange ra te  p a ss-th ro u g h  to 
dom estic relative prices. A foreign aggregate dem and  shock  h ad  a large positive 
im pact on U.K. GDP d u rin g  the  years 1980-1990, b u t its  im pact in the  m ore 
recent period h a s  been su b stan tia lly  sm aller. Foreign supp ly  shocks were im ­
p o rtan t for U.K. inflation du ring  the  1970s and  th e  pers is ten ce  of the  inflation 
response  h a s  also been sm aller since the  early 1980s.
* Chapter (6) is a summary of joint work with Haroon Mumtaz (Bank of England).
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6 .1  Introduction
T  TNDERSTANDING OF the in te rn a tio n a l tran sm iss io n  m echan ism  of econom ic shocks
__' is an  im portan t s tep  tow ards identifying th e  b es t policy resp o n se  in an  individual
econom y to in te rna tiona l developm ents. In a  world econom y, w hich h a s  experienced a 
steady  increase in integration  acro ss  goods, cap ita l and  financial m arkets , the in te rn a ­
tional aspect of the  transm issio n  m echan ism  h a s  becom e an  essen tia l ingred ien t in policy 
d iscussions.
An im portan t em pirical regularity  observed since the  m id-1980s, is the  su b s ta n tia l d e ­
cline in the volatility of o u tp u t and  inflation across OECD coun tries, a  phenom enon  know n 
as the  “g reat m odera tion”. In addition , over the sam e period th e  level and  persistence  of 
inflation h as  rem ained  a t h istorical lows. M any s tu d ies  have docum ented  reduced  form 
evidence in su p p o rt of th is  observation. For exam ple Kim and  Nelson (1999), M cConnell 
and  Perez-Q uiros (2000), and  Cogley and  S argent (2005) in the  case  of the  U.S. and  B enati 
(2006) for the U.K. However, the is su e s  re la ted  to c au ses  and  co nsequences of these  changes 
have been m ore controversial. A large lite ra tu re  h a s  exam ined ch an g es to the  m onetary  
transm issio n  m echan ism  during  the  g reat m oderation , and  conclusions are  mixed. Cogley 
and  S argent (2002), and  C larida et al. (2000) lend su p p o rt to th e  hypo thesis  th a t changes 
in th e  U.S. m acroeconom ic dynam ics w ere linked to th e  change in m acroeconom ic s ta b i­
lization policies. On the o ther h and , Prim iceri (2005), S im s and  Z ha (2006), and  G am betti 
et al. (2008) are  m ore sym pathetic  to the  idea th a t it is the  ab sen ce  of adverse non-policy 
shocks th a t h a s  con tribu ted  to the  g rea t m oderation . The lite ra tu re  so far h a s  largely ig­
nored the possible effects of changes in the  in te rna tiona l tran sm iss io n  m echan ism  over the 
g reat m oderation  period. T his p ap er focuses on th is  issue .
A large em pirical lite ra tu re  h a s  investigated the  in te rn a tio n a l tran sm iss io n  of m onetary  
and  non m onetary  shocks using  sm all scale s tru c tu ra l Vector A uto-R egression (SVAR) m od­
els. The identification restric tions in th ese  m odels a re  often a controversial topic, w here 
different identifying a ssu m p tio n s  can  lead to qu ite  d ifferent conclusions. Several recen t 
papers have proposed alternative identification  s tru c tu re s  including, am ongst o thers, the 
recursive schem es in Grilli and  R oubini (1995), E ichenbaum  and  E vans (1995), Dungey and  
Pagan (2000), and  F a u s t and  Rogers (2003), the non-recursive schem es in C u sh m an  and  
Zha (1997), Kim and  Roubini (2000), and  Kim (2001), and  the  sign restric tio n s in C anova 
(2005), Scholl and  Uhlig (2006), an d  Liu (2008).
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Most of these contributions are based on VAR models with only a few selected variables. 
Arguably, central banks across the world monitor (and possibly respond to) a far wider in ­
formation set than  typically assum ed in these small-scale VARs. To overcome this, Boivin 
and Giannoni (2008), and Mumtaz and Surico (2009) extend the Factor-Augmented VAR 
(FAVAR) model proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005) to the open economy setting. The FAVAR 
model helps address the limited information problem, in particular, they found many of 
the open economy anomalies disappeared when a large panel of data was used. However, 
a common assum ption is that both the volatility of the stochastic driving process and the 
natu re  of co-movements among the variables have not changed over tim e.1 As discussed 
earlier, m any closed economy studies have shown significant decreases in ou tput and in ­
flation volatility, and docum ented changes to the transm ission m echanism  during the great 
moderation. Therefore, it is unsatisfactory to simply assum e the size and the transm ission 
of international shocks have not changed over this period.
This paper extends the open economy FAVAR models with time-varying coefficients and 
stochastic volatility to examine possible changes to the international transm ission m echa­
nism  of shocks. The proposed model captures the changing co-movements among m acroe­
conomic time series by allowing their dependence on common factors to evolve over time. 
It also allows for stochastic volatility in the innovation process of the factors. We treat the 
U.K. as a small open economy and take an agnostic approach in modeling its interactions 
with the rest of the world.
The main contribution of the paper is to assess possible changes to the transm ission 
of world m onetary policy, dem and and supply shocks to the U.K. economy. A further 
advantage of our approach is that it allows us to derive the dynamic responses for a wider 
range of economic indicators w ithout placing overly restrictive prior restrictions on the 
model’s param eters.
The main results of the paper are as follows: A foreign m onetary policy easing has 
substantially  different effects on the U.K. in the period after 1990 compared to the period 
1980-1990. In particular, the response of the domestic economy in the period before 1990 
resem bles a classic beggar-thy-neighbor scenario, with increases in foreign money supply 
resulting in a fall in U.K. real activity. In contrast, the po st-1990 period is characterized 
with positive bu t insignificant response of U.K. real activity to a rise in foreign money su p ­
ply. Our estim ates attribu te this to a fall in the degree of exchange rate pass-through to
b o iv in  and G iannoni (2008) estim ate their model over two sub-periods by introducing a dum m y variable.
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relative prices. A foreign aggregate dem and  shock  had  a large positive im pact on U.K. GDP 
d u rin g  the  years 1980-1990. Its im pact over the  m ore recen t period h as  been  su b stan tia lly  
sm aller. Foreign supp ly  shocks w ere im p o rtan t for U.K. inflation du ring  the  1970s. The 
p ersistence  of the  inflation resp o n se  h a s  been  sm aller since the  early 1980s.
The p ap er is organized as  follows. Section (6.2) ou tlines th e  em pirical m odel and  d is­
cu sse s  the identification  a ssu m p tio n s. Section (6.3) explains the  estim ation  procedure and  
the  d a ta  u sed  for the  investigation. Section (6.4) repo rts  the  co-m ovem ent of the in te rn a ­
tional factors, dynam ic effects of an  unexpected  fall in world in te re s t ra tes , an  unexpected  
increase  in world activities and  an  u n an tic ip a ted  negative world supp ly  shock  on a  selected 
su b se t of U.K. m acroeconom ic ind icators. Section (6.5) co n ta in s  concluding  rem arks and  
d irec tions for fu tu re  research .
6 .2  An open  econ om y FAVAR m odel w ith  tim e-varying co ­
e ffic ien ts
6 .2 .1  T he em p ir ica l m od el
The m odel co n sis ts  of two blocks, one for the  U.K. an d  the  o th e r for the  re s t of the world, 
w hich is ordered first.2 T he inform ation ab o u t th e  U.K. and  th e  re s t of the  world are  su m ­
m arized by K  unobserved  factors, Ft = [Ft* F ^ K]', w here * deno tes the  foreign econom ies 
and  UK  deno tes the dom estic econom y. The U.K. sh o rt-te rm  in te re s t ra te , Rt , is the only 
observable factor. T his together w ith th e  unobserved  com m on com ponen ts form the dy­
nam ic system  th a t evolves accord ing  to th e  following tran s itio n  equation:
(  f;n B n ( L )  0  0
F U K = B 2l (L)  B 22( L)  B 23( L) Ff.f
V R> t B 31( L ) B 32(L)  B 33( L) V R,~1
w here B(L)  is a conform able lag polynom ial of finite order p, and  ut — fl}/2et w ith the 
s tru c tu ra l d is tu rb an ces  et ~  N(0,1)  and  f l t is th e  sto ch astic  co-variance of the reduced 
form shocks. The s tru c tu re  of B(L)  reflects the sm all open econom y a ssu m p tio n  su ch  th a t 
the dom estic factors do no t im pact on world factors, b u t  no t vice versa. The tim e-varying
2The term foreign and world are used inter-changeably.
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covariance m atrix  of the  VAR innovations, ut , can  be factored a s
Var(wt) = n t = A ; l Ht (At_1) / (6.2)
Following Prim iceri (2005), th e  tim e-varying m atrices  Ht and  At are  defined as:
h i , t 0 0




0 2 1 ,  t 1
0
O n l  ,t
(6.3)
(6.4)
w ith Inhitt, an d  the  non-zero and  n o n -u n it e lem ents of the  m atrix  A t is a ssu m ed  to evolve 
a s  driftless random  w alks
In h it =  In 4- i =  (6.5)
®ij,t i T £ij,t) i 2 , . . . ,  n an d  j  1 (6.6)
w here the d istribu tiona l a ssu m p tio n s  regard ing  [//*, £t] are  s ta ted  below. The random  w alk 
assu m p tio n  allows for p e rm an en t sh ifts  in the  sto ch astic  volatility te rm s. Allowing the  s i­
m u ltan eo u s relations (4fi to vary over tim e is crucia l for m odeling the  tim e varying dynam ics 
of s tru c tu ra l VAR m odels.
The unobserved  factors are  ex trac ted  from a large panel of N  foreign an d  dom estic in ­
d ica to rs conta in ing  im p o rtan t in form ation  ab o u t the  fu n d am en ta ls  of the econom ies. The 
factors are  a ssu m ed  to be related  to the  variab les in the  panel (Xt) according to the  following
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observation equation:
X f
x r  
x r  
V Rt )
A f  0 0 0 0 (  F ? '  '
0 A f  0 0 0 F f
0 0 A f*  0 0 F tR '
0 0 0 A ™  A f f u k




where A,1 *, Af’and AT  are the factor loadings on foreign real activity, foreign inllation and 
foreign interest rates with size N y ‘ x 1, N n’ x 1 and X R’ x 1 respectively: A ^ K is N UK x k 
matrix of factor loadings for the domestic unobserved factors and A f , N Uh x 1 , captures the 
contem poraneous relationship between the domestic indicators and the short-term  interest 
rate; and et is a (N — 1) x 1 vector of i.i.d d isturbances.3
Following Del Negro and Otrok (2008), the factor loadings A^  , Af", AR\  AYK and AR 
are also assum ed to evolve as driftless random  walks
= F T i  + rtf' (6.9)
FT — Af_x + rjf (6.10)
F T =  f T i +  v T (6.11)
A t K = A  Y I i + V t K (6.12)
Af = F t x + p R (6.13)
All the innovations in the model are assum ed to be jointly normally distributed with the
3The last row of equation (6.7) is an identity which does not have an error term.
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following a ssu m p tio n s  on the  variance covariance m atrix:
V Var
w 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5< 0 s 0 0 0 0 0 0
t t 0 Ü Q u 0 0 0 0
v f 0 0 0 M y * 0 0 0 0
v f 0 0 0 0 M n' 0 0 0
v F 0 0 0 0 0 m r ' 0 0
t]u k 0 0 0 0 0 0 M UK m u k r
\  V? ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 m u k , r m r
(6.14)
To reduce the n u m b er of estim ated  p a ram eters , we fu rth e r  a ssu m e  th e  covariance m atrices 
for the  sto ch astic  volatility (IT), the off-diagonal non-zero  elem ents (5) and  the  id iosyncratic  
erro r te rm s in the  observation  equation  (Q) a re  diagonal. However, we allow for co rrelations 
betw een the  factor loadings in each  equation  b u t  no t ac ro ss  equations. In principle, one 
can  allow for a  m uch  richer covariance s tru c tu re  am ong the  innovations in the system . 
N evertheless, th ere  are a t least two re a so n s  in  favor of the  sim plified s tru c tu re  described in 
(6.14). First, the  high n u m b er of p a ram ete rs  in the  system  will require  specifying sensib le 
priors to prevent cases of ill-determ ined p a ram eters . Second, a s  highlighted in Del Negro 
and  O trok (2008), a com pletely generic covariance s tru c tu re  will com plicate the s tru c tu ra l 
in te rp re ta tion  of the innovations.
The system  (6.1)-(6.14) is the  FAVAR m odel proposed  by B ernanke  et al. (2005) and  
extended to the  open econom y by M um taz and  Surico (2009). The m ain  innovation  in th is  
p ap er is the  in troduction  of tim e-varying factor loadings and  sto ch astic  volatilities. T his is 
im portan t in order to exam ine changes to the  in te rn a tio n a l tran sm issio n  m echanism .
6.2.2 Identification
6 .2 .2 .1  U nobserved factors
There are  th ree factors for the re s t of the  world rep resen tin g  in te rn a tio n a l co-m ovem ents in 
real activity, inflation and  sh o rt-te rm  in te re s t ra tes . The in te rn a tio n a l factors a re  identified 
th rough  the  u p p er (ArV + N *  + N R') x 3 block of the  m atrix  in (6.7). We assu m e  th a t 
all real activity series in the foreign block of the  m odel sh a re  com m on dynam ics an d  th a t 
su ch  com m on dynam ics are  no t sh a red  by any  o th e r series in th e  panel. The in tern a tio n a l
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real activity factor is identified as the only factor th a t is loaded by all real activity series in 
the rest of the world. Similar restrictions are assum ed for the international inflation and 
short-term  in terest rate factors.
The dynamics of the U.K. variables are captured by k U.K. factors, where k is assum ed 
to be four. The U.K. factors are not identified in a sense that they are extracted from the 
full panel of U.K. series. The sub-m atrix A^K in (6.7) is a full m atrix with the normalization 
assum ption on the first k series. The reason for leaving the domestic factor loadings un re­
stricted is th a t the dynamics of the variables in X\JK will depend on the s tructu re  imposed 
on the loadings. For example, if all domestic activity series share a single domestic activity 
factor, then the response of all domestic activity indicators will also share the common dy­
nam ics up to a scale factor pinned down by the loading. One of the goals of this paper is 
to investigate any possible heterogeneity in the responses of domestic prices and activities 
across sectors, and therefore it is unsatisfactory to impose a tight constrain t on the dynam ­
ics of the individual series. The vector A f, m easuring the contem poraneous relationship 
between the domestic indicators and the short-term  interest rate is also left unrestricted.
The identification scheme described above imposes most of the structu re  on the foreign 
block while leaving the domestic block, whose responses are the object of investigation, 
relatively unconstrained. The dynamics of each domestic series is a linear combination of 
all U.K. factors and the domestic short-term  interest rate. The transition equation (6.1) 
links the dynamic responses between the international and domestic factors. Together with 
the identification restrictions discussed in the next sub-section, the international factors 
serve to identify the foreign shocks.
6 .2 .2 .2  Foreign sh ock s
We are interested in studying the dynamic effects of three shocks on the U.K. economy: an 
unanticipated fall in the interest rates in the rest of the world, an unanticipated expansion 
in international activity and a negative world supply shock.4 The foreign shocks are iden­
tified using two schemes based on a m ixture of sign and zero restrictions and a recursive 
scheme. The ordering of the FAVAR is [AYt*, 7rt*, R*. F^ tK, Rt] with j  = 1 ,... ,k  and the let­
ters denote international real activity growth, inflation and in terest rates, domestic factors 
and domestic short-term  interest rate, respectively.
In the recursive scheme, the impact matrix A0 is assum ed to be lower triangular and the
4The response of U.K to domestic shocks has been studied in Benati (2008).
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block-zero s tru c tu re  for the lag polynom ial m atrix  B(L)  im plies th a t the re st of the world 
does no t reac t to U.K. dom estic conditions con tem poraneously  or w ith lags. This sm all 
open econom y assu m p tio n  is m ain ta ined  across b o th  identification schem es.
In ou r b en ch m ark  identification schem e, we im pose a m ix ture  of sign and  zero re s tr ic ­
tions:
1 WAV* ^ +  +  -  0  0 ^ c a d * ^
wn* +  -  -  0  0 £ a s *
w R* = +  x  +  0  0 e R *
U F , u k X X X X X 6 F ,u k
\  UR / X X X X X \  e R  )
(6.15)
w here et are  the  s tru c tu ra l shocks and  the  sign restric tions are  im posed as  described in 
A ppendix (6.A. 1). In the foreign block, a  shock  to aggregate dem and is associated , on 
im pact, w ith an  increase  in world activity, inflation, and  in te rest ra tes; a  positive supply  
shock  im plies a fall in inflation and  a rise in real activity, th e  in te rest ra te  response  is 
left un restric ted ; a  positive shock  to the sh o rt-te rm  in te rest ra te  com es w ith a decline in 
real activity and  inflation. Notice th a t  the  im pact of in te rn a tio n a l shocks on th e  dom estic 
econom y is left u n re s tr ic ted .5
We check o u r re su lts  u sing  an  a lternative identification schem e based  on a Choleski 
decom position. T his im plies the  following con tem poraneous restric tions:







UF,uk X X X X X CF,uk
V U R ) X X X X X \  e R )
(6.16)
Note th a t by p lacing the  U.K. sh o rt te rm  in te re s t ra te  last, we implicitly identity a  U.K. 
m onetary  policy shock  u n d e r bo th  schem es.
5A mixture of sign and zero restrictions is also used by Faust and Rogers (2003).
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6.3 Estimation
6 .3 .1  M ulti-step Gibbs sam pling
The m odel in equ a tio n s (6.1) to (6.14) is e stim ated  u sin g  p rocedures described in Kim and  
Nelson (1998), Prim iceri (2005) and  Del Negro an d  O trok  (2008) to approxim ate the posterior 
d is tribu tion . Essentially , th is  am o u n ts  to reducing  a  com plex problem  of sam pling  from 
the  jo in t posterio r d istribu tion  into a sequence  of trac tab le  ones by sam pling  from the 
conditional d is tribu tion  of a  su b se t of p a ram ete rs  conditional on all o th e r p a ram ete rs  of 
th e  model. The M ulti-step G ibbs sam pling  p ro ced u re  can  be b roken  down into five m ain 
blocks.
6 .3 .1 .1  T im e invariant param eters
We initialize the  factors u sing  a sim ple p rincipal com ponen t estim ator. Given the values 
for the  factors Ft , the  tim e-varying factor loadings At , th e  sto ch astic  volatilities Ht and  the 
off-diagonal covariances A t, we can  th en  draw  th e  tim e in varian t p a ram ete rs  for the VAR 
coefficients B(L),  the  au toregressive coefficients of th e  erro r te rm  in  observation  equation  
p{L) an d  the h y p erp aram eter Q.
D rawing th e  VAR coefficients is com plicated by the  p resence  of heteroscedastic ity  in the  
VAR covariance. We derive the  conditional posterio r d is trib u tio n  of the VAR coefficients by 
re-w riting the  VAR as s ta te -sp ace  system  and  the  p a ram e te rs  are  draw n u sin g  the algorithm  
described in C arte r and  Kohn (1994):
Ft = Bt (L)Ft_i +  ut (6.17)
Bt(L) = Bt-x(L)  (6.18)
w here B t{L) is a ssu m ed  to be tim e-invarian t an d  the  covariance of ut is Qt. Note th a t the 
restric tio n s im plied by the  sm all open econom y a ssu m p tio n  are  incorporated  by using  an  
app ro p ria te  prior d is tribu tion  for B t(L) :
p(B(L)) ~  N (B0, n0)
w here B0 h a s  all e lem ents equal to zero except those  correspond ing  to the  first lagged 
dependen t variab les w hich are  se t equal to the au toco rre la tion  coefficient obtained  via uni-
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variate autoregressions on the initial value of Ft. The values of are chosen such that they 
imply a very strong prior belief that the elem ents in the top block of B(L)  in equation (6.1) 
equal zero.
For the autoregressive coefficients (p(L)) of the error term in equation (6.8), the condi­
tional posterior distribution is easy to derive. To keep the notation simple, we write down 
the case where L = 1. Conditional on the factors (Ft ) and the factor loadings (At), the errors 
in the m easurem ent equation are independent across each equation i. We can draw p from 
its conditional posterior distribution given Q
p \ Q ~ N { p u Y>x) (6.19)
where px = (Eq 1 +  Q~2v't_ l vt- \ ) ~ x (£ q V o + Q~2v't_xvt) and Ei = (E„ 1 +  Q~2v't_ lvt- \ ) ~ l . We
assum e that the prior mean p0 =  0 and the prior variance E0 =  1. Given p,  we then draw the 
hyperparameter Q from an inverse Gamma distribution 7G(^-, ^-), where ai =  a0 +  T  and 
<5i =  <S0 + (vt ~ pvt-i)'{vt -  pvt- 1 ).6
6 .3 .1 .2  U nobserved factors
In the second block of the Gibbs sampling, we draw the factors conditional on all other 
parameters of the model. Rewriting the state and observation equation in (6.1) and (6.7) in 
compact form:
Ft =  B t(L)Ft- X +  ut (6.20)
X t = At Ft + v t (6.21)
Since vt is assum ed to be autocorrelated, we rewrite (6.21) as
(■I - p ( L ) ) X t = ( /  — p(L))(AtFt ) +  t t (6.22)
The m easurem ent errors t t in (6.22) are now i.i.d N(0, Q). Equations (6.20) and (6.22) give 
the standard Kalman filter system . We can now apply Carter and Kohn’s (1994) procedure
6ao and <io are the prior shape and scale parameter of the inverse Gamma distribution.
142
CHAPTER 6. TIME-VARYING TRANSMISSION OF INTERNATIONAL SHOCKS
to the above system  to calculate Ft . The d istrib u tio n  of the  factors Ft is linear and  G au ssian :
Ft \T ~  N(Ft\T ,Vt \T) (6.23)
Ft \Ft+1r  ~  N  (Ft|t+ i )Ft+1, Pt|t+1,F£+1) (6.24)
w here T rep re sen t all o ther pa ram ete rs  in the  m odel, t = T  -  1, ..1, and:
Ft \t  =  F ( F t  |T) (6.25a)
VT \T  = C o v {F t  |T) (6.25b)
^ | t + i , F l+1 =  E{Ft \T) (6.25c)
Vt\t+ i ,F t+1 =  Cov(Ft |T) (6.25d)
As show n by C arte r and  Kohn (1994) the  sim u la tion  proceeds a s  follows. F irst we use  
the K alm an filter to draw  FT\T and  VT\T and  th en  proceed backw ards in tim e using:
Ft\t+i = Ftlt + Vt]tVt- \ ]t(Ft+1- F t) (6.26)
Vtit+i = Vt]t -  VtltV-+\ ltVtlt (6.27)
6.3.1.3 Time-varying factor loadings
Conditional on the  factors (F,), the  erro rs in the  m easu rem en t equation  are  in d ep en d en t 
ac ross i. T his im plies the innovations in equation  (6.8) are  also  in dependen t ac ro ss  i. 
C onsequently , we can  draw  the tim e-varying factor loadings one equation  a t a  tim e. We 
apply the  sam e transfo rm atio n  to the m easu rem en t equation  a s  before w hich gives
( T - p ( L ) ) X t = (7 -  p ( L ) ) ( \ tFt) + et (6.28)
At = At_ i + 7/t (6.29)
w here the  variance of rjt is block diagonal, th a t is th e  factor loadings are  indep en d en t ac ro ss  
equations b u t correlated  w ithin the sam e equation . For the  ith equation  ift ~  N{0, A/1). U sing 
equation  (6.28) together w ith the law of m otion for At in (6.29) allows u s  to draw  th e  tim e- 
vaiy ing factor loadings (Af) u sing  C arter and  K ohn’s (1994) algorithm  from its conditional 
d istribu tion  N ( A*r , V-^ ) .  The h y p erp aram eters  for the variance  of yt , M,  a re  d raw n from 
an  inverse W ishart d istribu tion .
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Following Del Negro and Otrok (2008) we add an additional step in the sam pler to es­
timate the initial condition A0. Starting from a prior for A0 ~  N (A0,Vb) obtained via OLS 
regressions on the pre-sample, we obtain the posterior estim ate of A0 by updating the mean 
and variance A0 and V0 using the m ethods described in Carter and Kohn (1994).
Given a draw for At , we then draw the hyperparam eter AP from an Inverse W ishart 
distribution with a scale param eter r)\'r)\ + 6 ^ ' and degrees of freedom given by sample size. 
We set the prior scale param eter 6q* as 1 x 10-3 .
6 .3 .1 .4  T im e-varying sim u ltan eou s relations:
Given the factors (Ft), the VAR coefficients (B(L)) and stochastic volatility term s (Ht), we can 
draw the time-varying sim ultaneous relations (,4t). Let at be the vector of non-zero and non 
unit elements of the m atrix At (stacked by rows). One can rewrite the VAR model in (6.1) as
At (Ft -  B(L)Ft) = AtFt = Htet (6.30)
Taking B(L) as given, Ft is computable. Since At is a lower triangular matrix, (6.30) can 
be written as
Ft — Zta t +  Htet (6.31)
where Zt is the following n x 71 -  — matrix
Zt
0




and F[i .,] t denotes the row vector of [Fi.t, F2.t, ■ ■ ■, F ,t]. Intuitively, equation (6.31) is equiv­
alent to regressing the error term of the VAR on other error term s according to the lower 
triangular structure. With the block diagonal assum ption of S, th is allows us to apply the 
standard  state space method with stochastic volatility as described in Carter and Kohn 
(1994).
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6 .3 .1 .5  S to ch a stic  vo la tility
Sim ilarly, we can  rew rite the VAR model in (6.1) as
At{Ft -  B(L)Ft ) = Ft* =  Htet (6.33)
Given B(L) and  A t , Fj* a re  observed. Notice the sto ch astic  volatilities are  m utually  
independen t, th is  allows u s  to proceed on an  equation-by-equation  basis . We draw  the  
sto ch astic  volatility te rm s using  the date-by-date  blocking schem e as  in Ja c q u ie r  et al. 
(1994). Note th a t the  scale of the  factors is no t identified a priori. As in Del Negro and  
O trok (2008) we fix the  initial value of Ht to norm alize the  scale of the  factors.
We generate  20 ,000  G ibbs sam pling  rep lications as described above and  d iscard  the  first 
19,000 a s  b u rn -in . The posterior m om ents vary little over the  re ta ined  draw s providing 
evidence of convergence to its s ta tio n ary  d istribu tion .
6 .3 .2  G eneralized im pulse response fu n ction s
Given th e  tim e-varying n a tu re  of the model, we follow Koop et al. (1996) in com puting  the  
generalized im pulse response  functions, At , defined as:
A t = E (Zt+sl^t+s, fa) — B (Zt+sl^t+s) (6.34)
w here 4» deno tes all the  pa ram ete rs  and  h y p erp aram eters  of the  FAVAR, Zt is the  vector of all 
endogenous variab les and  s is the  horizon u n d e r consideration . E quation  6 .34  s ta te s  th a t  
the im pulse response  functions are  calcu lated  a s  the difference betw een two conditional 
expectations. The first term  denotes a forecast of the  endogenous variab les conditioned on 
a  shock  /q. The second term  is the  base line  forecast, i.e .: conditioned on the  scenario  w here 
the  shock  is equal to zero. The conditional expectations in 6 .34  are  com puted  via M onte 
Carlo in tegration  for 500 replications for each G ibbs sam pler. D etails on the  M onte Carlo 
in tegration  procedure can  be found in Koop et al. (1996).
6 .3 .3  Data description
We use  quarterly  d a ta  from 1974Q1 to 2005Q 1. The d a ta  se t sp a n s  17 coun tries and  
560 series. We refer to the U.K. as the “dom estic” econom y. The “foreign” coun tries are
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Canada, United States, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Australia, New Zealand and Japan . The 
foreign block includes most of the U.K. m ain trading partners and the major industrialized 
economies across the world.
For each “foreign” country, we collect data on real activity, inflation and interest rates. 
For real activity, we consider d ata  on output growth, employment, consum ption and invest­
ment. Inflation is m easured on the basis of a variety of domestic price indices, wage growth 
and import prices. Short-term  in terest rates are collected for each country.
The data  set for the U.K. is very similar in composition to th a t of the “foreign block”. In 
particular, we have many different real activity indicators, inflation series including com­
ponents of the retail price index, narrow and broad money and a set of asset prices that 
include house prices and the effective exchange rate. A more detailed describtion is pro­
vided in Appendix (6.A.2).
6 .4  Em pirical resu lts
This section describes the empirical results of the time-varying open economy FAVAR devel­
oped in Section (6.2). We report estim ates of the unobserved foreign factors, time-varying 
variance decompositions, and com pute the dynamic effects of an unanticipated fall in world 
interest rates, an unanticipated expansion of international activity and an unanticipated 
negative world supply shock using the generalized im pulse response functions described 
earlier.
It is interesting to note th a t with a large information set, the two identification schemes 
no longer produce significantly different results. However, the sign-restrictions tend to 
produce wider confidence intervals because of weaker restrictions placed on the model. 
Here, we focus the discussion of the results on the sign-restriction schem e.7
6 .4 .1  International co-m ovem ents
We extract three common com ponents from the foreign block of the panel using the iden­
tification described in Section (6.2.2). All variables are standardized. Figure (6.1) plots the 
estim ated factors for world real activity, inflation and nominal interest rates (blue is the
7The resu lts  for the recursive ordering are available upon request.
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estim ated  factors from the  G ibbs sam pling  an d  m ag en ta  is th e  principal com ponent e s ti­
m ator). The narro w n ess  of th e  confidence in terval ind ica tes th a t the factors are  estim ated  
quite  precisely.
It is in terestin g  to note the  sim ilarities betw een the G ibbs sam pling  p rocedure and  the 
principal com ponen ts e stim ato r (PCE) for the real activity and  inflation factors. For the 
in te rest ra te  factor, the PCE is m u ch  m ore p e rs is ten t and  the  cyclical flu c tua tions are  less 
volatile com pared  w ith the G ibbs sam pling  p rocedure. N evertheless, the cyclical flu c tu a ­
tions betw een th e  two series a re  sim ilar. One exp lanation  for the  difference is th a t  th e  G ibbs 
sam pling  p rocedure  tak es  into acco u n t the  au toco rre lation  of the  idiosyncratic  com ponents 
of each series, therefore it a ttr ib u te s  less of th e  observed persistence  to the  com m on com ­
ponent.
C om paring o u r es tim ates  w ith previous s tu d ie s  su ch  a s  Kose et al. (2003), a  few p a tte rn s  
are  very sim ilar. The industria lized  world experienced, on average, four severe recessions 
over the  sam ple period: the m id -1970’s oil price shock; th e  early 1980’s recession  asso c i­
ated  w ith the deb t crisis, loose U.S fiscal policy and  tigh t m onetary  policy to bring  down 
inflation; the early  1990’s dow ntu rn ; and  the  d o w n tu rn  in 2001 following the  b u rs t  of the 
“dotcom ” bubble. The da tes  roughly  m atch  tho se  identified in Kose et al. (2003). In te r­
estingly, by u sing  h igher frequency observations (quarterly  d a ta  ra th e r  th a n  annual), we 
identified the  early  1980’s recession  a s  a “doub le-d ip” in econom ic activity w hereas e s ti­
m ates from Kose et al. (2003) suggest a  prolonged recession . O ur estim a tes  suggest the 
decline in world econom ic activity in the  m id -1970’s w as the  s teep est ou t of the  four reces­
sions, b u t its recovery w as very rapid . The trough  of th e  early 1980’s recession  w as less 
severe b u t the  recovery w as slow er due  to th e  high in te re s t ra te s  over th a t period. The 
m agn itude  an d  th e  speed of recovery betw een th e  early  1990’s and  2001 recession  w as 
rem arkab ly  sim ilar. In bo th  cases, th e  fall in the  in te re s t ra te  h ad  helped to speed u p  the 
recovery.
The decline in the m easu re  of in te rn a tio n a l inflation is co n sis ten t w ith the  notion  of 
global d isinflation  p u t forw ard by Rogoff (2003). D espite the  steady  increase  in oil and  
com m odity prices betw een 2003-2005 , world inflation rem ained  relatively stable. World 
in te rest ra te s  peaked  in the  early 1980’s, since then , it h a s  declined significantly reaching  
historical lows in the  very recen t past.
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6 .4 .2  An unanticipated  fall in world in terest rates
6 .4 .2 .1  World factors
A shock  to th e  world in te rest ra te  factor can n o t be in te rp re ted  literally a s  a  foreign policy 
shock  a s  a “world policy m a k e r’does no t exists. However, a  generalized fall in in te rest ra te s  
m ay rep resen t a  s itua tion  th a t requ ires cen tra l b a n k s  ac ro ss  the  world to deviate from the 
p a th  im plied by the  system atic  com ponent of th e ir m oneta ry  policy. The global d isinflation  
s tan ce  in the  early  1980’s and  the recen t experience of u n p reced en ted  low policy ra te s  are 
exam ples of su ch  events. Here, we in te rp re t the  u n an tic ip a ted  fall in in te re s t ra te s  ac ross 
the  world as  a  m onetary  policy shock  th a t occurs, on average, in the  foreign block.8
Figure (6.2) p lo ts the  dynam ic effects of the world factors in response  to an  ex p an sio n ­
ary m onetary  shock. The size of th e  shock  is norm alized to be a  1% decrease  in the  world 
in te rest ra te  factor. The first colum n plots the m ed ian  tim e-varying im pulse re sp o n se  fu n c ­
tions (IRFs) to th e  shock, while the  second and  th ird  co lum ns illu stra te  th e  re sp o n ses  in 
1975 and  2004 together w ith the 90%  confidence in tervals (light b lue band). The decline in 
world in te re s t ra te s  genera tes a s ta tis tica lly  significant expansion  in real world activity and  
inflation. More in terestingly , once we control for the  tim e-varying sto ch astic  volatility the  
response  of the  world factors are very sim ilar ac ross tim e. The inflation resp o n se  is slightly 
larger in  th e  la tte r  p a r t  of th e  sam ple b u t  th e  difference is  sm all. B ased  on th ese  estim ates, 
the  im pact of world m onetary  policy shocks on real activity an d  inflation h a s  changed  little 
over the  sam ple period.
6 .4 .2 .2  U.K. ex tern a l ind icators
The key to u n d e rs tan d in g  the  in te rn a tio n a l tran sm iss io n  m echan ism  to foreign m onetary  
shocks re st on the  behavior of th e  exchange ra te  an d  th e  response  of relative prices to 
the shock. F igure (6.3) plots the tim e-varying resp o n ses  for th e  U.K. nom inal effective 
exchange ra te  (NEER), te rm s of trade , trad e  balance, im port and  export prices. T h roughou t 
the sam ple, the  exchange ra te  app rec ia tes  in resp o n se  to h igher capital inflows from a 
h igher in te rest ra te  differential. Its response  w as w eakest in the  early 1990’s a ro u n d  the 
tim e of the  U.K.’s exit from the E uropean  Exchange R ate M echanism  (ERM). T ha t period 
w as considered to be qu ite  ex trao rd inary  w here h igher in te re s t ra te  d ifferentials did not
8Unfortunately with a limited number of factors, we cannot distinguish the effects of policy shocks versus 
policies aimed at bringing down the levels of inflation.
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result in significant inflows of foreign capital. Consistent with the evidence reported in 
Mumtaz and Surico (2009), we also find little evidence of delayed overshooting as suggested 
in Eichenbaum  and Evans (1995), and F aust and Rogers (2003). The peak impact of the 
exchange rate response occurs within the first two quarters of the shock.
In the earlier part of the sample, the m edian import price response falls immediately 
following the exchange rate appreciation and then rises slowly as the exchange rate depre­
ciates back to equilibrium. This is consistent with the notion of producer currency pricing 
(PCP) by foreign exporters. More recently, pass-through from the exchange rate apprecia­
tion is sm aller with the median response closer to zero. This lends more support towards 
local currency pricing (LCP) and is consistent with recent papers th a t docum ent a fall in 
exchange rate pass-through in the U.K. (see for example Campa and Goldberg (2006) and 
Mumtaz et al. (2006)). As a result of this shock, export prices increase and the U.K. term s 
of trade improve. The trade balance deteriorates in the early years in the sam ple-a response 
th a t is consistent with PCP and high exchange rate pass-through. In which case, domestic 
consum ers substitu te  out of more expensive domestic goods into cheaper foreign imports 
- the classic expenditure switching effect. In more recent years, the response of the trade 
balance has been largely insignificant again suggesting a possible shift towards LCP. The 
expenditure switching effect is now sm aller because import prices do not fall by as much.
6 .4 .2 .3  U.K. real a c tiv ity  and in fla tion
Figure (6.4) plots the time-varying response of investment, GDP and consum ption. One 
striking feature is the uniform switch in the sign of contem poraneous responses from nega­
tive to positive among the real activity indicators in the early 1990’s. This change is consis­
tent with the possibility discussed above of a shift from producer to local currency pricing 
and a fall in exchange rate pass-through. Under PCP, high exchange rate pass-through im ­
plies th a t domestic consum ers may shift to relatively cheaper imports. If this expenditure 
switching effect dom inates the positive income effect from the expansion in world money 
supply, then domestic real activity is adversely affected as appears to be the case in the 
early part of the sample. On the other hand, if im ports are priced in local currency and 
exchange rate pass-through is low, then there is less incentive for consum ers to switch to 
imports and the beggar-thy-neighbor effect is ameliorated. See Betts and Devereux (1999)
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for a  m ore detailed explanation .9
Figure (6.5) p lots the  tim e-varying response  of nom inal wages, inflation m easu re s  based  
on CPI and  GDP deflator. Both inflation m easu re s  a re  h igher im m ediately following the  
shock  and  reach  th e ir  peak  in four q u arte rs . The resp o n se  of inflation m easu res  is fairly 
co n s ta n t ac ross the  sam ple period.
6 .4 .2 .4  U.K. a sse t  prices
Figure (6.6) p lo ts the  tim e-varying response  of 90-day, an d  10-year governm ent bond yields, 
and  the growth ra te  of house  and  equity  (m easured  by the  FTSE index) prices. There is a  
sta tistically  significant fall in bo th  the sh o rt an d  long te rm  in te re s t ra te s  following the  
shock. The m agn itude  of the fall is larger in th e  7 0 ’s and  8 0 ’s relative to the  inflation 
targeting  period. H ouse prices fall a t the beginning of the  sam ple while th ere  is a  positive 
im pact on equity  prices. In the la te r sam ple, th ese  effects are  v irtually  zero. B ased on 
these  estim ates, aggressive foreign m onetary  expansion  betw een 2001 and  2005 h as  little 
effect on the U.K.’s house  and  equity  prices. T his suggests  th e  recen t rise in a sse t prices is 
a ttrib u ted  to o ther shocks.
6 .4 .2 .5  R esu lts from recursive id en tifica tio n  sch em e
Figure (6.7) p lots the tim e-varying response  for various U.K. variab les u sing  the  recursive 
identification schem e (RIS) described in (6.16). The sign an d  sh ap e  of the  dynam ic re ­
sponses are largely sim ilar across the two identification schem es. However, th e re  are som e 
in teresting  differences. F irst, the  m agn itude  of the  NEER and  te rm s of trad e  response  w as 
sm aller in the RIS. For exam ple, the te rm s of trad e  now peaks a t 0.6%  ra th e r  th an  1.5% 
earlier. Second, the re sponses for w ages and  the  inflation m easu re s  from the  RIS now re ­
tu rn s  to equilibrium  m uch  faster, w ith in  the first five q u a rte rs  of the shock. Third, the  
sw itch in the sign of dom estic econom ic activity now h ap p en s  in a m uch  m ore g radual 
m anner. N evertheless, the  tim ing of the sw itch is the  sam e.
9We have also investigated the possibility of changes to the policy stance using Lubik and Schorfheide’s (2005) 
model as an alternative explanation. However, changes to both foreign and domestic policy stance cannot explain 
the switch in the sign of domestic activities.
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6 .4 .3  An unanticipated  increase in in ternational activ ity
T his subsec tio n  d iscu sses  the im pact from an  u n an tic ip a ted  increase  in in te rna tiona l real 
activity. We norm alize the shock  to be one u n it of the world real activity factor w here the 
u n its  of the world factors are  transfo rm ed  to m atch  U.S. da ta .
6 .4 .3 .1  World factors
Figure (6.8) p lots the tim e-vary IRFs for the th ree  world factors. B oth world inflation and  
in te re s t ra te s  rise  on im pact. While the  response  for world inflation is roughly the  sam e over 
tim e, the  in te rest ra te  response is clearly stronger du ring  the d isinflation  period in the early 
1980’s. Over the NICE decade -  non-infla tionary  consisten tly  expansionary  -  (beginning in 
the  early  1990’s), the  m agnitude of the in te rest ra te  response  rem ained  fairly co n stan t.
6 .4 .3 .2  U.K. external ind icators
Figure (6.9) p lots th e  tim e-varying response  for th e  NEER, the te rm s of trad e  and  the  trad e  
balance. The NEER and  the te rm s of trade  w ere v irtually  unaffected  by the  shock. On 
the  o th er han d , th ere  is a  sm all b u t p e rs is ten t increase  in the trad e  balance  from higher 
dem and  in the re s t of the world. It is difficult to accoun t for the relatively large response  
of the  dom estic econom y (to be d iscu ssed  below) via the  u su a l trad e  an d  relative price 
linkages. This suggests  there  m aybe o ther m issing  ch an n e ls  in the tran sm issio n  of world 
dem and  shocks. D ungey and  Pagan (2000), and  P esa ran  et al. (2009) suggest m ore explicit 
roles for financial linkages in m odeling the  in te rn a tio n a l tran sm issio n  m echanism .
6 .4 .3 .3  S e lec ted  U.K. variables
Figure (6.10) p lo ts the tim e-varying IRFs for a  selected su b se t of U.K. variables. At the 
beginning and  the  end of the sam ple, the  im pact on dom estic real activity is close to zero. 
However, for a large p a rt of the sam ple (between 1980 an d  1998) dom estic activity ac tually  
increases  in response  to h igher world dem and albeit the im pact is relatively sh o rt lived. 
The s trongest im pact is betw een 1980-1990. Both nom inal w ages and  CPI inflation is 
significantly positive in the  m edium  term . W hile th ere  were su b s ta n tia l tim e varia tions in 
the  world in te rest ra te  response, th e  peak  response  of the  dom estic sh o rt-te rm  in te rest ra te  
response  w as very sim ilar across the  sam ple.
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6 .4 .4  An unanticipated  negative world supply shock
T his su b sec tio n  d iscu sses  the  im pact from an  u n an tic ip a ted  negative world supply  shock. 
We in te rp re t th is  a s  a com m on shock  th a t  affects the  cost of p roduction  a ro u n d  the world, 
th e  su d d en  su rge in oil prices in the m id -1970’s is an  exam ple of su ch  a shock. The shock 
is norm alized  to have u n it im pact on the world inflation  factor.
6 .4 .4 .1  World factors
Figure (6.11) p lo ts the  tim e-varying resp o n se  of th e  th ree  world factors. Inflation is h igher 
while o u tp u t is lower im m ediately following the  shock. The sim ilarities along the  ad ju stm en t 
p a th s  acro ss  tim e is quite  strik ing. A round th e  tim e of the 1975 oil shock, world in te rest 
ra te s  rise  su b stan tia lly  to help offset th e  in fla tionary  p re ssu re  re su ltin g  from th e  h igher oil 
prices. In the  1980’s, the  in te re s t ra te  response  w as largely negative. Since then , world 
in te re s t ra te s  generally  in creases  in response  to supp ly  shocks and  the  m agn itude  is a  bit 
sm aller.
6 .4 .4 .2  U.K. external in d icators
Figure (6.12) plots the tim e-varying response  for th e  NEER, the  te rm s of trade  and  the trade  
balance . The resp o n se  of the U.K.’s ex te rna l in d ica to rs  in  the  1970’s  w as qu ite  different to 
the re s t of the sam ple. There w as an  apprecia tion  of th e  exchange rate , a  fall in the trade  
ba lan ce  and  an  im provem ent in the  te rm s of trade . T hese effects a re  less p rom inent in the 
c u rre n t period.
6 .4 .4 .3  S e lec ted  U.K. variables
Figure (6.13) p lots the tim e-varying response  for a  selected su b se t of U.K. variables. Apart 
from the  initial period, the nom inal wage resp o n se  to the  world supp ly  shock  w as largely 
negative. CPI inflation on the o ther h an d  in creases  following the  shock. T hat m eans real 
wage a d ju s ts  dow nw ard in response  to negative supp ly  sh ocks orig inating  from the re st 
of the  world. It is in te resting  to note th a t  the  speed  an d  m agn itude  of p a ss-th ro u g h  from 
th e  supp ly  shock  to CPI inflation is m u ch  sm aller in th e  la tte r p a r t of the  sam ple, possibly 
due to a b e tte r an ch o r of inflation expectations. U.K. GDP falls following the  supply  shock. 
However, the m agn itude  of th is  fall is sm aller in the  recen t period.
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6 .5  C onclusions
T his p ap er h a s  s tud ied  the  in te rn a tio n a l tran sm iss io n  of s tru c tu ra l shocks in an  open 
econom y FAVAR model applied to th e  U.K. Unlike prev ious co n tribu tions, we u se  d a ta  on 
17 co u n tries  and  560 variables, covering prices, activity an d  m onetary  ind icators, to m odel 
the  in terac tion  betw een the foreign and  dom estic blocks of the  VAR. In addition , we allow 
the re la tionsh ips em bodied in th is  m odel to change over tim e -  we incorporate  tim e-varying 
coefficients an d  s tochastic  volatility w ith in  the FAVAR fram ew ork. This allows u s  to b e tte r 
identify changes to th e  UK’s m acroeconom ic dynam ics due  to changes in th e  size of the  
shocks (stochastic  volatility) v e rsu s  ch an g es in the  underly ing  s tru c tu re  of the  econom y 
(tim e-varying coefficients).
A foreign m onetary  policy easing  h a s  su b stan tia lly  d ifferent effects on the  U.K. in the 
period after 1990. In particu lar, th e  response  of the  dom estic econom y in the  period before 
1990 resem bles a  classic beggar-thy-neighbor scenario , w ith increases in  foreign m oney 
supply  resu lting  in a fall in U.K. real activity. In c o n tra s t, the  p o s t-1990 period is c h a r ­
acterized w ith a positive b u t insignificant resp o n se  of U.K. real activity to th is  shock. O ur 
estim ates  a ttr ib u te  th is  to a  fall in exchange ra te  p a ss -th ro u g h  to relative prices. A fo r­
eign aggregate dem and  shock  had  a large positive im pact on U.K. GDP d u rin g  the years 
1980-1990. Its im pact over the m ore recen t period h a s  been  su b stan tia lly  sm aller. Foreign 
supp ly  shocks w ere im p o rtan t for U.K. inflation d u rin g  the  1970s. The p ersistence  of the  
inflation resp o n se  h a s  been  sm aller since th e  early  1980s.
We find it is difficult for the u su a l exchange ra te  an d  relative price m ovem ents (trade 
linkages) to acco u n t for the  large im pact of foreign dem and  and  supp ly  sh ocks on the 
dom estic econom y. T his suggests  th ere  m aybe o th er ch an n e ls  beyond th e  u su a l trade  
linkages in the tran sm issio n  of in te rn a tio n a l shocks. More w ork shou ld  be done in th ink ing  
abo u t financial linkages and  “confidence effects” in m odeling th e  in te rn a tio n a l tran sm issio n  
m echanism . The recen t dislocation  in financial m ark e ts  and  synchronized response  of 
econom ic activities a ro u n d  the  world fu rth e r em phasize th is  view. F u rtherm ore , we have 
identified a sw itch in the  resp o n se  of the dom estic econom y to relative m onetary  policy 
shocks a ro u n d  th e  sam e tim e as the  change in the  U.K.’s m onetary  policy fram ew ork in the 
early 1990’s. The possibility  of in te rac tio n s betw een exchange ra te  p a ss-th ro u g h  and  policy 
deserve closer a tten tion .
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Figure 6.1: S tandard ized  fo re ign  fac to rs  (ligh t b lue  band  is  the  95%  confidence in te rva ls )
World real activity World inflation
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20051975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
World interest rate




Figure 6.2: Response o f w o rld  fac to rs  to  a w o rld  m o n e ta ry  expans ion
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Figure 6.3: Response of U.K. external indicators to a world m onetary expansion
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Figure 6.4: Response of U.K. real activity to a world m onetary expansion
1975 2004
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Figure 6.7: Response o f U.K. va ria b le s  to a w o rld  m o n e ta ry  expans ion  u s in g  recu rs ive  id e n ­
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Figure 6.9: Response of U.K. external indicators to increases in international activity
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Figure 6.10: Response of selected U.K. variables to increases in international activities
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Figure 6.11: Response of the world factors to a negative world supply shock
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Figure 6.13: Response of selected U.K. variables to a negative world supply shock
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6 .A A ppendix
6.A.1 Im posing the sign restriction s
The sign restrictions are imposed as follows. We com pute the structural impact matrix, 
A(), via a slightly modified version of the algorithm recently introduced by Rubio-Ramirez 
et al. (2006). Specifically, let =PtP/ be the Choleski decomposition of the VAR covariance 
matrix Qt (with the foreign variables ordered before the U.K. variables), and let Ä0,t =  Pt- 
We draw an j  x j  matrix, J, from the N (0,1) distribution, where j  denotes the dim ension of 
“foreign” block in the VAR. We take the QR  decom position of J . That is, we compute the 
matrices Q and R such that ./ =  QR.
This gives u s a candidate structural impact matrix as J 0,t =  Ao<tQ, where Q is a /V x 
N  identity matrix with Q' in the top j  x j  block. Note that such candidate draw has a lower 
triangular structure for the U.K. block and, as in the standard Choleski decomposition, 
implies that U.K. shocks do not have a contem poraneous impact on the “foreign” block. 
If A0)t satisfies the sign restrictions, we keep it and move on to the next Gibbs sample. 
Otherwise, redraw J.
6.A .2 D escription of th e data
In the interest of brevity we do not provide an exact list of all 560 series in our panel. 
However this appendix gives an idea of the type of data used and the underlying sources. 
The full list is available on request from the authors.
6 .A .2 .1  International data
Our international data set contains data on real activity, inflation and interest rates for 
Canada, United States, Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. All 
data series are seasonally adjusted. We take log differences of all series apart from interest 
rates. The data is then standardized.
Where available, our real activity data contains real GDP, industrial production, real 
household consum ption expenditure, investm ent, exports, gross national income and u n ­
employment. In terms of coverage, the US has the m ost detailed data with a breakdown of 
unemployment and production by sector. Most of the data is obtained from Datastream and
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In te rn a tio n a l fin a n c ia l s ta tis t ic s  (IPS) database. The u n e m p lo ym e n t da ta  is  ta ke n  from  the  
G loba l fin a n c ia l database and the  US series are ob ta ined  from  Federal Reserve Econom ic 
D a ta  (FRED).
O u r basic in fla tio n  da ta  co n ta in s  CPI, GDP de fla to r, m easures o f wage g row th  and im p o rt 
prices. A ga in , fo r the  US we are also able to o b ta in  a b reakdow n  o f CPI and PPI by sector. 
The series are ob ta ined  from  D a tas tream  and  IFS.
The in te rn a tio n a l in te re s t ra te  da ta  p r im a r ily  co n ta in s  s h o rt- te rm  in te re s t rates. These 
in c lu d e  d is c o u n t ra tes, m oney m a rke t ra tes, tre a s u ry  b i l l  ra tes and ce n tra l b a n k  in te re s t 
ra tes. The da ta  is  ob ta ined  from  the  G loba l fin a n c ia l database.
6 .A .2 .2  U .K . data
S im ila r to  the  in te rn a tio n a l data , o u r da ta  set on the  U .K . co n ta in s  da ta  on rea l a c tiv ity  and 
in fla tio n . We also in c lu d e  some in d ic a to r o f m oney and key asset prices.
Real a c tiv ity  d a ta  inc ludes  rea l GDP, in d u s tr ia l p ro d u c tio n  (w ith  a broad  sectora l b reak  
dow n), im p o rts  and  exports , in ve s tm e n t and rea l househo ld  co n su m p tio n  expend itu re . The 
d a ta  set in c lu d e s  a ve ry  de ta iled  sectora l b reakdow n  o f co n su m p tio n  q u a n titie s . The da ta  
is  ob ta ined  from  the  O ffice  o f N a tio n a l S ta tis tic s  (ONS).
In f la t io n  da ta  in c lu d e s  the  m a in  price  ind ices  (GDP defla to r, CPI, RPI and RPIX) and 
com ponen ts  o f the  co n su m p tio n  de fla to r. ONS and the  B a n k  o f E ng land  are the  m a in  
sources fo r the  data.
M oney d a ta  fo r the  U .K. in c lu d e s  MO and  M 4, w ith  a sectora l b reakdow n  o f the  la tte r. 
T h is  d a ta  is ob ta ined  from  the  B a n k  o f E ng land .
The asset p rice  da ta  in c lu d e s  house prices, s tock  p rices, exchange ra tes (pounds in  
te rm s  o f US d o lla rs , E u ros , Yen, C anad ian  and  A u s tra lia n  D o lla rs) and the  te rm  s tru c tu re  
o f in te re s t ra tes. The da ta  are ob ta ined  from  the  G loba l fin a n c ia l database and the  B a n k  o f 




\  fl ’I HE OVERALL goal of th is  th esis  is to provide a  deeper u n d e rs tan d in g  of the  role of 
1 m onetary  policy as  a  stab ilization  tool in a sm all open econom y (SOE). In te rna tiona l 
trad e  an d  financial m arke t in teg ra tion  induce  m any  additional co n stra in ts  to the  s ta b i­
lization problem . T his is a  very broad  topic w ith a  large existing  lite ra tu re . The th esis  
co n trib u tes  to th is  ongoing debate  by p resen tin g  four case  s tu d ie s  each looking a t a  self 
con tained  issue .
C h ap te r (3) looks a t the  im portance of tim e-in co n sis ten t policy for New Zealand and  how 
th is  notion h a s  led to a  n u m b er of in te resting  in sigh ts regard ing  th e  cen tra l b a n k ’s behavior 
and  in stitu tio n a l design. C h ap te r (4) uncovers the  underly ing  m acroeconom ic stabilization  
objectives for th ree  of th e  earliest inflation targeters: A ustralia , C anada  and  New Zealand. 
In particu lar, the  role of exchange ra te  stab ilization  in th e  policy m ak e rs’ objective function. 
C h ap te r (5) exam ines the  so u rces  of b u s in e ss  cycle flu c tu a tio n s focusing on the role of 
in te rn a tio n a l sh ocks for A ustralia . C h ap te r (6) investiga tes changes to the  in te rna tiona l 
tran sm issio n  m echan ism  in response  to foreign d is tu rb a n c e s  for the  U.K. The em pirical 
analysis  con ta ined  in th is  th esis  is prim arily  focused on four SO Es -  A ustralia , C anada, 
New Z ealand an d  th e  U nited Kingdom. A lthough, the  policy conclusions an d  m ethodologies 
developed here  can  be easily related  or applied to o th er SOE stud ies.
7.1  Main resu lts  and p o licy  im p lica tio n s
C h ap ter (3) develops an  em pirical m odel to investigate th e  degree of inefficiencies arising  
from discre tionary  policy relative to the  com m itm ent equilibrium . The d iscussion  focused 
on analyzing the  policy tradeoffs faced by the cen tra l b a n k  w ith in  a SOE, and  how th a t
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differs from a closed economy.
Two key results emerge from the analysis. First, the estim ated size of the stabilization 
bias for a SOE is found to be nearly twice as large relative to th a t usually found in the closed 
economy counterpart. The result is robust across different loss function param eterizations 
and model param eters. As the economy becomes more open, the cost of discretionary 
policy relative to commitment equilibrium is higher. Second, the size of the stabilization 
bias increases with the policymaker's preference for stabilizing exchange rate fluctuations. 
This implies th a t a stronger attitude towards pre-com m itm ent of policy will help minimize 
the inefficiency arising from the stabilization bias when the exchange rate is included as 
one of the stabilization objectives.
Chapter (4) estim ates the macroeconomic policy objectives of the central banks of Aus­
tralia, C anada and New Zealand within the context of a DSGE model. The param eter 
estim ates reveal the objectives of these small open economy inflation targeters. The resu lts 
emphasize the similarities ra ther than  the differences in the macroeconomic objectives of 
the central banks of Australia, C anada and New Zealand.
Over the period considered, all three central banks show no concern for mitigating ex­
change rate volatility as an objective in its own right. However, all three central banks show 
a substantial concern for interest rate smoothing. The Reserve Bank of Australia shows 
the m ost desire to mitigate volatility in the ou tpu t gap bu t in all three cases the estim ated 
weight on the ou tput gap is substantially  lower than  the weight on the deviation of annual 
inflation from target. Nevertheless, all central banks would be sensibly classified as flexible 
in their approach to inflation targeting. Another interesting outcome is th a t the resulting 
optimal policy rule still responds to exchange ra te movements, even in the case where the 
central banks do not explicitly care about exchange rate stabilization.
The analysis has im portant implications for assessing the accountability and tra n s ­
parency of m onetary policy. By jointly estim ating the param eter estim ates conditional on 
the sam e DSGE model, one can make inferences about objectives conditional on the en ­
vironm ent each central bank  operates under. Such jo int estim ates result in very different 
conclusions relative to uninformed inference based on the unconditional distributions of 
target variables such as annual inflation, the ou tpu t gap, in terest rates and the exchange 
rate.
Chapter (5) uses a small open economy VAR model to investigate the sources of business 
cycle fluctuations for the A ustralian economy. The VAR is identified using robust sign
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restrictions derived from an estim ated small structu ra l (DSGE) model ra ther than  imposing 
zero-type restrictions. The results suggest th a t international factors account for over half 
the domestic ou tput fluctuations while dem and type shocks play a small role.
Chapter (6) studies the international transm ission of s tructu ra l shocks in an open 
economy FAVAR model applied to the U.K. Unlike previous contributions, the analysis uses 
data on 17 countries and 560 variables, covering prices, activity and m onetary indicators, 
to model the interaction between the foreign and domestic blocks of the VAR. In addition, 
the relationships embodied in the model are allowed to change over time by incorporating 
time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility within the FAVAR framework.
The results indicate a foreign monetary policy easing has substantially  different effects 
on the U.K. in the period after 1990. In particular, the response of the domestic economy 
in the period before 1990 resembles a classic beggar-thy-neighbor scenario, with increases 
in foreign money supply resulting in a fall in U.K. real activity. In contrast, the po st-1990 
period is characterized with a positive b u t insignificant response of U.K. real activity to this 
shock. The estim ates attribute this to a fall in exchange rate pass-through to relative prices. 
A foreign aggregate dem and shock had a large positive im pact on U.K. GDP during the years 
1980-1990. Its im pact over the more recent period has been substantially  smaller. Foreign 
supply shocks were im portant for U.K. inflation during the 1970s. The persistence of the 
inflation response has been sm aller since the early 1980s.
The conclusions drawn from C hapters (5) and (6) carry im portant implications for a 
small open economy central bank’s stabilization policy. In addition to the usual domestic 
dem and and supply shocks, policy m akers should pay greater attention to disturbances 
originating from the rest of the world. In particular, the analysis has identified changes to 
the international transm ission m echanism  and this h as  im portant implications in term s of 
our understanding of the effects of foreign disturbances on the domestic economy.
7 .2  Future research  d irection s
The above findings and conclusions rest on quite a few im portant modeling assum ptions. 
One common them e stressed throughout the thesis is the assum ption with respect to trend 
and cycle decomposition. Even though the thesis takes a fairly agnostic view on which is the 
appropriate method and tests key conclusions against various different detrending m eth­
ods, it is necessary for future research to shed more light on this contentious issue. One
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fruitful direction is to try and  model the trend  w ith in  th e  s tru c tu ra l m odel’s a ssu m p tio n s  
and  estim ate  it w ith o ther p aram eters  of the model.
A nother potential a rea  of research  is to a d d re ss  the  problem  related  to u sing  m is- 
specified m odels for policy analysis. A fam ous quote by Box an d  D raper (1987) s ta te  th a t
. all m odels are wrong; the practical question is how  wrong do they  have to be to not be 
usefu l" , is very relevant to econom ic m odeling. For exam ple, th e  conclusions draw n in 
C hap te r (3) re s t on the assu m p tio n  of U ncovered In te rest Parity  (UIP), desp ite  the ongoing 
debate  on w hether UIP holds. It is im portan t to a s se s s  the  im plication of u sing  alternative  
assu m p tio n s  on the m odel’s predictions. Del Negro an d  Schorfheide (2005) have proposed 
u sing  the  DSGE-VAR m ethodology to a sse ss  th e  degree of po ten tia l m is-specification u n ­
derlying the s tru c tu ra l model. A nother app ro ach  is to u se  B ayesian m odel averaging (using 
m any m is-specified models) and  ro b u st policy to evaluate  th e  ro b u s tn e ss  of the  policy con­
clusions.
The analysis in C hap te r (6) revealed th a t it w as difficult for the  u su a l exchange ra te  and  
relative price m ovem ents (trade linkages) to acco u n t for the large im pact of foreign dem and 
and  supply  shocks on the  dom estic economy. T his suggest th ere  m aybe o ther ch an n e ls  
beyond the u su a l trad e  linkages in the tran sm issio n  of in te rn a tio n a l shocks. More work 
should  be done in th ink ing  abo u t financial linkages and  “confidence effects” in m odeling 
the  in te rn a tio n a l tran sm iss io n  m echanism . The recen t dislocation  in financial m ark e ts  and  
synchronized response  of econom ic activities a ro u n d  the  world fu rth e r em phasize th is  view.
Finally, C h ap te r (5) used  sign restric tions from  a DSGE m odel to help identify s tru c ­
tu ra l shocks in a  VAR. F u rth e r  work is needed to bring  the  two s tra n d s  of m acro-m odeling 
m ethodologies, s tru c tu ra l DSGE m odels and  s ta tis tica l VAR b ased  m odels, closer together. 
F u tu re  research  could therefore be d irected tow ards u sing  q u an tita tive  restric tions implied 
by a DSGE m odel for sta tis tica l VAR identification.
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